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Introduction 
In a time of drastic change it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned 
usually find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists.  
Eric Hoffer 
 
The problem of development has been at the forefront of international policymaking in recent 
years. The question of how can developing countries leave their impoverished state and become 
developed is one of the most important issues in the international agenda. The solutions to this 
problem are as varied as the number of commentators and international organisations that have 
attempted to deal with it.   
One of the most important questions with regards to development is that of technology. The 
technological deficiency in a society can affect almost every aspect of a country’s well being: 
from education to health; from economic competitiveness in a global economy to local 
governance; from media access to communications technology. It could be theorised that a 
society with technological advantages will have easier and cheaper ways to attempt to address 
many of the causes of poverty and underdevelopment.  
But technology does not come free. In developed nations, technology is owned by means of 
intellectual property – knowledge comes at a price. This situation creates an obvious vicious 
circle for developing societies: they need technology to compete and become developed, but 
they lack the economic resources to buy and/or research that technology, therefore remaining 
poor. It could be argued that a restrictive regime of international intellectual property protection 
may stifle the trade of technology between developed and developing countries. 
The present work will examine the technology trade, the cycle of poverty and address some of 
the issues that are at the heart of the technological gap. To do this, the study will analyse exactly 
what we understand as technology, and whether or not it is really necessary for development. 
The definition of technology thus developed will form the basis of the subsequent examination 
of the existing mechanisms of the ownership of technology, a process that will take the shape of 
the deconstruction of the justifications for the existence of intellectual property protection. This 
process will be illustrated by three cases from the developing world involving problems in the 
acquisition of technology in the area of information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
Towards developing solutions to this problem of access, the work will look for different models 
that may ease the transfer of proprietary technology to developing countries, in particular by the 
use of the open source model.  
  
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the quantity and quality of studies dedicated to the 
subject of the economics of research and development for science and technology, with 
particular interest paid to the economic study of the impact of intellectual property rights in the 
fostering of innovation.  Intellectual property has generally been considered as one of the most 
important drivers of new innovation in science and technology because it allows researchers, 
institutions and inventors to recover their investment in the shape of limited monopolies to their 
ideas.  However, some authors have raised concerns that enhanced intellectual property 
protection may actually have adverse effects in the development of future research.  Basic 
research had usually not been considered to be subject to protection, and up until recently it was 
generally offered to the public in the shape of peer-reviewed journals. However, there is a 
growing trend towards excessive commercialisation and protection of scientific data, usually 
considered outside the realm of protection, as illustrated in the case of the growing protection of 
the human genome.   
Because access to scientific data has become a requisite of modern research and development 
(R&D), there is growing concern that the trend towards commercialisation will translate into 
less available public academic research, which would therefore reduce the overall scientific 
output. These worries have prompted several studies and reports that attempt to address the 
problem of the dissemination of academic scientific research.  The area of biotechnology has 
been deemed to be of particular concern because of its significant economic potential; therefore 
it has been subjected in recent years to a patenting rush of unprecedented proportions.  This 
phenomenon has prompted the release of genetic information into the public domain, which has 
also prompted fears of the misuse of the publicly available data by unscrupulous users, who will 
use this information to close and commodify research through excessively general patents.  
These problems have motivated some to call for the devising and utilisation of new ways of 
protecting basic scientific research from potentially damaging commodification of knowledge.  
One proposed solution is to use the novel intellectual property licensing model that has been 
successful in software development, generally known as open source software. This system uses 
intellectual property protection to ensure the wider dissemination of software, by maintaining 
the copyright protection over a work, and then distributing it using a licence that allows further 
copying and redistribution of the work, ensuring that the wider community will have access to 
the software's source code and allow its modification and dissemination. There are several open 
source and free software licensing models, but the common denominator in most of them is to 
allow access to the source code and to allow users to disseminate the code without restrictions.   
  
In particular, it is regarding access to scientific research and innovation that the possibility of 
translating some of these open source models to the scientific research arena comes into play.  
The initial application of the open source model has been in the adoption of a scientific 
publishing model often referred to as open access (OA). The OA movement can be best 
exemplified by the publication of scientific outputs and other materials online.  These results are 
offered online without subscription charges, allowing the wider scientific community access to 
high-quality content with the click of a button. However, open access is not enough to ensure 
access to scientific works because OA generally covers only those materials that are subject to 
copyright protection, such as journal articles. If scientists want to distribute their works using 
the open source model, then there would need to be some sort of licence that allows the 
distribution of patented works, or works contained in scientific databases.  
The solution would appear to be a simple matter of translating existing licences to protect 
patented research, but this has proven to be much harder than previously expected.  It is very 
interesting that while there are new open access and open source licences created every day, an 
open science licence that protects research through patents and database rights has been slow in 
the making, despite the obvious enthusiasm from commentators, and extensive political will to 
generate such a licence.    
There are many reasons for the difficulties encountered. Some have pointed out that the open 
source model does not work best with patented works, because the model appears to be in 
conflict with the public interest justifications for patents, which imply that inventors are 
expected to recoup the investment they have incurred. It has also been remarked that the open 
source model works best with copyright works because they protect creations that are 
immediately awarded protection, while patented research requires a specific application to the 
research, making its dissemination through open licences a more difficult endeavour.  
 
  
Chapter 1. Technology and development 
“It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our 
humanity.” 
Albert Einstein 
 
Technological advance is omnipresent in modern Western society. In the last forty thousand 
years in which homo sapiens has ruled the planet – a geological and evolutionary blink of an 
eye – our species has tamed fire, developed agriculture, learnt how to work metal, discovered 
gunpowder, developed antibiotics, travelled to the Moon and split the atom. Even when modern 
humanity wants to get away from civilization and get closer to nature, technology is still there 
in the shape of waterproof fabrics, aluminium cooking utensils, flashlights and Swiss Army 
knives.  
But this development is not shared around the world; access to the most basic technological 
advances has not reached large sectors of the human family. In many countries people die of 
malnutrition, have no access to mass communication, electricity, clean water or medicines; the 
very basic technological advances with which the inhabitants of the developed world have 
become so accustomed as to take for granted.  
The central problem in this work is to try to describe and analyse ways in which less developed 
countries can access technology. However, the further exploration of this problem is not 
possible without first analysing whether the acquisition of technology is actually something to 
which the developing world should aspire. This is far from a settled issue, as will be shown in 
the following pages. There are many questions regarding the very assumptions about the 
technological model of development for which answers will be sought.  Is technology required 
for development? Can societies become developed without the help of technology? Should we 
strive for technological advancement?  
1. Definitions 
1.1 Defining technology 
Technology is a term that has many different definitions. Etymologically, the origin of the word 
comes from the Greek tekhnologiά, from the roots techne (art or craft) and logos (word), being 
read literally as the systematic treatment of an art or craft. The normal dictionary definition of 
the word is similar; for example, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, technology is 
  
“the scientific study of the practical or industrial arts.”1  A more detailed definition is that used 
by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which defines it as “the application of scientific knowledge to 
the practical aims of human life or, as it is sometimes phrased, to the change and manipulation 
of the human environment.”2 As a general definition then, it can be said that technology is the 
systematic development of ways of undertaking a human action. There are many sub-definitions 
of technology. For example, information technology is usually defined as a term that 
encompasses all sorts of technology that are applied to the storage and transmission of 
information, including telecommunications and computer technology.3 There are as many 
subdivisions of technology as there are fields of human endeavour. 
Ray Kurzweil notes that technology is often defined as the creation of tools to change the 
environment, but points out that this theory is insufficient to explain adequately all of the 
different aspects of technology, as even some other primates can produce tools. He prefers to 
define technology as “the application of knowledge -- recorded knowledge – to the fashioning 
of tools.”4 This definition includes art and language as technological creations.  
Theodore Kaczynski, the infamous eco-terrorist and technophobe, makes a useful 
differentiation between two types of technology. In his words:  
“We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call small-scale 
technology and organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is 
technology that can be used by small-scale communities without outside 
assistance. Organization-dependent technology is technology that depends on 
large-scale social organization.”5 
This definition is particularly useful because even the staunchest critics of technology – such as 
Kaczynski – tend to admit that small-scale technology is needed for the survival of modern 
society. Whenever technology is mentioned in this work, it will be assumed that it is 
organization-dependent technology and not small-scale, unless otherwise stated.   
It is also important to differentiate science and technology, as they are often used 
interchangeably. According to some commentators, “Science is the systematic enterprise of 
gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into 
                                                
1 “technology”,  Webster Dictionary, 1999.  
2 “technology”, Encyclopædia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=73384&tocid=0&query=technology 
3 Center of Cyber Logistics. Information Technology definition. http://ccl.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/IT/definition.html 
4 Kurzweil, R. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence, New York: Putnam Books, 1990.  
5 Kaczynski, T. The Unabomber Manifesto, 1995. http://hotwired.lycos.com/special/unabom/list.html 
  
testable laws and theories.”6 Nevertheless, both science and technology are very closely linked, 
as technology is usually considered a by-product of scientific advances. Science provides the 
theoretical structures; technology is the application of such structures. As commentator of 
science, Michael Shermer, notes:  
“Scientific progress is the cumulative growth of a system of knowledge over 
time, in which useful features are retained and nonuseful features are 
abandoned, based on the rejection or confirmation of testable knowledge. By 
this definition, science (and technology by extension) are the only cultural 
traditions that are progressive, not in any moralistic or hierarchical way but in 
an actual and definable manner."7  
The word technology, as it is used today, is relatively recent. The term was originally used in 
ancient Greece to discuss the applied and fine arts, and it first appeared in English during the 
17th century to describe the discourse of the applied arts. It was well into the 20th century that it 
started being used to describe the applied knowledge in a particular field of research.8 
For the specific purpose of this work, the most adequate definition is the one used by the draft 
of the International Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer (TOT Code), drafted by the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which states that 
technology is: 
“…the systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the 
application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to 
the transactions involving the mere sale or lease of goods." 9 
It is important to stress that according to this definition, goods themselves are not to be 
considered technology; rather, technology is the knowledge in producing and operating any 
given artefact. For example, a computer by itself is not technology; technology comprises the 
manufacturing skills, and the knowledge in operating it. A computer without such knowledge 
becomes an expensive and heavy collection of circuits. 
1.2 Defining development 
Trying to define development is not as straightforward as defining technology, mostly because 
there is a wide range of opinions about what development really means.  
                                                
6 Park, R. Voodoo Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.39.  
7 Shermer, M. Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, superstition and other confusions of our time, New York: W. 
H. Freeman and Company, 1997, p.31.  
8 "technology”, Encyclopædia Britannica, op cit.  
9 UNCTAD. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, June 20, 1985, Chapter 1.2. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/pubframe.htm  
  
The modern interest with development issues gained momentum after World War II and the 
process of dismantling the colonial powers. It has been a theory among certain academic circles 
that technological power was one of the reasons that allowed Western countries to establish 
colonial rule over less developed societies.10 After the colonial powers were split into a large 
number of smaller countries, it was noticed that these countries were poor and under-developed, 
which was explained by years of economic exploitation. These observations resulted in the 
traditional definition of development, mainly measured by the economic well-being of a nation, 
expressed by the country’s per capita income.11 By using income as the measure for 
development, two types of development stages were identified, the developed and the under-
developed world. Later, the term under-developed became obsolete and replaced with the 
much-favoured “developing countries”.12  
The developing countries are divided into two types: low-income developing countries, 
defined as those with per capita incomes below $400 US Dollars (USD); and middle-income 
developing countries, defined as those with per capita incomes between $400 USD and $4,000 
USD. Anything higher would be considered a developed country.13  
This traditional definition of development has some serious problems. For a start, there is the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate statistics from developing countries, and then there is the issue 
of translating often devalued currency into US dollars, which further hinders the analysis. An 
added problem is the existence of oil producing countries, which may have considerably high 
per-capita income, but that could be considered to be under-developed when looking at the rest 
of their economic infrastructure.14 Raw per capita income data can also have the added problem 
of not really explaining the difference in the acquiring power of money in different locations 
around the world. Ten dollars will buy more in Cuba than in New York and Paris.  
International organisations have realised that the traditional definition is not enough to try to 
determine if a country is developed or not. The World Bank for example, has made the 
following admission: 
                                                
10 For a review of some of the literature in this area, see: Bicket, D. Technological Determinism, Colonialism, and 
Postcolonialism. http://www.geneseo.edu/~bicket/panop/techdet.htm  
11 Lal, D. and Myint, H. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: a Comparative Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996, pp.348-354.  
12 Ibid.   
13 Ibid.   
14 Ibid.  
  
"[I]ndicators of wealth, which reflect the quantity of resources available to a 
society, provide no information about the allocation of those resources – for 
instance, about more or less equitable distribution of income among social 
groups, about the shares of resources used to provide free health and education 
services, and about the effects of production and consumption on people's 
environment."15  
It is entirely possible that two countries with similar per capita income levels will have 
completely different distribution schemes, making one more developed than the other.  
The modern definitions of development try to get around these problems by measuring more 
than per capita income when trying to determine whether or not a country is developed. Terms 
like sustainable development, or human development, are in vogue nowadays. The United 
Nations World Commission on Environment and Development has defined sustainable 
development as that which “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet theirs.”16 In the same philosophical approach to development, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has begun measuring development using 
more tools than the mere economic analysis, with the launch in 1990 of the Human 
Development Report (HDR). The HDR considers many more elements, such as various health 
indicators, access to water, adult illiteracy rates, poverty rates, and many economic indicators.17  
To the UNDP, human development is “the process of enlarging people's choices;”18 it is seen as 
development with a human face, recognising that economic growth alone cannot immediately 
translate into human well-being. Strangely enough, even though human development is of very 
recent use as a measurement tool, its proponents claim that it has its origins in antiquity, where 
Aristotle said that “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and 
for the sake of something else."19 Human development has then two elements: one is the 
improvement of the human capabilities by the access to health and education, and the other is 
the use of those capabilities made by any normal human being making its own choices.20  
                                                
15 World Bank. Beyond Economic Growth: Meeting the challenges of Global Development, 2000, Chapter I. 
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/global/chapter1.html  
16 UNCTAD. The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, UN General Assembly 96th General 
Plenary, resolution 42/186, 11 December 1987. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-186.htm   
17 UNDP. About the Human Development Report. http://www.undp.org/hdro/general/about.htm 
18 UNDP. Human Development Report 1990: Concept and Measurement of Human Development. 1990. 
http://www.undp.org/hdro/hdrs/1990/english/90.htm  
19 Cited by Anand, S. and Sen, A. Sustainable Human Development: Concepts and Priorities.  1994. 
http://www.undp.org/hdro/papers/ocpapers/Oc8a.htm 
20 Ibid.   
  
Perhaps the best way to compare the two definitions is to contrast the traditional ways of 
measuring development with the modern terms. A straightforward look at the per capita income 
data from the World Bank for the year 2000 shows a list of countries at the top that should not 
be surprising, with Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Bermuda, and the United States as 
the countries with higher per capita income.21 It may not come as a surprise that some of these 
countries are considered tax safe havens. On the other hand, Canada is to be found at number 
twenty-six on the list, but on the Human Development Index (HDI) for the year 2000 Canada 
came in first, although in the 2003 HDI it had dropped to 8th place. Other interesting 
discrepancies can be found. On the income chart, Chile and Costa Rica are to be found further 
down the list, in positions seventy-two and seventy-seven respectively; but on the 2003 HDI 
both countries are thought to be amongst those with high human development, at positions 
forty-two and forty-three respectively. These two countries are even ahead of the Bahamas, 
which is positioned at forty-nine in the HDI, but always ranks very high on the income lists.22    
For the purposes of the present work, there will be a merging of both modern concepts of 
development. Development, therefore, will be considered as the growth in people’s choices by 
meeting the present needs of the society without jeopardizing the needs of the future 
generations.  
1.3 Measuring development 
Even more difficult than defining development is the categorisation of countries in order to 
establish which countries are developed and which are not. This is more difficult than it appears 
because many factors could be taken into consideration to measure development, as evident 
from the various definitions explored above. Whatever definition one prefers, there has to be an 
arbitrary line drawn to establish which country can be considered a developing country and 
which country will not.  
The classic way to define underdevelopment is to use the term “developing country” to refer to 
those countries that are not properly developed in the material sense. Other terms that have been 
used interchangeably are Third World and the South. This work will favour the use of 
“developing country”.  
                                                
21 World Bank. Gross National Income Per Capita Report 2000. http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GNPPC.pdf  
22 UNDP. Human Development Index 2003. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/pdf/hdr03_indicators.pdf  
  
The easiest way to measure when a country is developing originates from the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which uses an entirely subjective self-assessment of development. The 
WTO requests countries to determine and announce whether they are developed or not, and 
then respects that self-definition, but other countries can challenge it.23  
Tempting as it may be to follow the WTO’s pragmatic approach, this way of classifying 
developing countries is not particularly useful, as it is evident that there are several different 
levels of development even within the generally loose definition of developing countries – 
China, Brazil and India are more developed than Haiti, Mozambique, and Rwanda. The need to 
differentiate between developing countries was first noticed at the first session of UNCTAD in 
1964, where a working definition to differentiate developing countries was achieved, and the 
term Least Developed Countries (LDC) was born.24  
The original definition of LDC included all countries with a GDP of $100 USD or less; share of 
manufacturing in total GDP of 10% or less; and adult literacy rate of 20% or less. The present 
definition has been tweaked to provide more accuracy and includes 49 countries, and it is still 
managed by UNCTAD. According to them, an LDC is included in the list if it fulfils the 
following criteria: 
"...low national income (per capita GDP under $900 for countries now joining 
the list), weak human assets (a composite index based on health, nutrition and 
education indicators) and high economic vulnerability (a composite index based 
on indicators of instability of agricultural production and exports, inadequate 
diversification and economic smallness). Different thresholds are used for 
addition to, and graduation from, the list of LDCs. A country qualifies for 
addition to the list if it meets inclusion thresholds on all three criteria, and if its 
population does not exceed 75 million."25 
Although this is an extremely useful definition, particularly in order to differentiate one 
developing country from another, there are many instances where it may become useful to have 
much finer distinctions. Once again, the UNDP’s Human Development Index provides an 
excellent way to differentiate between developing countries. The HDI offers three different 
types of stages for countries: high human development, medium human development, and low 
human development. This list tends to produce some surprises, as countries that are generally 
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considered developed are included as high-development countries in the HDI, such as Cuba, 
Uruguay, and the Seychelles.  
Another useful tool when categorising development is to measure developing countries against 
their opposite. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) – 
which is made up of 30 countries united by their commitment to democratic rule and market 
economy – maintains comprehensive statistical records on developed countries. Membership in 
the OECD usually indicates development, with very few exceptions (such as Turkey).  
This work will generally prefer to use the term “developing country” to refer to those countries 
that are underdeveloped, and it will generally use the WTO approach for the same pragmatic 
reasons. The work will differentiate LDCs and developing countries when necessary. The 
reason for this is because, although developing countries have very different circumstances and 
find themselves at various stages of development, part of the solutions that will be offered later 
in the work are done so regardless of whether a country is an LDC or in a medium development 
stage. It is also the author’s view that many of the most pressing issues facing developing 
countries in the area of technology are shared by all developing countries regardless of their 
stage of development.          
2. Relationship between technology and development 
2.1 Establishing a link 
The concepts enumerated just provide a description of the subject matter, but they do not say 
anything about the role of technology in development. It would appear evident through common 
sense that technology is indeed one of the main features of most developed countries; as there 
appears to be a strong correlation between technological advance and social and economic 
development.26 However, common sense could be wrong, so it is important to attempt to draw a 
link, categorically speaking, between both.    
Whichever definition of technology is used, the importance of technology to human society is 
becoming more evident as time passes. Humanity is increasingly dependent upon technology, 
and this phenomenon has prompted many historians and sociologists to propose that technology 
is one of the most important factors in shaping human history. However, the importance of 
technology to society is not the real issue, as it is almost self-evident that it is particularly 
                                                
26 For more about this link, see: Inkster, I. Science and Technology in History: An Approach to Industrial Development, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1991.  
  
important; the real question is the role of technology for society. When history is analysed in 
detail, one must ask who is shaping whom. Is society shaping technology, or is technology 
shaping society? Or to re-word this conundrum: are particular societies developed because they 
are technologically advanced, or are they technologically advanced because they are developed? 
At the heart of this question lies the concept of technological determinism, which in its most 
basic form can be explained as “...technology as a driving force of history: a technical 
innovation suddenly appears and causes important things to happen.”27 Technological 
determinism then is based upon the idea that technology shapes society and that it is 
independent in many respects of the society that gave birth to it. This is an interesting idea, 
which will become more important as the relationship between development and technology is 
explored further; but the main premise behind it appears to be rather simplistic and fails to 
explain why some societies are more suited to technological development and some are not. In 
the words of Robert Heilbroner, “A theory of technological determinism must contend with the 
fact that the very activity of invention and innovation is an attribute of some societies and not of 
others.”28  
Technological determinism in itself appears to have some serious problems when it comes to 
explaining the creation of technology and its eventual acceptance and dissemination in a culture, 
but the concept remains of considerable importance to the issue of technology and development. 
If technology were the main factor in the social mechanics that drive history, then it would be 
logical to assume that those societies with more technological advances will be the ones that are 
developed, and that those lacking technology will not, a phenomenon that would be caused by 
the shaping role of existing technologies upon a society. Thomas Hughes further explores this 
question, arguing that “A technological system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape 
or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend to be more 
shaping of society and less shaped by it.”29  
It would appear then that the truth about the role of technology in society would still necessitate 
some form of technological determinism. Technology may be initially created in certain 
societies, but as technology advances and is more widely disseminated, the society will depend 
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further on the technological advances, hence being shaped by the technology. Salomon further 
explains this point: 
"Technology is one social process among others: it is not a question of technical 
development on the one hand and social development on the other, as if these 
were two entirely different worlds or processes. Society is shaped by technical 
change which, in turn, is shaped by society. Conceived by man (…) technology 
eludes his control only in so far as he wants it to. In this sense, society is defined 
no less by those technologies that it is capable of creating than by those it 
chooses to use and develop in preference to others."30     
Perhaps a better way of explaining the relationship between technology and society is the 
concept of disruptive and sustaining technologies.31 Disruptive technologies are advances to the 
state of the art that generate an entirely new technological paradigm, opening new markets and 
relying less on existing technologies. On the other hand,   sustaining technologies build on the 
disruptive technologies and improve performance, while their impact tends to be of lesser 
importance for society as a whole. It could then be said that technological determinism rests on 
disruptive technologies, while the average occurrence is for society to use technologies and 
affect sustaining innovations.  
But technological advance is not the only determinant of development; which technologies are 
chosen to be developed by a society also play a crucial role in development. Ancient China was 
technologically advanced when compared to the European Dark Ages – an often cited example 
is that of the knowledge of gunpowder. However, this technological advance did not translate 
into steady development because this technology was used for entertainment (fireworks) and 
not as a military advantage.32  
Many philosophers seem to agree on the importance of technology for development. 
Heidegger’s understanding of technology is more metaphysical, but he still recognises that it 
plays a large role in humanity, an entity almost in and of itself, which even shapes society and 
the objects and people contained in it.33 Borgmann, another philosopher of technological 
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change, claims that humans use science and technology to dominate nature and shape it to fulfil 
their individual needs by the creation of a technological society.34   
Economists would also appear to agree that there is a link between both, but the application of 
this link is a much more debated fact in economic circles. On one hand, Ricardian economics 
assumes that countries will benefit if they specialise in the production of products for which 
they have a competitive advantage in labour costs, as this will allow them to sell these goods at 
a better price in the global market. This model was later reformed and adjusted as the Hecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model.35 According to these models, developing countries would be better-off 
attempting to specialise in some areas of production, and they could still acquire technology 
through some other means. Other economists have pointed out that these models do not reflect 
reality, and that countries will still trade between each other even if they already produce the 
goods.36 This view is strongly put forward by post-Keynesian economist Jan Kregel, who points 
out the need of developing countries to be able to produce their own technology; otherwise the 
technology gap will remain, and possibly expand. The danger of this will be the reliance on the 
trade and export of single commodities, a formula for disaster according to Kregel. He states 
that “developing countries specialization in primary commodities does seem to be accompanied 
by specialization in technology, and when these countries produce industrial goods they often 
use technologies that are less efficient than those used in developed countries.”37 
All of these considerations serve to establish a strong theoretical link between technology and 
development. But how are these considerations met in real life?   
2.2 The Evidence 
There are some very strong factual indicators that there is indeed a link between technology and 
development. To begin establishing this relationship, it would be prudent to make a comparison 
between the quality of life of different societies located in the same geographical area at 
different stages of technological development. As discussed earlier, trying to define 
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development is problematic. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this comparison, health will be 
used as a useful indicator of the general state of development in a society.  
The first example to be used is the Italic peninsula, home of the ancient Roman Empire and of 
today’s Italy, mostly because Rome was one of the wealthiest and more developed civilisations 
of antiquity. Statistics for Ancient Rome are inaccurate for many reasons,38 but at least some 
statistics are possible due to the availability of records, thanks in great part to the Roman 
obsession with record-keeping. In Ancient Rome, life expectancy was no more than twenty-five 
years of age,39 and the infant mortality rate was 319/1000 births, this means, that out of every 
thousand children, three hundred and nineteen did not survive beyond infancy.40 In 1950, the 
average life expectancy was 65 years, and in 1998 the figure had risen to a considerable 78.5 
years for both men and women.41 Life expectancy had risen still further to 79.14 years by the 
year 2001, with child mortality rates 5.84/1000 during that same year.42  
Some other statistics for developing countries present more evidence of a steady growth of life 
expectancy over the second part of the 20th century. In 1950, life expectancy in Egypt was 
roughly 42 years, while in Costa Rica the rate was 57 years. In 2001, Egypt’s life expectancy 
had risen to 61 years; while Costa Rica’s had reached developed country levels at 77.9 years.43  
There appears to be a marked correlation between economic development and health statistics, 
such as life expectancy. Most of the countries with high per capita income have high life 
expectancy rates, but there are exceptions. The United States for example is usually amongst the 
top five countries in economic indicators, but it has one of the worse health records of all the 
developed countries, coming 24th in the life expectancy charts for the year 2000.44 Saudi Arabia 
also shows very high economic indicators, but has a life expectancy of 64.5 years. On the other 
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hand, countries with low per capita income such as Cuba and China have high life expectancy 
rates.45 Some social factors seem to be at work here, and it is possible that access to public 
health systems may play a big role in health indicators. However, it would be disingenuous to 
ignore the significant role played by advances in technology in improving health statistics. 
Immunisation seems to be the main cause of the decrease in infant mortality rates experienced 
around the world during the last century. Better medical treatment and improvement in medical 
technology would also have to be considered as strong causes for better health rates. Further 
support for the role of technology in improving health statistics comes from a report for the 
World Bank. This Report identified technological advance as the most important determining 
factor in technical progress, accounting for mortality reductions of 40 to 50% improvement 
between 1960 and 1990, making technology a more important source of gain than higher 
incomes.46 
Another strong indicator that the advancement in technology plays an important role in 
development is that of education. Enrolment in higher education can be used as a measure in 
this instance, based on the strong link between education, research, and development, 
suggesting that countries investing in education will realise technological advances more 
effectively. The HDI measures the combined enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels of education. In the statistics for 2001, the countries at the top closely match those at the 
top of the general HDI, with Australia, Belgium, the UK, Finland and Sweden as the top five in 
this important indicator. Of the top 25 countries on the general HDI, only Hong Kong and 
Cyprus show disappointing enrolment levels, comparable to countries in the middle of the 
league.47  
The HDI also has a section that is more important to the issue of measuring technology. This is 
a percentage of higher education students enrolled in the natural sciences, engineering, 
mathematics and computer sciences, and other technology related subjects. These include: 
architecture, urban planning, transport, and communications; trade and industrial programmes; 
and agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The results are more surprising in this category, with 
countries like China, Algeria, Russia, Mozambique, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria showing some of 
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the highest percentages of enrolment in the sciences, but being characteristically lower on the 
general HDI rankings.48 This could readily be explained by a lack of curriculum and finance in 
other areas, such as social sciences and the arts. This hypothesis is supported by an analysis of 
the expenditure in higher education in relationship to the general spending in all education 
levels. Unsurprisingly, the highest level of expenditure in tertiary levels in general comes from 
developed countries, such as Canada, the UK, and the United States. The countries which spend 
more in science generally allocate a lesser percentage of their education budget to other areas, 
such as the social sciences and the arts.49 It would be fair to assume then that countries that 
cannot afford to spend too much of their resources on tertiary levels of education, are investing 
most of those resources in science. It would be interesting to see if in the future these countries 
start to experience positive results from these efforts.  
It has been shown that there may be a strong correlation between technological advance and 
development. However, there is an axiom in scientific thought that says that correlation is not 
causation, and more convincing evidence is required. The best proof of a direct link between 
technological advance and development comes from the recently created Technology 
Achievement Index (TAI), which plays an important role in the 2001 HDR. This index ranks 
countries according to the creation and use of technology. The top country in this indicator is 
Finland – just ahead of the United States – mostly because large percentage of its population is 
connected to the internet.50 It should be no surprise that of the top ten countries in the general 
HDI, seven are present in the top ten countries in the TAI, and all are within the top fifteen. 
Other countries in the top ten are Korea, the UK, and Singapore. Developing Latin American 
countries are surprisingly very well located, with Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica 
showing up favourably in the list. This elevation could be attributed to the high education 
enrolment figures, thus marking these countries as possible future leaders of technological 
advance according to this model.51    
3. The technology gap 
The connection between technological advance and development seems to be strong. One of the 
results of this relationship is an evident distinction between less developed countries and the 
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developed world in regards to technology. Richer countries have better technology, while the 
poorer ones are behind in technological terms. This is the technology gap; the difference in 
access to technology from the less developed countries to the more developed ones. This 
technology gap can be measured by assigning a certain “level of technology” to countries, 
which is the sum of the existing applicable technology and technology that is theoretically 
feasible, but has not been applied yet for economic reasons.52 This formula for determining the 
level of technology is now applied in the UNDP’s TAI. A cursory look at the leaders in the TAI 
indicates a stark separation between rich and poor countries. The leader of the table in 2001, 
Finland, had a technology index of 0.744. In contrast, Mozambique, the last of the countries 
shown by the TAI, has a rating of 0.066.53   
However, these numbers do not indicate the serious consequences that the technology gap has 
in society. History provides the first warning to this effect. All major technological advances 
made by a society have meant a competitive advantage against its rivals. From the advantages 
of irrigation, bronze, and iron in the Ancient world, to the development of armour and castles in 
medieval Europe, some societies have always held the technological upper hand. This 
culminated in the conquest of the Americas by European powers. Experts still place a large 
emphasis on the European possession of advances such as the wheel, gunpowder, and maritime 
navigation at this historical juncture, and the ease with which great civilizations such as the 
Aztecs or the Incas fell to the Spaniards.54 
The industrial and technological advantage during the 19th century also accounts for the massive 
colonial land grab by the European nations. These technological advances took the shape of 
steam power, guns, communications, and even quinine. Talking in particular about guns, 
Headrick states:  
“European forces were able to conquer large parts of Asia and Africa – empires 
of truly Napoleonic proportions – at an astonishingly low cost. What made this 
possible was the crushing superiority of European firepower that resulted from 
the firearms revolution of the mid-century.”55  
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The historical land grab has been translated into a modern world is filled with inequalities, both 
economic and technological. The many economic indicators studied in the last section easily 
correlate with economic inequalities. Other statistics would seem more worrying. For example, 
the combined sales of the world’s richest two hundred corporations are higher than the 
combined gross domestic product of all but ten countries of the world. The combined assets of 
the three richest men in the United States exceed the combined assets of all of the population of 
the sixty poorest countries in the world.56      
These economic inequalities are translated into the technological field even in the most basic 
advances. A report by the World Bank calculates that two billion people in the world have never 
had any access to electricity, and that at present 50% of the world’s population has no electricity 
at all.57 Access to telephony is worse; according to a BBC study, 80% of people have never had 
access to any telephone. In Africa, out of a population of 740 million, there are only 14 million 
phone lines, and 80 percent of those are located in only six countries of the area.58    
Access to even the basic health technology is almost as bad. In the poorest countries in the 
world about 20% of the population on average has access to sanitation.59 A recent report notes 
that 99% of infant deaths in the world take place in poor countries, 70% of those dying of 
infectious diseases for which there are vaccines.60 Access to medicines is equally deplorable, 
mostly because of pricing. Of the total sales of pharmaceuticals worldwide, 61.6 percent are 
purchased between Europe and North America. Africa purchases only 1.3 percent, the Indian 
subcontinent 1.8 and China and South East Asia only 5 percent.61   
Research and development of medicines directed towards the less developed countries is also 
abysmal. Research into tropical infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, sleeping 
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sickness, and leishmaniasis is almost non-existent; one study comments “Between 1975 and 
1997 out of 1,223 new drugs developed only 13 (1%) were to treat tropical diseases.”62  
Even access to agricultural technology is limited. The average of fertiliser consumption in the 
last ten countries of the HDI is of 5.76 kilograms per hectare of arable land, while the average 
for the top ten countries is of 492.3 kg per hectare.63 In Norway, there are 163 tractors per 
hectare of arable land; in the UK there are 79. In countries like Cambodia, Cameroon, Haiti and 
Ethiopia the figure does not even reach one tractor.64   
It is almost needless to say that the gaps in research and development expenses also act as 
indicators of the technology gap, as poor countries will not have the opportunity to acquire 
technology by themselves and develop the tools to redress this imbalance. In 1993, 84 percent 
of the world’s spending in R&D was concentrated in only ten of the richest countries of the 
world.65 The percentage of spending in research and development in the last 10 countries in the 
HDI for which there are statistics, averages 0.37 percent of the total GNP, while in the top 10 
the average is of 2.34 percent of the total GNP.66  
The migration of scientists and other professionals from less developed countries to the 
developed world, colloquially referred to as the “brain drain,” is another big problem that only 
enhances the technology divide. The main problem is that many of these professionals are 
educated initially in their countries and later migrate, which means that the countries lose large 
amounts of money in education investment, which will ultimately benefit other countries. While 
this is a current problem that may complicate the development indicates proposed here, it 
should be noted that the “brain drain” is not always detrimental or without collateral benefit. 
The reason for this is that many of the experts that are trained in developed countries will return 
to their nations of origin, thus advancing the level of training available to new researchers and 
scholars. Nevertheless, the UNDP calculates that in India alone, the “brain drain” has cost the 
country a total of two billion dollars a year.67 There is an actual policy in many developed 
countries to attract qualified specialists from other countries, such as teachers, nurses and 
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information technology (IT) professionals. The UK has recently implemented a policy of 
providing visas to qualified workers from overseas to work in Britain, following a similar 
scheme practiced in the United States.68  
4. Do developing countries need technology?  
It would seem that technology is now an integral part of the human experience. With 
technology we have harnessed our environment and shaped it to suit our needs. Since the 
discovery of fire, human history has made a steady progression towards the advancement of 
technology, of finding ways to do things faster, and of shaping the world to suit their needs.  
Technological change has now become overwhelming; it seems like every time one reads the 
papers there is a new technological advance advertised, more ways of making our lives easier, 
longer and better through the application of technology. It is now hard to think of a world 
without telephones, electricity, cars, television and the internet. Humans are fast becoming more 
and more dependent on technology for every aspect of their lives.  
But not everybody is happy with this scenario. Despite all the evidence that points towards a 
strong relationship between technological advance and development, there are many voices that 
disagree with the advantages brought by technology; New Age gurus, environmental advocates, 
alternative medicine practitioners, anti-globalisation protesters, religious fundamentalists, 
ideologues and academics; the number of people dissatisfied with the modern technological 
society appears to be growing every day.  
The criticisms of technology have to be taken seriously because one of the starting assumptions 
of the present work is that technology is a positive thing for society and must be pursued by any 
country that wants to become developed. Because less developed countries are less 
technologically advanced, one would expect that they would be closer to the ideal espoused by 
those who criticise technology.    
Why is technology so reviled in many sectors? After all, it provides health, electricity, 
telephones and the internet. Paraphrasing the famous line in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, apart 
from sanitation, medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, 
and public health, what has technology ever done for us? 
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Scepticism towards technology is generally referred to interchangeably as technophobia or Neo-
Luddism. Neo-Luddism is a philosophical movement that attacks certain negative aspects of 
technological advance in society and not all technology. In the words of prominent Neo-Luddite 
academic Chennis Glendinning, “What we oppose are the kinds of technologies that are, at 
root, destructive of human lives and communities.”69  
Philosophers from the Frankfurt School are generally held to be the precursors of modern 
technophobia. Marcuse, for example, offers scathing criticism of modern science and 
technology, mostly fuelled by his political ideas. Marcuse believes that instrumentalism (his 
term for science and technology) goes against nature, and he advocates a reworking of science 
and technology to create a new shift in commonly held views.70 It is his ambition to create new 
concepts so that technology could be a part of nature, and not work against it. Habermas attacks 
Marcuse’s idea of a new technology, although he does not like the present system of 
technological advance. For him, technology is simply a means of communicating social power 
and control.71 Even Heidegger considers that the individuals serve as mere raw material for 
technology.72    
Famous architect and intellectual Lewis Mumford, sees in technology an anathema to humanity. 
He often laments the development of machinery as detrimental to the human spirit: “The 
machine itself makes no demands and holds out no promises: it is the human spirit that makes 
demands and keeps promises.”73 Mumford explains that “One of the by-products of the 
development of mechanical devices and mechanical standards, has been the nullification of 
skill.”74 This is a common complaint from philosophers and intellectuals opposed to 
technological advance. The machine is seen as the opposite of humanity; something in the 
artificiality makes it an anathema of everything human. For these critics, the quality of being 
human transcends tool-making as the defining feature of humanity – self-consciousness is the 
defining characteristic.      
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Besides these criticisms, it would appear that technophobia assumes that technology in itself is 
not negative, but that it can be misused. This is the concept of technology neutrality. Proponents 
of technology as a valuable tool tend to assume that technology in itself is neutral, and that its 
use or misuse is independent of its development. Philosopher Karl Jaspers has noted that 
“[Technology] is only a means, in itself neither good nor evil. Everything depends upon what 
man makes of it, for what purpose it serves him, under what conditions he places it.”75 On the 
other hand, most technophobes and Neo-Luddites start from the assumption that technology is 
not neutral. As put forward by the Technorealists, a group of technology critics: 
“A great misconception of our time is the idea that technologies are completely 
free of bias -- that because they are inanimate artifacts, they don't promote 
certain kinds of behaviors over others. In truth, technologies come loaded with 
both intended and unintended social, political, and economic leanings.”76  
This view of technology as being not neutral seems to be shared by many other technophobes.77 
As difficult as it is to establish certainty in these types of debates, it would appear that the view 
that technology is neutral is closer to reality. Technology is certainly prone to being subjected to 
“evil” uses: purposefully, by omission, through short-sightedness, or through sheer human 
stupidity. Indeed, many of the criticisms of technological advances are warranted. 
Technological creations are responsible for many controversies of our time, from environmental 
pollution to the creation of devastating weapons. Ecological problems caused by technology 
cannot be underestimated, and they threaten to increase in the future in the shape of long 
foretold ecological disasters such as global warming or the depletion of the ozone layer. 
Unscrupulous governments and corporations have indeed misused technological advances, and 
technology indeed facilitates increasingly efficient ways of waging war.  
Nevertheless, technology can also help reduce those environmental concerns. Cheap energy and 
clean transportation could be just some of the technological advances that could help humans 
develop a cleaner and better future. The decoding of the human genome is heralded as opening 
the door to the largest medical revolution ever witnessed. Yet technophobia is still a very strong 
cultural and political presence in modern society, particularly in Western developed countries. 
This is epitomised by the almost dogmatic denial of the potential benefits of biotechnological 
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advances that can be found in large sectors of the environmental lobby. This denial goes as far 
as the potentially beneficial technologies to the developing world on the basis that this 
technology is damaging in one way or another. This is often done without asking for the opinion 
of the people in those countries to ascertain whether there is any desire to acquire the 
technology in the first place. But sadly the opposite is also true; technology is often pushed 
upon poor nations even if it has been banned in developed countries. It has been reported that as 
many as 25 million workers in poor nations may suffer health problems from pesticides 
originating from developed nations. 78  
There is a need to reach a middle ground. Developing countries should be empowered into 
making their own decisions about what technology they want to acquire, something which is 
sadly missing at the moment. The endless number of doomsday scenarios coming from some 
sectors of the developed world must be weighed against the actual need of developing nations. 
It seems that some technophobic groups find it easy to pontificate against technology while 
having access to electricity, clean water, and modern medicine. It seems easy to criticise 
technology and merely inform the developing nations of their perceived needs. Some of the 
critics of technology may very well be justified in making assumptions about the needs of the 
rest of the world and many environmental preoccupations are certainly worthy of consideration, 
but to try to assume that all technological advances are not desired seems culturally and 
politically arrogant and unwarranted. In the end, it is the people of the developing world who 
should determine whether they want to have access to technology or not. Nevertheless, extreme 
technophobic dreams of a future without technology seem suspiciously like a formula for 
continuing the vicious circle of poverty. 
There cannot be any doubt then that there is need for technology in the developing world: from 
internet access to the knowledge to increase agricultural production; from health-related 
technology to communications infrastructure. Many of the development indicators that have 
been covered here would improve immensely if the people in the less developed world could 
have access to some minimum standards of technology. But not only raw technology is 
required, some capacity to understand the technology in order to establish whether or not it 
should be adopted is also necessary. The UNDP expresses this eloquently by saying that “Not 
every country needs to develop cutting-edge technologies, but every country needs domestic 
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capacity to identify technology’s potential benefits and to adapt new technology to its needs and 
constraints.”79 
If we conclude, based on the evidence presented so far, that technology and development are 
interlinked, then the answer about whether or not developing countries really need development 
should answer itself. It should be obvious that developing countries should attempt to obtain 
technology. But how is this done? 
5. Developing technology 
Assuming that developing countries require technology, and that technology translates itself 
into development, then developing countries should attempt to develop technology.  
Unfortunately, technology simply does not appear from thin air.  
How is technology developed? This is not the place to offer a detailed account of the history of 
technological development, but it may be easy to see how today’s developed nations built their 
technological dominance.  
Arguably, modern technology in developed Western nations is a direct result of the Scientific 
Revolution that took place almost 400 years ago during the Enlightenment. This revolution was 
set in motion by the writings of natural scientists and empirical philosophers of the 17th century, 
such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Isaac Newton.80 The ideas 
embraced by this period of history made technological advance possible by placing reason and 
the application of knowledge as the highest standards, and turning inquiry into the norm in 
society. Paraphrasing Francis Bacon, knowledge became power.  
The ideas set in motion by the Enlightenment went hand in hand with another revolution, the 
creation of modern payment systems and modern financial institutions, which assisted the fast 
development of commerce and international finance hubs in Amsterdam and London.81 All of 
those advances in society made possible the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, an era of 
technological advances that allowed Western nations to overcome their competitors. The 
Industrial Revolution heralded the change of low-technology to high-technology advances, as 
society moved from agrarian and handicrafts technologies towards industrial and machine-
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based technologies. 82 With machine-based technologies in place, European countries became 
economically powerful, and by all measurable standards the route towards modern development 
was well under way. The technological advances generated by the Industrial Revolution became 
more evident with the advent of the Second Industrial Revolution that took place during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, with further achievements in the chemical, petroleum, electrical, 
and steel industries that prompted the invention of many modern high-technologies, such as the 
internal combustion engine, airplanes, the telephone, and the light bulb.83 There are those who 
argue that we are in the middle of a Third Industrial Revolution,84 consisting of biotechnology 
and ICTs.  
The common denominator of these different technological stages is the fact that technological 
inventions follow a steady and incremental flow from basic low technologies to high-
technological innovations, a path that has its origin in the aforementioned Enlightenment, which 
explains why Western countries are technologically advanced in the present. It seems like an 
early start in the technology race may produce dividends later on because subsequent 
developments are made relying on existing technologies. Nevertheless, the steady advance of 
technology in the West still does not answer the vital question of how technologies are 
developed in the first place.   
The answer lies in the dichotomy between innovation and imitation as gears that move 
technological advance. Innovation is the clear-cut generation of a new technology, while 
imitation is the widespread adoption and adaptation of these technologies. With the large 
number of technological advances in the West, one would expect to see innovation taking place 
all the time, but this is actually not the case. Jared Diamond makes the argument that true 
innovators are few and far between. Archimedes, Guttenberg, James Watt, Thomas Alba Edison 
and the Wright brothers are the exception to the rule; they are just some of the very few true 
original inventors. After them, there are large numbers of anonymous and less celebrated 
copiers and imitators, who take the work of a true innovator and improve on their innovations in 
incremental advances.85 For Diamond, what makes a society more likely to develop and become 
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technologically sophisticated is the openness to embrace the discoveries of those few 
innovators. He says: 
“Necessity is the mother of invention. That is, inventions supposedly arise when 
society has an unfulfilled need: some technology is widely recognized to be 
unsatisfactory or limiting. Would-be inventors, motivated by the prospect of 
money or fame, perceive the need and try to meet it. Some inventor finally comes 
up with a solution superior to the existing, unsatisfactory technology. Society 
adopts the solution if it is compatible with the society’s values and other 
technologies.”86 
This means that societies that are more open to the widespread imitation of an originally 
innovative technology obtain an advantage and are rewarded with more development – 
imitation drives technology. 
This idea can be easily corroborated throughout history; an example can be seen in the now 
famous solving of the longitude problem, performed by a humble self-taught clockmaker from 
Yorkshire called John Harrison between 1736 and 1775. The longitude problem had baffled 
some of the best minds of the period, as there needed to be a way to measure longitude 
accurately. This was something which was not possible at the time, creating all sorts of 
problems to the naval powers, and in particular Britain. Harrison built five different clocks that 
could be carried to the sea to provide accurate measurements of the time at Greenwich, thus 
enabling calculation of the distance travelled.87 The story of Harrison’s perseverance and sheer 
inventive genius is by itself a great illustration of the innovative process. What is more 
important to the present work, is that his clocks, (in particular the most successful one, his last 
watch named H-5) were immediately subjected to a process of reverse engineering by other 
artisans and watchmakers. One of these watches, built by another watchmaker named Larcum 
Kendall, made a famous trip with Captain Cook in 1772-1775. The original problem was that 
the watches were too expensive and could not be given to all of the ships making part of the 
vast British Navy. Several other watchmakers took the challenge and were able to mass-produce 
variations of Harrison’s watch for affordable prices.        
Philosophers and historians of science fully recognise that scientific advances and technological 
changes are not only incremental, but rely on the work of few innovators to drive them forward. 
Thomas Kuhn is perhaps the best known proponent of the idea of development by leaps, or 
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what he calls paradigm shifts.88 This view indicates that there are numerous and considerable 
changes and adaptations of scientific thought within a paradigm, and that these later accumulate 
until a new system is created.89 The same would apply to technology, because it is the practical 
application of scientific knowledge. 
The fact that a few innovations are needed to kick-start development holds the key to 
understanding the reason why the West is industrialised to the extent it is today and why 
developing countries are finding it more difficult to generate their own technology. The initial 
technological innovations that prompted the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century gave those 
few countries that adopted these developments the proper environment to generate further 
innovations. Once the Industrial Revolution produced some key innovations, the only thing that 
was needed was to improve those innovations to make them more efficient. For example, the 
steam engine was a great innovation, but the initial engines were too expensive to operate 
because they were not efficient enough.90 During the years following the invention, developers 
did not create new engines; rather, they concentrated in increasing the efficiency of the existing 
ones. Therefore, the amount of coal required to operate a steam engine dropped from 30 pounds 
of coal per horsepower hour in 1769, to 2.5 in 1850.91  
This also helps to explain partially why Europe beat other cultures in the technological race 
during the 17th and 18th century. Arguably, Chinese, and Arab cultures had attained considerable 
technological advances by that time. However, they did not make that important leap from low-
technology to high-technology. This has been explained by different means, but it seems like 
there was something missing in Chinese society that stopped them from developing the type of 
useful technology that helped Western nations in their development. Leibniz expressed some of 
these differences as early as the 17th Century, when he made the following remarks about 
Chinese culture:  
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“In profundity of knowledge and in the theoretical disciplines we are their 
superiors. For besides logic and metaphysics, and the knowledge of things 
incorporeal, which we justly claim as peculiarly our province, we excel by far in 
the understanding of concepts which are abstracted by the mind from the 
material.”92 
Similarly, China may have been the victim of its own success at low technologies. This theory 
is called the high level equilibrium trap, and it states that Chinese society was too efficient in 
non-mechanised low-technologies such as agriculture and manufacture, so a transition to 
mechanisation was unprofitable.93 Other theories point towards the availability of some raw 
resources like coal in Europe that were not so readily available in China.94    
Whatever the cause for the initial high technology leap in Europe, the advantage of being the 
first innovator, the first mover, cannot be underestimated. After all: “The adoption of new 
technologies is notoriously slow. The initial incarnations of new ideas are often expensive and 
bug-infested.”95 Developing nations have had to contend with this fact, always trying to catch 
up with high technologies that were generated in the West, commencing with the Industrial 
Revolution, with each of the new technological paradigms widening the gap.  
The capability to create new technologies in modern times becomes an expensive exercise 
because the cumulative nature of technology means that the more advanced the technology, the 
more expenditure in research and development is required to develop it, and the more expensive 
it becomes to maintain the dominance.96    
History shows that a society needs to go through several steps of the development of high-
technologies to achieve the levels of development seen in European nations. Although Japan 
and the United States were latecomers to the European Industrial Revolution, both made early 
efforts to adopt some of the preliminary high-technologies as early as the 19th century. The 
United States had entered its own Industrial Revolution by the 1840s,97 while Japan’s effort to 
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become industrialised date from as early as the 1860’s.98 By the Second World War, both 
countries had technology levels that rivalled those of Europe, and often overcame them.  
More recently, South Korea is a society that has become technologically developed in a 
relatively short time. However, even here some early head start has shown to pay dividends 
later on. “The introduction of Western culture and technology to Korea began around 1880. 
Until 1910, the introduction of modern technology was dominated by Japan and the Western 
powers.”99 Although the country was devastated by the Korean War, there was considerable 
input of American know-how operating on the existing infrastructure introduced by the 
Japanese. After that, South Korea conducted an imitation policy based on the acquisition of 
imported technologies and some government investment in research and development.  
It is important to point out that the early head start in technological advances does not 
necessarily translate into development. An example of this is Argentina. At the beginning of the 
20th century, this country was one of the most developed in the world, ranking thirteenth 
amongst the richest nations of the world. Buenos Aires had one of the highest densities of 
telephones per capita by 1913, and by 1929 it was fifth in the number of automobiles per capita. 
By 1987 all of these figures had fallen considerably, and the country is now immersed in a 
tremendous economic crisis. 100  
Regardless of this, there cannot be any doubt that the initial step of acquiring technology is the 
most important one. How is this done? The critical means and strategies by which developing 
nations, and in particular LDCs, can acquire technology will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
                                                
98 Chamarik, S and Goonatilake, S. Technological independence: The Asian experience, New York: United Nations University 
Press, 1994, Chapter 6.  
99 Ibid, Chapter 3.  
100 DeLong, J. B. Slouching Towards Utopia?: The Economic History of the Twentieth Century, 1991. 
http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/Slouch_divergence5.html 
  
Chapter 2. International Technology Transfer 
“If man realises technology is within reach, he achieves it, it's damn near 
instinctive.” 
Ghost in the Shell 
  
The last chapter presented evidence that developing countries need technology to become 
developed, but because high technologies were fist implemented in Western nations, they must 
first acquire technology in order to become independent and generate their own innovations. 
This chapter will deal with the concept of the modern international system of technology 
transfer.   
Literature covering technology transfer problems has been growing in number in recent years101 
after a period of silence caused mostly by the fact that the main efforts to establish an 
international technology transfer code failed in the later part of the 1980s, as will be described 
in this chapter. Despite some exceptions dealing with the specific issues of licensing of 
technology and some changes to European competition legislation, the international system of 
technology transfer to developing countries has been inadequate, and has not progressed in 
recent years. This chapter attempts to redress this trend by bringing the issue of international 
technology transfer to the forefront of the debate, and it will try to address some of the questions 
raised, by proposing technology transfer as one of the most viable solutions that the developing 
world could adopt towards its development.    
1. Introduction to Technology Transfer 
1.1 Definition 
The last chapter concentrated on the concept of innovative technology, and it also emphasised 
the fact that innovation is difficult, and that technological advance often relies on imitation, 
adoption, dissemination and improvement of existing technologies. Chamarik and Goonatilake 
identify five distinct stages that a society has to take in order to generate its own innovations. 
They are:  
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“1. Acquisition of proper skill and know-how. 
2. Maintenance. 
3. Repair (including minor improvement). 
4. Design. 
5. Beginning of domestic production.”102 
The initial stage is then one of the most important processes for a country looking for means to 
generate technology. There are several mechanisms that can assist developing countries to 
acquire technology from industrialised nations. These mechanisms come within the concept of 
technology transfer, which can be broadly defined as “the process by which commercial 
technology is disseminated”.103 It is important to point out that commercial technology in this 
context refers to “proprietary” technology, meaning technology that can be owned. Examples of 
proprietary technology are Intel’s Pentium chip, pharmaceuticals, computer software, 
machinery, etc. Non-proprietary technology is that which is widely available to the public by 
being in the public domain or by being licensed through non-proprietary means, something that 
will be dealt with in more detail later on. Examples of this type of technology can be seen in 
scientific journals, books in the public domain, open source software, and even cloning 
technology – technology that was published in several journals and has been replicated by many 
laboratories around the world.  
In the global economy, proprietary technologies are subject to being owned by a intellectual 
property. In the strictest sense, intellectual property deals with the protection of intellectual 
creations. As described by Bainbridge, intellectual property is: 
“…that area of the law which concerns legal rights associated with creative 
effort or commercial reputation and goodwill. The subject matter of intellectual 
property is very wide and includes literary and artistic works, films, computer 
programs, inventions, designs and marks used by traders for their goods or 
services.”104  
The way in which this protection is made available is by providing a limited right of ownership 
over intellectual creations, and by the existence of legal remedies in case such creation has been 
misused, copied or appropriated by somebody who is not entitled to do it by means of 
authorship or ownership of the right.105 Following chapters will deal with some of the issues for 
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developing countries of intellectual property. What the reader must keep in mind for now is the 
fact that intellectual property allows the owner to transact with its property, be it by granting 
rights to use it, or in some cases the owner can even transfer the ownership of the work entirely.    
Technology transfer is then centred on the concept of the commercial transmission of 
technology owned by intellectual property. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that technology 
can be transmitted both by commercial and non-commercial transfers of technology. 
Commercial technology transfer refers to any transaction between two undertakings, in which a 
type of economic exchange is performed between parties, but is not necessarily monetary. Non-
commercial technology transfer takes the form of any agreement where the technology owner 
provides the recipient party with technology without expecting any monetary returns, even if it 
is done expecting some other types of benefits, such as market benefits and tax breaks.106  
It is important to point out as well the difference between low-technologies and high-
technologies on the supplying and recipient sides. Conventional technology is more evenly 
distributed and used (textiles, food processing, pulp, beer production), but there are few 
suppliers of high technology (chemicals, aerospace, computer chips, and so on), and fewer 
countries that can use and absorb this technology.107 
For there to be a transfer of technology in the terms mentioned, the transfer must take the form 
of a transaction. This transaction need not necessarily be a contract, but it must involve the 
communication between the owner of the technology and the recipient. Brooks comments that, 
“Technology transfer differs from ordinary scientific information transfer in the fact that to be 
really transferred it must be embodied in an actual operation of some kind.”108 This is an 
important distinction because it means that the study of international technology transfer 
systems will not have to deal with a large number of non-proprietary systems of technology 
transfer, such as dissemination by the internet, or journal articles.  
In the international context, technology transfer has further implications given the technological 
gap that has already been described. Some authors have expressed concern at the state of things, 
therefore they convey that there is a moral responsibility from developed nations to provide 
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viable transfer of technology mechanisms from to the poorer nations, particularly LDCs.109 If 
proprietary technology is the subject of ownership by means of intellectual property rights; the 
issues of international technology transfer are closely linked to the mechanisms that exist for the 
protection of the ownership of ideas. For this reason, the international system of technology 
transfer will have to be framed within the borders set by international intellectual property 
mechanisms. Because of the operating definition of technology transfer preferred in this work; 
only legal means of acquiring technology can be covered within this framework. Other systems 
of acquiring technology, such as reverse engineering, piracy, and other imitative practices, are 
not covered by the definitions above and therefore are will not be considered when discussing 
the transfer of technology.  
Because the rewards for technology are premised upon an ownership model, it is generally in 
the best interest of the owners of intellectual creations to secure their technology through 
monopolistic rights. That is why a structured model of technology transfer is of great interest to 
them, as it can help them to transfer certain types of technologies to the developing world 
without fear that they will be illegally copied or distributed. This being the case, Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) are going to keep their hold on technology to maintain an economic 
advantage and increase their profits. Owning technology also means that MNEs will have a 
considerable bargaining advantage when negotiating technology transfers to developing 
countries.  
While talking about the definition of technology transfer, it must be pointed out that the term is 
used also to refer to something slightly different, which may lend itself to confuse readers. In 
some of the specialised literature, the term technology transfer has become synonymous with 
the transfer of knowledge generated in a university into the commercial realm, particularly 
through spin-off companies.110 The author prefers the term “knowledge transfer” when talking 
specifically about universities. Therefore, whenever technology transfer is mentioned in this 
work, it must be assumed that the wider and more inclusive definition is being used.  
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1.2 Methods of technology transfer 
Technology can be transferred in many ways. The draft International Code of Conduct for 
Technology Transfer (TOT Code), which will be seen in more detail later, lists several, such as: 
• Assignment, sale or licensing of industrial property. 
• The transfer of “know how” and technical expertise in fields such as design, plans, 
models, etc, of the technology. This usually involves technical advice and expertise. 
• The provision of technical knowledge to install and use machinery or equipment.  
• The transfer of technology through industrial co-operation agreements.111 
It is interesting to point out that technology transfer through the TOT Code agrees with the 
definition of technology transfer provided above as only dealing with transactions of proprietary 
technology; non-commercial technology transfers are not included.112 Of the methods described 
above, the most common means of transferring technology are the following: licensing 
agreements; joint ventures with a local partner; or by doing an internal transfer to a subsidiary in 
a country, also known as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).113 In more detail, these are: 
a) Licensing is a transfer of technology by means of a contract assigning intellectual property 
rights. This takes place when the owner of technology contracts with an undertaking (whether a 
private or public business) in the receiving country to allow them to make use of the technology 
without infringement. A licensing agreement may also transfer protected or unprotected know-
how, or may include in its provisions the training of specialists, transfer of procedures, and 
technical assistance.114 The granting of a licence assumes that the transmitting party owns the 
technology by means of intellectual property protection and is willing to allow the receiver to 
make use of it by any of the cited means. To be able to maintain control of the technology, the 
owner will draft and negotiate the licence and place a number of restrictions on the licensee. An 
appealing restriction takes the shape of the site licence, which restricts the licensee to be able to 
exploit the licence only within in a determined territory.115 Many other restrictions exist, 
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varying from controls in the time in which the licensee can obtain the licence to restrictions on 
the type of technology that will be transferred.  
b) Joint Ventures are slightly different from licensing agreements. A joint venture is “an 
agreement between firms to work together on a project for mutual benefit.”116 Both joint 
ventures and licence terms are non-exclusive, and they are best applied where there is an 
existing large company or the adequate infrastructure to make use of that technology. Joint 
Ventures imply the existence of a certain amount of co-operation between the owner of the 
technology and the recipient. Once an agreement to transfer technology has been reached, the 
MNE usually imposes restrictions on the terms of the technology transaction, just as with 
licensing. These restrictions may come in two types. The first are restrictions on the commercial 
policy of the recipient (for example: the MNE may ask the recipient to purchase certain types of 
materials or machinery, usually owned by itself; or the MNE may impose restrictions on the 
duration of the agreement, etc). The second are restrictions on the use of the technology. This 
may include clauses like confidentiality agreements, agreements not to contract with 
competitors of the multinational, restrictions on research and development undertaken by the 
recipient, etc. 117  
c) Foreign Direct Investment. The MNE may forego any sort of licensing or joint venture with 
undertakings within the country and may decide to operate directly with its own resources, 
usually opening a subsidiary in the recipient territory. This is an appealing way to handle 
operations for a large owner of technology, as multinationals may prefer to invest directly into a 
less developed country because there is no sufficient skilled labour to undertake a profitable use 
of the technology, and the MNE is more likely to maintain control of the technology without 
fear of the loss of profits by means of intellectual property infringement.118   
1.3 The need for technology transfer regulation 
It must be noted that in all of the methods listed above, the technology owner maintains strict 
control over the technology, be it by legal mechanisms or by direct intervention. In most of 
these restrictive practices, the imbalance of power in existing technology transfer transactions is 
shown to its full extent, as the owners have the bargaining dominance and they use it to their 
advantage. It is evident that while the technology remains firmly in the grasp of the owners, 
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developing countries have fewer possibilities to make use of that technology for their own 
interests. It could be said then that unregulated technology transfer is simply a mechanism 
available to enterprises to dominate an underdeveloped market, and that the possibility of this 
technology being applied by the country to a wider extent is minimal. This is why there is need 
for some sort of international framework that will dictate some practical procedures that may 
allow developing countries to make use of this technology in a less restrictive manner.   
A study conducted by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) during the 1970s 
highlighted some of the problems faced by developing countries when attempting to acquire 
technology by existing means.119 There were many important structural, political, and economic 
problems identified, including the problem of technology dependency by developing countries, 
the high price of acquiring technology, the lack of mechanisms to achieve fair pricing of 
technological products, the lack of legal and technical knowledge in those countries, and many 
others.120 Amongst the many situations described, perhaps the most important was the lack of a 
legal framework for technology transfer transactions. It was understood by the drafters of the 
report that such lack of a legal framework diminished the negotiating power of developing 
countries. The report goes on to conclude that: 
“If obstacles to the transfer of technology are to be removed, if fair and 
reasonable terms to its access are to be negotiated, if technology is to be utilized 
properly and is to be suitably developed, if indigenous technology is to be 
created, if commercial practices are to be adapted and if abuses are to be 
prevented –  so as to play a significant role in the accelerated development of 
developing countries –  the bargaining position of potential technology 
acquirers in developing countries when dealing with enterprises, governmental 
and private, in developed countries must be strengthened.”121  
It is unfortunate that some of the more pressing problems that were described are still present, 
an indication of the lack of viable solutions available in this area. Developing countries still face 
high prices for the technology; developing countries still find themselves in disadvantageous 
negotiating positions in technology transfer negotiations with MNEs; developing countries still 
find themselves depending on technology manufactured and owned by developed nations. 
Developing countries are faced not only with these problems a quarter of a century after this 
report was first released, but they also face new challenges. Developing countries find 
themselves subject to a much stricter regime of technology ownership; developing countries 
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find it difficult to make sure that they will be able to further implement and adapt the 
technology acquired due to restrictive licensing agreements; developing countries find a wall of 
trade secrets restrictions when attempting to unlock the knowledge acquired by their own 
citizens. 
Why has this situation reached this impasse? Where is the regulation in this area?  
2. International technology transfer 
The need of developing countries to acquire technology in cost-effective ways results in a clash 
of interests in the way in which technology transfer will be regulated at national and 
international level. Developed countries follow a model of strong ownership of technology 
which places some restrictions upon developing nations. The ownership model relies on the 
strong intellectual property mechanisms that ensure that this technology remains in the 
possession of developed countries.  
In contrast, developing countries will want to acquire technology in the cheapest possible 
manner, which is why intellectual property protection is generally weaker in poorer regions. 
Because of their need, there have been some efforts by developing countries to obtain 
international protection on subjects relating to technology transfer. The best-known effort is the 
proposed TOT Code, which is the main international effort to impose a set of self-regulation 
rules on MNEs to encourage a more equal transfer of technological innovations from rich 
nations to less developed ones.   
2.1 The TOT Code 
The history of the International Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer has been a long and 
tortuous one, and at present, the outlook for its approval is not a promising one.  
The UNCTAD was created in 1964 as an organ of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
to replace the failed International Trade Organisation. Its main purpose has been to provide a 
forum for the discussion of mechanisms to develop poor countries through trade.122  
The existence of a technology gap had already been noticed by the United Nations as early as 
the 1960’s. In 1963, the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the 
Benefit of the Less Developed Area had already addressed the issue of patents and poor nations. 
The process that led to the draft TOT Code began when a group of experts met in 1970 to 
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address issues of technology transfer. This led to the creation of several commissions, which 
culminated in their work on the III General Assembly of UNCTAD in 1972 in Chile, where the 
need to create an international code on technology transfer was discussed.123    
A first draft Code was prepared and presented in 1974, which prompted the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Group of experts on a Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology in 
1975.124 A couple of drafts were introduced by developing countries and a group of 
industrialised nations. In 1976, the IV UNCTAD General Assembly appointed yet another 
group of experts, which prepared another draft. In 1978, the United Nations Conference on an 
International Code of Conduct met to negotiate the implementation of the Code, but although 
there was consensus in certain areas, no agreement resulted on some of the most important 
aspects. A further meeting of the Conference yielded no results, nor did some discussions 
during UNCTAD V, which took place in 1979.125  
In total, the Conference held six sessions in the period between 1978 and 1985. The last session 
took place on June 5, 1985. A draft was discussed at that meeting, which is the existing text, but 
no further sessions have been undertaken since then because of the deadlock in the discussion of 
some of the key issues of the Code.126  
Much of the problems experienced by the TOT Code can be attributed to the incompatibility of 
the views held by the countries participating in the discussions. The first and largest group to 
take part in the talks was the G77, a coalition of less developed countries that was formed in the 
first UNCTAD conference of 1964.127 Their goal was to create a legally binding treaty that 
would cover all kinds of technology transfer and that would contain extensive provisions about 
dispute resolution.128 The second group (Group B) was made up of the Western developed 
nations, which sought the creation of a voluntary code of conduct in which dispute resolution 
mechanisms would be discussed by the parties.129 The third negotiating block was made up of 
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the socialist Eastern Bloc and Mongolia (called Group D), and their proposal was a hybrid 
between the two other groups.130   
The existing draft TOT Code consists of nine sections, eight of which are part of the 1985 text. 
In general, the remaining existing text attempts to deal with present and future national 
technology transfer regulations. The draft also makes a list of restrictive business practices that 
are considered illegal, but includes some exceptions. The list of restrictive practices in relation 
to technology transfer agreements had been highlighted by earlier works from the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). These included agreements that 
created territorial market restraints, the tying of the agreement to the purchase of other goods, 
restricting the party from entering into other technology transfer agreements, restrictions on 
research and development, and restrictions on adaptation or innovation on the technology being 
acquired.131 This list is certainly useful as it attempts to curb some of the most common 
practices that MNEs apply in dealing with developing countries because of their stronger 
negotiating position.  
There are some other important sections dealing with the guarantees and obligations of the 
parties, and a specific chapter dealing with the preferential treatment given to developing 
nations when entering into technology transfer agreements. The Code also deals with 
international technology transfer cooperation agreements.132  
From the existing draft, one can highlight some of the more positive steps that the text 
implemented, such as the adoption of several principles that would apply to these types of 
agreements. The principles tried to bring together some of the opposing views from the 
Commission, and managed to do so in a satisfactory manner. Perhaps the most important 
principle is the one that recognises the necessity of fairness in the drafting of technology 
transfer agreements between the supplier and developing countries. The existing draft reads:  
Facilitating and increasing the access to technology, particularly for developing 
countries, under mutually agreed fair and reasonable terms and conditions, are 
fundamental elements in the process of technology transfer and development.133 
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The main points of disagreement stemmed from chapters Four and Nine. Chapter Four dealt 
with the issue of restrictive business practices. The final drafting of this chapter is the one that 
has created some of the most heated debate, and a final draft does not exist in the final text. The 
representatives from the G77 wanted a total ban on restrictive trade practices, which they 
considered could hinder the economic and technological development of acquiring countries.134 
Group B wanted to apply a ban only to unreasonable practices, such as the ones covered by 
competition laws of the United States and Europe. Chapter Nine was also never completed and 
it was considered to be the toughest one to bring to an agreement as it dealt with the applicable 
law and settlement of disputes.135 Group B proposed a voluntary system in which the parties 
could agree on the law that would apply, and they could choose whether to use arbitration to 
solve their differences. On the other hand, G77 proposed that the law of the receiving country 
should always apply. They also opposed any type of absolute rule regarding arbitration as the 
mechanism to solve disputes, as the local law would always be applied first.136  
These differences appear to be insurmountable, and the talks reached an absolute gridlock. Even 
well into the 1990s, the UNCTAD Secretary General gathered the opinions of the different 
groups involved in an attempt to reach an agreement, but apparently he found no possible way 
out, going as far as stating that “the conditions do not currently exist to reach full agreement on 
all outstanding issues in the draft code of conduct.”137 The issue of the TOT Code appears to 
have disappeared from the radar at the UNCTAD as it is not even listed in any scheduled 
upcoming events at this organisation.138 Unfortunately this avenue appears to lead nowhere.  
2.2 Other international attempts  
Because of the failure of establishing a text to which all interested parties could agree, the 
UNCTAD is starting to pursue other avenues to attempt to promote the transfer of technology 
through other means. At the VIII UNCTAD Conference in Cartagena in 1993, a set of 
recommendations were provided towards achieving the means to encourage the transfer of 
technology to developing countries. Because of the commitments set out in this meeting, the 
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UNCTAD created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Interrelationship between Investment and 
Technology Transfer.139 Despite being a welcome addition, the group came up with no useful 
findings in any of its reports. They did agree that there is a strong correlation between 
technology and development, and that the acquisition of technology is a priority of developing 
countries; but their suggestions did not add anything new to the debate. Unsurprisingly, the 
Working Group found that the main means of technology transfer were licensing, direct foreign 
investment, joint venture agreements, and to a lesser extent, franchising and sub-contracting of 
work.140 The group finished by stating a “wait and see” policy, as discussions took place before 
the then future implementation of an international treaty on the trade aspects of intellectual 
property under discussion in the GATT process.141  
Nevertheless, there were some encouraging solutions offered by some members of the Working 
Group, particularly from developing countries. In particular, these solutions included calls to 
create fiscal incentives for private enterprises willing to transfer technologies to developing 
countries and to enhance academic assistance and cooperation;142 but these solutions did not 
make it into the final recommendations. UNCTAD seems to have lost the pre-eminence it had 
earlier on this issue. From reading the group proceedings it is possible to see a continuation of 
the split between developed and developing nations within the Working Group, and although 
there is no shortage of diplomatic language, the divisions in regards to the substantive findings 
are still enormous.           
What is more disheartening is that these discrepancies are evident even in other UN fora where 
technology transfer issues have been discussed. The Commission on Sustainable Development 
has seen a flare-up in the debate over technology transfer. Countries like China and Cuba have 
expressed that the developed world should make efforts to provide technology transfer to 
developing countries, but the response from the representatives from developed nations has not 
been particularly warm.143  
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Despite the failure in UNCTAD, other signs are more encouraging as technology transfer has 
been mentioned in some international agreements. Of particular mention at this stage is the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),144 part of the Earth Summit dealing with 
sustainable development in Rio de Janeiro. The CBD contains an entire article mentioning 
technology transfer, encouraging the signatory states to foster the transfer of technology 
between each other in the area of biodiversity. Article 16.1 reads: 
“Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes biotechnology, 
and that both access to and transfer of technology among Contracting Parties 
are essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention, 
undertakes subject to the provisions of this Article to provide and/or facilitate 
access for and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are 
relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make 
use of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the 
environment.”   
Despite this laudable opening paragraph, the rest of the article fizzles out, as it does not offer 
specific mechanisms in which the transfer of technology will be achieved. Although the article 
invites developed countries to treat developing countries with favourable status, and encourages 
the implementation of legislation that allows access to biological and genetic materials, the 
CBD lacks teeth when it comes to enforcing lack of compliance. Nevertheless, the provisions in 
the CBD must be applauded.  
WIPO has also expressed some interest in trying to create some guidelines in the area of 
international licensing,145 but other than those efforts and a joint workshop on the subject about 
technology transfer to developing countries and a few papers, the topic had not generated 
enough interest in the organisation.146  
3. Regional technology transfer attempts 
There is a void in the international system of  technology transfer due to the failure of to 
implement the draft TOT Code, and also caused by the failure by the international community 
to create a durable and enforceable instrument for the regulation and encouragement of 
technology transfer. The problems created by this void are obvious. In a competitive business 
environment, developing countries are looking to attract foreign investment in any possible 
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way, which gives technology owners a better bargaining position when negotiating technology 
transfer agreements. Given the relative international inactivity in this area, it has to be assumed 
that other options have to be explored.  
3.1 Regional agreements 
Still within the international arena, the next best option for the implementation of some 
technology transfer regulation is by means of regional treaties on the subject. The forerunner in 
this respect is the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela. The Cartagena Agreement,147 which created this trade partnership, opened 
a united negotiating front by this group of neighbouring countries. The original Pact was 
originated in 1971, and was reformed later in 1987, but the latest version still provides for a 
united negotiating group. In Article 65.d of the Agreement, the member states maintain that 
they will undertake “joint negotiations with enterprises and international government agencies 
to gain external resources or transference of technology.”148 This facilitated a united front in 
any negotiation regarding technology transfer agreements, providing the member states of 
ANCOM with a better bargaining position.  
Unfortunately, the provisions in the original Agreement have been eroded because of external 
economic pressure.149 After a summit of the presidents of the member states in 1990, ANCOM 
found that some specific changes were required to foster international investment and to 
increase economic openness and market liberalisation. After that meeting, the Cartagena 
Agreement Commission passed resolution number 291, which makes some specific changes to 
the existing interpretation of the Agreement in order to maintain competitiveness in the area. 
Article 10 of the resolution reads: “In the resolution of conflicts that arise from foreign 
investment or transfer of technology, the member states will apply their own legislation.”150 It is 
obvious that the wording has created a material deviation from what is stated in the Cartagena 
Agreement, foregoing the requirement to present a united negotiating front and making it 
possible for countries to negotiate unilaterally with technology owners. It is difficult to maintain 
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that the spirit of the Cartagena Agreement still exists, as the technology transfer provisions 
included in the agreement have been watered down.   
Another regional effort on regulating technology transfer can be found with the proposed 
creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). During the 1996 Summit of the 
Americas that took place in Bolivia, the participating states voted for Resolution 33, in which 
the signing states promised to undertake efforts for the development of technology transfer 
initiatives. The United States and Canada were among the signatory countries, which lends 
credibility and strength to this promise.151 The 1998 and 2001 summits continued the specific 
commitments towards the development of a hemispheric policy in specific technological areas. 
The 2001 Quebec summit in particular produced commitments in encouraging technology 
transfer in the areas of disaster management, ecologically sound technologies, and education.152 
The working draft of the FTAA, resulting from these summits, takes these proposals and 
includes them in the intellectual property regime that is an essential part of the eventual 
Agreement.153 Unsurprisingly, there is still considerable emphasis on the protection of 
intellectual property in the proposed text. However, some of the proposals regarding technology 
transfer appear to be positive, although the exact wording in this respect is still not finalised. 
Article 9 stipulates that each party will attempt to stimulate technology transfer in the area as an 
incentive to competitiveness in the international market by several means. The proposed text 
also allows member countries to provide rules that may prohibit restrictive contractual 
practices,154 but it does not specify what those practices may be. The article also relies heavily 
on economic incentives, which responds mainly to the economic interests of the United States 
in the area.      
It is still too early to ascertain if these provisions will serve to encourage the transfer of 
technology, although the naming of specific sectors of technical cooperation must be taken as a 
very positive step towards this end. There is a clear possibility that the good intentions 
expressed in text will not be translated into action, as was the case with ANCOM. 
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The option of relying on regional trade agreements may be a plausible solution, but it is still not 
clear how effective they can be in providing a proper legal framework to assist developing 
countries in negotiating technology transfer agreements. Nevertheless, a specific legal 
framework requires further exploration so as to present a united front against economic powers; 
but this path may be criticised on the ground that the implementation of technology transfer 
rules may discourage investment. A broad agreement or code of conduct is still the most 
desirable solution, but regional solutions may have to do for the time being.    
3.2 European technology transfer block exemptions 
Although the European Union does not have in place any technology transfer mechanisms at a 
wider level, there are some interesting technology transfer regulations that apply specifically to 
the field of competition law. The EU has a comprehensive system of rules that regulate the 
market behaviour of undertakings, so as to enhance competition within a market.155 Articles 85 
and 86 of the European Community Treaty of Rome156 regulate the competition law system in 
areas such as market dominance, horizontal agreements, monopolies, oligopolies, and many 
other anti-competitive practices. These rules are very strict and have the desired goal of 
achieving a system of workable competition.157 The European system of competition law is a 
subject of intense interest on the part of enterprises operating in the EU because of the strict 
application of the competition rules. Multinational corporations have been fined considerable 
amounts of money when they have been discovered to be engaged in anti-competitive 
practices.158 For example, new legislation in the UK will even impose jail sentences and 
disqualification penalties for company directors found guilty of dishonest actions leading to 
anti-competitive practices.159  
Within this very strong legal framework, Article 85.3 of the Treaty of Rome specifies that the 
anti-competitive practices listed in Article 85.1 – which includes actions like price fixing, 
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entering into anti-competitive agreements with other undertakings, and others – will be 
exempted from enforcement in agreements that contribute “to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”.160 The effect of this 
exemption is that undertakings will be able to notify the European Commission that their 
agreement falls in this category and should not be considered anti-competitive. Further to this 
exception, the Commission created a set of exemptions for technology transfer agreements 
within the European Union, with the Block Exemption Regulation 240/96/EC.161 This 
regulation was the result of bringing together two existing block exemptions for know-how 
agreements and intellectual property licences,162 which allowed undertakings involved in one of 
the listed agreements to forego the notification procedure enacted by Article 85.3.   
The subject matter of the block exemptions are technology transfer agreements in the shape of 
patents, but the Regulation also covers know-how licensing agreements, and mixed patent and 
license agreements.163 The exemptions are under revision, however, and there is a serious 
proposal to include licensing of trademarks, copyright and design rights as well; this is because 
the Commission has found that these issues generate a large amount of exemption 
applications.164   
The creation of these exemptions for technology transfer agreements has the general objective 
of ensuring a broad utilisation of innovative technology by allowing an owner to exploit their 
innovation instead of not making use of it.165 In other words, without these exemptions, it is 
assumed that some creators or owners may not exploit their innovations in a particular market if 
unable to impose certain restrictions on the use in that other market. The other stated goal of 
these exemptions is to increase legal certainty and to decrease the number of exception 
applications that the Commission would otherwise receive.166 But perhaps the most important 
effect of the existence of these block exemptions is that there is a marked intention by the 
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European Commission to make technology transfer licensing agreements more appealing for 
MNEs. By giving several exemptions in the very strict area of competition regulation, the 
Commission is taking great steps to create an environment where firms will feel more 
comfortable signing licensing agreements. According to Korah, the Commission “has 
recognized that competition stimulates innovation and innovation stimulates competition.”167  
Although the underlying rationale behind the block exemptions is to foster technology transfer 
within the EU, the rules would seem to apply as well to licensing agreements with undertakings 
or governments outside of the European Community. This should be assumed as the 
Regulations make no mention whatsoever in this respect. This has the beneficial effect that 
corporations may be more likely to transfer technology to developing nations without fear of 
breaking competition rules.   
Nevertheless, there is an unexpected problem created for developing countries by the block 
exemption system. By allowing European firms to become exempt from the oversight of 
competition law, these undertakings could easily be involved in what would otherwise be 
considered anti-competitive practices, as there is a danger that companies will have an open 
field to negotiate licensing agreements that will contain terms that are damaging to developing 
countries. As stated above, the TOT Code attempted to curb the use of restrictive practices, 
some of which were also in contravention of competition law. For example, agreements that 
contain restrictions on the acquisition of competing or complementary technology would 
normally be considered anti-competitive practices,168 but these types of agreements are to be 
included within the technology transfer block exemptions. However, Kinsella points out that if a 
restrictive agreement from a European undertaking takes place, this agreement will still be 
subject to the competition regulations enforced within the EU.169 This of course begs the 
question of why there are block exemptions in the first place if such actions are still subject to 
competition regulations.   
Despite these worries, the existence of these exemptions must be considered a positive 
instrument for less developed nations. There appears to be a certain relationship between 
competition law, licensing and the innovation process.170 Regional regulations like the 
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European block exemptions are indicative of the fact that there are other avenues to be explored 
in the area of technology transfer regulation.  
4. National technology transfer regulation 
It is not yet clear just how efficient the mentioned regional agreements will be in fostering 
technology transfer from developed countries and in defending the interest of less developed 
nations. The implementation of national legislation may present another way to regulate 
technology transfer. Although many developing countries have such laws in place, it has been 
pointed out that many of these laws are inoperative, or are being repealed.171  
Nigeria passed a law in 1979 to attempt to centralise the process of technology acquisition 
negotiations, with other legislation regulating this area in the subject of petroleum technology. 
However, this law has been widely ignored by multinationals and local enterprises.172 Other 
attempts at regulating the transfer of technology at national level have been repealed in Brazil 
after liberalisation efforts hit the country in the early 1990s. A similar situation operates in 
India, with India’s national technology transfer legislation.173  
All of these failed examples of technology transfer legislations may be attributed to the fact that 
attracting foreign investment is becoming one of the main goals for developing nations, and the 
competition to achieve this goal is fierce. One of the ways to gain a competitive advantage is to 
present investors with a dynamic country with as few bureaucratic and legal restrictions as 
possible, as well as providing extensive tax breaks.174 If a country becomes too expensive, or 
offers restrictive laws and bureaucratic obstacles, the technology owner can just move on and 
look for a better place to do business. If presented with a place that offers technology transfer 
regulation and one that does not, it would be fair to assume that all things being equal the MNE 
will choose the later.  
Despite the doubtful track record of national technology transfer legislation, China offers an 
example of a developing country that has been successful in implementing a legal regulatory 
regime in this area. In 1985, China implemented a technology transfer regulatory scheme in the 
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shape of the Administration of Technology Import Contracts,175 which established a strict 
governmental control over all technology transfer agreements made effective in the People’s 
Republic of China. These regulations applied to every licensing of patent, industrial design or 
other intellectual property rights, and also covered know-how agreements and technical service 
contracts.176 Under this scheme, every contract dealing with these subjects had to be approved 
by the Administration, which was required by the legislation to make sure that the contract 
would provide enough time for the recipient of the technology to be able to assimilate it. The 
regulation also established a list of restrictive terms that would be immediately removed from a 
contract. These included – amongst others – forcing the recipient to purchase other unrelated 
goods in exchange for the technology; the restriction of sales channels; and restrictions to the 
further use of the technology after the agreement had ceased.177 A set of implementation rules 
for this regime were later approved in 1987.178    
The existing Chinese regulations have undergone a recent amendment to make them more open 
and friendly to direct investors in technology. This was achieved with the new Technology 
Import and Export Administrative Regulations.179 As the title describes, these new rules 
regulate not only technology imports, but also exports. There is still a requirement from the 
contracting parties in a technology transfer agreement to obtain permission for the 
implementation of the contract in the People’s Republic of China, but there are some changes 
that eliminate some of the strictest rules from the previous regulations. The main change is that 
technology owners will not be required to allow recipients to use the acquired technology after 
the conclusion of the contract, and the prescribed minimum term for the contracts will also be 
abolished. There are also some administrative changes directed towards making the application 
process much easier.180     
Although it could be argued that both the new and old sets of regulations were stricter than any 
other unilateral effort at a national level in the developing world, there cannot be any doubt that 
China has enough market power to be able to pose a comprehensive legislative technology 
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transfer regime because of the sheer size of its market. The scrapping of existing national 
technology regulations in other countries can serve as evidence that those countries feared that 
these were stifling foreign investment. However, China is too big a market to be so easily 
dismissed by multinational corporations. It is entirely possible that most undertakings will 
tolerate China’s technology transfer requirements, in return for the opportunity to enter the 
Chinese market; an LDC could not hope to have a similar legislation and place and remain 
competitive. The rapid advancement in many technological areas during the 1990s would serve 
as evidence that the Chinese technology transfer regulations did not alienate potential 
investors.181 Further evidence of this is that China is the top developing country recipient of 
foreign direct investment, and it is thought that this year it may pass the United States as the top 
FDI recipient in the world.182  
The Chinese model could then offer a viable regulatory path to some other larger developing 
nations. It is curious that other large developing markets like Brazil and India have not taken 
advantage of the potential use of their market size gives to enact legislation that will grant them 
an advantageous negotiating position against the economic power of large technology owners. 
Nevertheless, this does not fully answer the problem of diminished negotiating power in 
technology transfer agreements for less developed nations with smaller markets. There can be 
little doubt that a smaller country that attempted to impose the Chinese model would simply be 
bypassed by foreign investors. This leaves fewer possibilities open in this field for least 
developed nations.  
5. Fostering direct investment 
From reading the last sections it has become evident that the legislative attempts to provide 
developing countries with a workable set of rules to create incentives and protect them from 
entering into disadvantageous technology transfer agreements have not been fruitful, and that 
many poor nations still find themselves with problems when attempting to acquire technology 
from developed nations. It is possible to continue attempts to obtain international consensus to 
create an international framework for the regulation of this important area for development, but 
at the moment there is no compromise in just how to do this. Would it be possible to attempt 
some other options beyond the ones discussed already?  
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It is unlikely that technology transfer regimes will change in the near future. This leaves 
developing countries in the position of having to continue to acquire technology through the 
traditional channels of licensing, know-how agreements and direct investment, and also having 
to work without a viable international regulation regime.   
5.1 Why foreign investment?  
Technology owners have made sure that any new option for technology transfer will have to 
take into consideration the fact that intellectual property must be at the centre of any operation 
between technology industries and the developing world. Talking about the requirements for 
technology cooperation with the developing world, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) has stated that:  
“The protection of patents and property rights of the developer is also essential 
to ensure that funding is available for yet further technological developments. A 
company will rarely share its technological know-how if it loses control of that 
know-how as a direct result. Governments should examine whether their existing 
legal and fiscal structures act as barriers to discouraging technological 
cooperation and investment, and where this is the case they should enact 
measures to replace them with enabling fiscal and other framework 
conditions.”183 
One of the main methods of ensuring this control over the technology is by the granting of 
licences of intellectual property rights to enterprises and/or governments in the receiving 
territory. Licensing of technology is a big business for developed nations, being one of the most 
important export industries for some countries. As stated by Ryan: 
“U.S. multinational manufacturing enterprises increasingly transfer intellectual 
property internationally through the industrial processes that they sell abroad. 
Exports, as measured by royalties and licensing fees, amounted to about 
U.S.$27 billion in 1995, while imports amounted to only U.S.$6.3 billion. At 
least U.S.$20 billion of the exports are transactions between U.S. firms and their 
foreign affiliates.”184  
Licensing is not only a big industry, but also has been steadily on the increase. In 1947, 
intellectual property licensing did not even reach 10% of the total exports in the United States. 
By 1987 this figure had reached 37% of the total exports, and it is calculated that the figure 
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might be close to 50% at present.185 It is not difficult to foresee that this figure will continue to 
increase as the economy in developed countries moves from manufacturing into services. The 
economic power in these countries is retained by the acquisition and ownership of knowledge, 
and the commodification of information.186 For these reasons, there is immense pressure by 
developed countries to increase international protection.  
Under this scheme, licensing has become an attractive option for intellectual property owners 
because it implies the minimum investment for them. If some technology is owned and it is 
desired by governments and undertakings in developing countries, all they have to do is grant a 
licence and the technology will go directly to the recipient, who will have to make sure that it is 
used in the prescribed manner. But if licensing is appealing for technology owners, is it 
similarly appealing for the recipient developing countries? The answer is no.  
There is a large deficit between technology imports and exports of technology in less developed 
nations. In 1998, the US received a net surplus of more than $23 billion USD from its 
intellectual property related exports.187 According to figures by the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), there are just a few countries that enjoy a trade 
surplus of intellectual property materials. The UK has a surplus that just exceeds $1 billion 
USD, and the US has a staggering surplus of more than $20 billion USD. In contrast, 
developing countries have a large deficit in this area, which means that they import large 
amounts of intellectual property works.188  This imbalance is caused to large extent by the 
licensing inequity, as developing countries have to purchase technology through licences as the 
easiest means of acquisition. But the restrictions upon these licences may be too onerous, and 
without an international regime regulating this area, they may even be abusive in some ways. 
There is also the great problem that the recipient may not have the infrastructure to be able to 
implement a licensed technology, forcing poor nations to license only low-level technology that 
they already can assimilate in some way.    
The best solution for developing countries may be to attract direct foreign investment of high-
technology industries. This may seem a like a controversial position at first because there is 
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prevalent assumption that technology owners will be less likely to invest in countries where 
there is not adequate intellectual property protection.189 Nevertheless, the evidence that points 
towards the discouragement of investment in countries with weaker protection is not as strong 
as some would assume. Maskus has found evidence that several developing countries with 
strong intellectual property protection have not been attracting as much foreign investment as 
countries like Brazil, India and China, which have had until recently weaker intellectual 
property protection regimes.190  
Assuming that direct investment will take place even in countries with weak intellectual 
property protection, the question still remains as to whether or not this is the desired route for 
encouraging technology transfer to developing countries. To answer this question, it must be 
proven that direct investment will produce beneficial results in recipient nations, namely that the 
technology that is brought in by the owner will somehow be assimilated by the beneficiary. 
There is some evidence that this is the case. For example, a corporation that creates a new 
subsidiary in a developing country may still want to patent their technology in the country to 
make sure that it is protected; by disclosing the invention this will open the opportunity for 
other firms in the country to make use of the technology once the patent has expired.191 Some 
other studies have found that foreign direct investment in developing countries does indeed 
produce technological overflows that will increase productivity in other sectors of the economy, 
particularly in industries that rely heavily on research and development.192  
Nevertheless, there are also problems with this scheme. Another study has found that strong 
intellectual property rights in a developing country may even prevent technology transfer 
because the receiving country cannot make use of the innovations by virtue of restrictions 
imposed by stricter legal provisions.193 It is a common practice of technology owners to impose 
severe non-disclosure agreements upon their employees in developing countries in an attempt to 
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make sure that the technology remains proprietary, particularly if the technology has not been 
patented and is protected by trade secrets. This would imply that most of the technology will 
remain in the ownership of the company. An excellent paper charting the literature in the 
subject of FDI and investment points out that although the evidence seems to be contradictory, 
it would seem that technology spill-over from one direct investor to a developing country are 
greater in countries with a much smaller technology gap.194 This is generally attributed to the 
fact that countries with less technological capability will be less likely to adopt and assimilate 
the technology because they lack the local know-how to do it.  
There are still indirect benefits of employment and education, but the fact remains that 
multinationals will continue to own the technology and developing nations will obtain only 
indirect benefits. However, even these indirect consequences may have long term effects for the 
developing nation as the technology owner will have to train staff to be able to operate 
technology. There seems to be enough evidence that at least some technology will remain in the 
country even if the undertaking leaves.   
5.2 Some direct investment experiences 
Having seen that the best option at the moment is for developing countries to attract direct 
investment, some successful examples of where this has been achieved may point the way for 
other nations to follow.  
One of the most noteworthy experiences in attracting high-technology investors into a 
developing nation is the creation of so-called technology parks or science parks, which have 
proven to be successful throughout Europe.195 According to the British Council:   
“A science park consists of a supporting infrastructure for the establishment and 
development of knowledge-based companies based in a location formally linked 
(and usually physically close) to a centre of technological excellence, usually a 
university. It normally incorporates business management and other services 
and a technology link to the centre of technological excellence.”196  
The implementation of these parks is usually accompanied by tax incentives, government grants 
or subsidies, and the setting up of networks with nearby higher education institutions. These 
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parks are usually considered excellent providers of technology transfer opportunities.197 The 
advantages for developing countries in adopting this road are evident. When moving into a 
science park, technology owners will have to hire and train the local labour force, which implies 
long-term benefits. It is difficult to assess the exact impact of high-technology firms moving 
into science parks in a developing country, but some preliminary evidence supports the 
statement that the short-term benefits are impressive.198 It is surely undeniable that the mere fact 
of having a high concentration of technological enterprises has to be beneficial to an 
underdeveloped economy.  
Costa Rica is a developing country that has been successfully applying the science park model. 
By setting up tax-free science parks around the country, the amount of money generated by 
direct foreign investment surpassed $1 billion USD during 1998, of which more than a third 
was made up of investment in science parks.199 In that same year, Costa Rica had 219 foreign 
high technology companies located in these science parks, which employed 27,200 employees 
directly.200 Despite these figures, direct foreign investment did suffer a decrease after 2001, but 
this was due in large part to a global economic downturn.  
Science parks in Costa Rica have created a specialised workforce that can respond to the 
demanding needs of modern markets. In many instances, multinational corporations have 
understood that they have a lot to gain from providing help to the economies and higher 
education institutions of the developing countries in which they are based. For example, the 
giant multinational Intel has established a large manufacturing centre in Costa Rica that 
employs 3000 people. As part of the decision to invest directly in the Costa Rican economy, 
Intel has signed a co-operation agreement with the University of Costa Rica to improve its 
engineering courses and provide millions of dollars in equipment and training.201 This is a direct 
benefit to the future of the country, as the knowledge will remain even if the owners leave.  
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It is not only developing countries that can assist in motivating direct investment. Developed 
nations can also help poor countries by introducing, through legislation and other means, 
incentives for companies that invest in these nations. This form of unilateral effort may be the 
way of the future, evidenced by the fact that some European countries are starting to create an 
encouraging environment for the transfer of technology from their local industries to developing 
countries. In the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry has established the Technology 
Partnership Initiative (TPI),202 a project that encourages UK companies to transfer ecologically-
sound technologies overseas. Many other developed nations are taking some official steps in 
this direction,203 a trend that must be welcomed and encouraged as it may foster the spirit of 
cooperation required in this area.  
Bilateral agreements between countries could pose another incentive. There is a recent 
agreement signed between the European Software Institute and China, in which future joint 
ventures are regulated. In their recommendations, the involved parties promise to sign 
technology transfer agreements to be able to obtain their goals on the joint venture.204 Although 
positive, the question with these sorts of agreements still remains, as these bilateral agreements 
may contain restrictive terms for the receiving country. There are several draft licensing 
contracts available to developing countries which could help them in entering into such 
agreements. A model contract by WIPO that dates back to 1977 still contains several useful 
clauses that attempt to ensure that developing countries will not be short-changed when dealing 
with a powerful technology owner.205  
Although some of these options may seem viable, the problem of technology transfer 
agreements still remains. There cannot be a perfect substitute for the preferred solution, the 
enactment of some sort of international mechanism that will set rules against restrictive 
practices in technology contracts and licences. The problem of the acquisition of technology by 
poor nations is by no means easy to solve, and the systems of technology transfer described 
have one big disadvantage – technology must still be purchased in one way or another. 
Nevertheless, attempting to have a technology transfer system that will at least be favourable to 
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the needs of developing nations should be at the top of the agenda for discussions on this 
subject. It is surprising that this very important subject has been neglected so far in the nascent 
debate about intellectual property rights and less developed nations. It cannot be stressed 
enough that this is an area of vital importance to developing countries. If things stay as they are 
now, economic power will be the determining factor in the negotiation of technology transfer 
agreements between the developed and less developed countries. 
 
  
 
Chapter 3. Owning ideas: The intellectual property regime 
“That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the 
moral and mutual instruction of man, and the improvement of his conditions, 
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she 
made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in 
any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical 
being, incapable of confinement of exclusive appropriation.  Inventions then 
cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”   
Thomas Jefferson 
 
The last two chapters have helped to establish the importance of technology for the issue of 
development, but in doing so something else has become clear. Developing countries rely 
heavily in imitation and the acquisition of technology from those who have already developed 
it, particularly because high-technology requires heavy investment in research and 
development, and most poor nations, particularly LDCs, do not have the resources to undertake 
such research. The acquisition of technology by developing countries is also a problem because 
developing countries find themselves in a disadvantageous position when negotiating 
technology transfer agreements because of the lack of an international standard to protect and 
assist developing countries in this respect.  
The issue at the heart of technological innovation since the last half of the 20th century is one of 
ownership through intellectual property. This chapter will take a closer look at the international 
system of protection of ideas, its history, the justifications behind it, and it will also explore 
whether the system can be replaced for another one.  
1. Owning ideas: The development of intellectual property 
1.1 Property vs. intellectual property 
Before providing more details about intellectual property, it is important to make some 
distinctions between intellectual property and tangible property, as there is obviously a 
relationship between both. This is important to the present study because property per se is not 
discussed in the wider theme of technology ownership and less developed countries. After all, 
people in the developing world can easily acquire physical technology if they have the required 
monetary resources. For example, people in the Sudan can purchase a computer, a tractor or a 
new type of seed. The act of purchase would warrant the buyer with ownership over that 
particular piece of technology, they would own the physical computer, tractor or seed. 
  
Intellectual property is important because it deals with something more important: the 
acquisition of the knowledge to produce that technology. For example, if the process to produce 
a specific piece of computing equipment is owned by a patent, then the people in the Sudan will 
not be able to produce that computer by themselves (granting that the patent is registered there), 
as the knowledge necessary to manufacture it is owned. The people would have to acquire this 
knowledge to create new computers.  
Another reason why it is important to study both systems is that there are people who equate the 
success of property with that of intellectual property. Famous objectivist Ayn Rand goes so far 
as to suggest that property depends almost solely on intellectual property. She commented that 
“patents are the heart and core of property rights, and once they are destroyed, the destruction 
of all other property rights will follow automatically, as a brief postscript.”206 This view may be 
extreme, but serves to emphasise that in the minds of some people, the entire system of property 
is indistinguishable whether one speaks of material property and its intellectual cousin. One 
needs only to read anything written by copyright owner lobbies such as the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA) to read appeals ad populum about how copyright infringement is the same as 
stealing a car.207  
Historically, modern property arises from Ancient Rome, where the system of dominium or 
proprietas (literally ownership) was first established. In this system, the owner of a thing had a 
property right recognised by the State. The Roman system recognised that the possessor of a 
thing would not always be the proprietary, but ownership was assumed. Restrictions on 
ownership were also common.208 Property was further developed with the English medieval 
Feudal system, in which property was awarded by the King to one of his trustees, and the owner 
of the land received payment by the possessors of the land as a means of usage fee.209     
These early stages apply only to the existence of real property. However, many authors believe 
that the modern property system of tangibles and intangibles originates from modern Western 
capitalism in its earlier forms, in particular, the mercantilist and proprietary system of 
Renaissance Venice during the thirteenth century. Many historical factors colluded in Venice to 
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help the development of modern capitalism: Venice was the mercantile centre in the 
Mediterranean, and there was an accumulation of wealth and the exploitation of wage labour, 
two of the most marked features of capitalism.210 Also with the rise of capitalism came the 
modern characteristic of understanding property as an individual right, instead of a more 
collective system, which was the standard left by the Roman and Feudal systems.  
Modern property owes a lot to these systems, but the regime as we know it stems mostly from 
the early modern period, and the works of philosophers and other thinkers, because 
theoretically, it has received a more complex treatment in the hands of philosophers. One of the 
earliest proponents in this area was the philosopher John Locke, who was the main proponent of 
property as a basic natural right of the individual: 
“Every Man has a Property in his own Person. This No Body has any Right to 
but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, 
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property”211  
Some of the original theoretical problems that arise from the study of property are centred upon 
its very existence. How is property acquired in the first place? Locke dealt with this by stating 
that the first owner is that person who instils labour into the object, establishing a relationship 
that will denote ownership.212 Some other contemporary philosophers proposed different 
approaches. One of the most popular was to see property as consent given by the rest of 
humanity onto the owner. A proponent of such a theory was theologian, Hugo Grotius, who 
separated the rights of the State to appropriate a thing and the individual’s right to 
compensation, and first discussed the realisation of modern economic links between property 
and the individual.213 
As both of these interpretations seemed somewhat lacking, the principle of possession evolved 
in common law countries to explain property. This theory states that the original act of 
possession, or occupancy, is the basis for property. The possession is established against the rest 
of the community by two basic elements: firstly, there must be a clear act that informs others 
about the occupancy; and secondly, possession is given as a reward to the labour exerted in 
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acquiring the object.214 Modern thought has brought more complex and sophisticated workings 
on the nature of property. A popular opinion understands property not so much as a right, but as 
a social relationship between individuals in a society, not so much as control over an object, but 
as a means of understanding the relationship between members of a society through exerting an 
exclusionary use of an object over another. This exclusion of usage works as an economic 
principle of allocation and control of resources, and by serving as a way to mediate conflicts 
that may arise from the competing desires for control of those resources.215   
The practical application of these capitalist individual theories of property are evidenced in their 
adoption by modern political and economic models, mostly due to the French Revolution and 
the first French Civil Code, and later in the emerging Industrial Revolution, in the shape of 
liberalism. Criticisms to this system come from the same period of time by Marxist theories.216 
It is clear that both intellectual and real property share a common philosophical and economic 
link, mostly due to the shared past and the fact that both are ownership tools of modern Western 
capitalist theory. Other similarities exist: in the present capitalist system, intellectual creations 
can be sold, bought and licensed; they can also be taxed, passed on as inheritance and in 
divorces; or they can be used as credit.217  
However, that is where the similarities end, not only because the subject of both systems is 
entirely different, but also because there are many other differences between the property of 
ideas and of things. This can be assumed because ideas (or the expressions of ideas) are 
intangible, inexhaustible, non-excludable and non-rivalrous entities. Intellectual properties are a 
kind of property in some sense, although a sui generis one, mostly because it is a proprietary-
like interest that entitles the owner to almost the same rights as those awarded to the owner of 
‘real’ property. The main difference between both systems is the limitation of terms. Tangible 
property exists on a physical object or location indefinitely; even ancient artefacts are prone to 
be owned by whoever finds them, unless the government appropriates them. The same happens 
with land, where property rights are passed on from one owner to the other. Intellectual property 
is different in the sense that it has a limited duration for a fixed amount of years. In the case of 
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patents, it is generally 20 years; in copyright, lifetime of the author plus 70 years. After that 
period of time the idea passes to the public domain and it can be used by anyone.218  
The other main difference between tangible property and intellectual property is the existence of 
a moral element in intellectual property, in particular in trademarks and copyright. In 
trademarks, what is defended is the good name of a manufacturer or service provider. 
Copyrights protect moral rights of authors, in particular the right to be identified as the owner of 
a work and the right to the integrity of the work. These moral aspects are not to be found 
anywhere in real property rights.  
1.2 The birth of national protection of ideas 
There is plenty of literature that deals with the history of intellectual property,219 so this is not 
the place to provide a detailed account. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recount part of this 
evolution to illustrate how it is that ideas were subjected to a limited ownership right, mostly 
because this model is now being exported to (and some would say forced upon) developing 
countries.  
Although intellectual property as it exists today is a relatively recent institution, there are 
several indications that some aspects of the existing institutions were present in some ancient 
civilisations. For example, the Greeks were some of the first to attribute authorship of works to 
individuals, before that a system of oral tradition and communal attribution and ownership of 
ideas was prevalent. The Hebrew Talmud made it compulsory to oral contributors to a story to 
be identified, constituting an early form of moral authorship rights. Although there is no direct 
evidence that any sort of intellectual property existed in Ancient Rome, literary production 
became an accepted occupation for the wealthy classes, and some writers survived on a system 
of patronage; there is even evidence that some writers signed contracts with publishers.220 The 
same moral attribution applied to inventors, as is the case with many early inventors, who have 
had their names placed together with their creations.  
During the Middle Ages, it was assumed that authors possessed certain moral rights, but the 
implementation of laws protecting them was not a viable option because most intellectual 
creations were of a religious nature and the population was largely illiterate, which allowed the 
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Church to maintain a monopoly on information. However, the first intellectual property case 
takes place during this period. This case took place in 567 CE, and it was between St. Columba, 
who apparently was accused by his teacher Finnian of copying a Psalter of his.221  
Despite the fact that the origins of intellectual property may be credited to the concept of moral 
rights, the real motivation behind this legal institution can be attributed to the desire of authors 
and inventors to obtain an economic remuneration from their work. The birthplace of modern 
intellectual property is England, both in patents and copyright. The first recognisable modern 
form of intellectual property was a Letter Patent, a document bearing the King’s seal granting 
the bearer the right to practise their craft or art in England, the first one granted to a Flemish 
weaver in 1311. The first Letter Patent granted to an invention took place in 1449. The birth of 
the patent system to be granted as an exploitation monopoly for inventors took place during the 
reign of Elizabeth I, as it was felt that there was a need for the enactment of a method by which 
an inventor could stop others from copying and unfairly profiting from their work. Although 
monopolies were frowned upon by common law, the existence of a patent as an exception to the 
general rule was granted in section six of the Statute of Monopolies of 1623. 222     
The development of copyright was rather more complicated. It is widely accepted that the 
invention of the printing press and an increase in the number of colleges and universities created 
the necessary environment for the development of copyright laws. The first country where 
legislation was developed was England. In the early sixteenth century, Henry VIII gave a 
printing monopoly to the Stationer’s Company, which lasted well into the next century.223 In 
1709, the English parliament passed the Statute of Anne, the first law to provide authors with a 
property right over their works224. It receives its name from Queen Anne of England, who was 
the Monarch at the time of its enactment. The Statute was enacted after a series of failed 
attempts to regulate licensing of literary works by means of a limited property right. Many 
literary celebrities of the time, like John Locke and Jonathan Swift, had a say in its creation after 
they had suffered from the piracy of their works.225 Several other laws were passed enhancing 
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author’s rights to other works such as paintings, sculptures, musical and dramatic works226, until 
the present legislation, the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (CDPA). 
The modern proprietary version of copyright was exported to the United States very easily. 
While it was still a colony the right was part of the colonial legislations.227 After independence, 
the United States Constitution recognised the nature of copyright as an economic reward to 
authors. Later, the US Supreme Court recognised this fact by stating that the "encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors…"228 The United States Congress adopted most of the British legislation by passing 
its own Copyright Act in 1790, hence the similarities between the two systems. This first act 
was limited to books, maps and charts. In following reforms, photographs, musical 
compositions and paintings were included. A new Copyright Act was created in 1909 to provide 
protection to several new inventions, such as perforated music rolls. This Act was almost 
immediately amended to include motion pictures. It was not until 1976 that another Act was 
passed by Congress to protect new technologies, such as tape recordings. This law is still in 
place, although it has been amended several times when new inventions require it. There have 
been acts of Congress to include protection of computer software (1980), semiconductor chips 
(1984), tape recording rentals (1984), software rentals (1990), digital audio recording (1992), 
digital performance (1995) and electronic theft (1997). 229  
1.3 International protection 
The development of national copyright and patent regulation in the Anglo-Saxon world is 
certainly of great importance to the later creation of an international system, but the most 
influential country in the early progress of a multinational system was France. French 
intellectual property law took a different approach from the system favoured in England, which 
was slanted towards publishers’ rights. France placed more emphasis on the moral rights of 
authors and inventors. After the French Revolution, several laws where enacted to implement a 
system of copyrights and patents based on these moral rights. For example, section 1 of the 
patent law of 1791 states that "All new discoveries are the property of the author; to assure the 
inventor the property and temporary enjoyment of his discovery, there shall be delivered to him 
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a patent for five, ten or fifteen years."230 The 1793 copyright legislation follows the same 
philosophical background by establishing a droit d’auteur (literally, author’s rights); with the 
added peculiarity that it recognised the existence of copyrights outside of France.231  
It took almost a century for some of the ideals espoused by French legislation to be awarded 
international protection. It had been an increasing concern of authors and inventors that their 
works were being copied and pirated in other nations because national legislations, with the 
exception of France, did not recognise the rights of foreign authors or inventors. This situation 
came to a boiling point when many inventors refused to attend the International Exhibition of 
Inventions in Vienna in 1873 because they feared that their works would be copied and 
exploited in other countries.232  
A few nations entered into reciprocal agreements for the mutual protection of artistic and 
industrial works, but it was not until the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property in 1883 that these efforts for internationalisation of intellectual property protection 
were solidified into the first international treaty relating to the ownership of technology. This 
treaty allowed the nationals of one country to obtain protection of their works in the other 
signatory nations, and it covered inventions (patents), trademarks and industrial designs.233  
A similar problem had been experienced by authors, and during the 19th century there was 
rampant piracy of foreign works throughout the industrialised world. The Association 
Littaeraire et Artistique International was formed in Paris in 1880 in an attempt to implement 
some sort of international copyright protection. They produced a working document that would 
later become the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886. One 
of the most notable points of this international instrument is that it provided protection for 
economic factors, much in the spirit of British legislation, as well as protection for moral rights, 
in the spirit of the Continental legal tradition. One of the main features of the treaty is that it 
allows for the automatic copyright protection of any original work without requiring 
registration.  
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It is interesting to note the marked absence of the United States from the Berne Convention. 
Publishers in the United States greatly benefited from not having to pay royalties to foreign 
authors, thus enhancing their profits and making cheap European books available in the United 
States. It has been noted that: 
“Influenced greatly by its early status as a net importer of copyrighted 
materials, the United States resisted joining the Berne Convention for over a 
century. Adherence to the treaty's conventions would have required U.S. 
publishers of foreign works---many of whom produced pirated copies---to pay 
royalties and fees to foreign copyright holders, thus causing a significant 
amount of money to go overseas.”234  
This reticence by the United States continued throughout most of the 20th century, although this 
isolationism meant that other countries could pirate American works. After the Second World 
War, it was felt that it would be in the best economic interest of the United States to implement 
some sort of international protection. That is why the US sponsored the Universal Copyright 
Convention (UCC) of 1952, which, unlike the Berne Convention, worked only as a means of 
allowing foreign nationals access to the existing copyright legislation in foreign countries. This 
was clearly beneficial for the United States, as most countries had provisions that allowed 
protection of foreign works because of the Berne Convention, but the US did not. This allowed 
American authors to claim their copyrights abroad, but it still did not allow foreign nationals to 
be able to claim royalties from American publishers.235 Eventually the US ratified the Berne 
Convention in 1987.    
Both the Paris and Berne Conventions prompted a new era in international intellectual property 
cooperation, being administered by a joint international organization called the Bureaux 
Internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle (BIRPI), which was based 
in Berne and lasted well into the 20th Century. The two treaties were not based on a system of 
reciprocity, but rather on a common minimum requirement of rights that should exist in the 
national legislation of the signatory countries. The other main requirement is that local 
legislations should warrant foreign authors and inventors the same rights awarded to nationals. 
These rules would allow for more independence from each country when determining the 
adequate levels of protection that will be awarded in that territory.  
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Several other treaties were established to address and to add to the existing agreements, but they 
remained for many years the main source of international protection, and the basis for the 
existing system. Amongst these other treaties it is important to mention the Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks in 1891, the Hague Agreement Concerning 
the International Deposit of Industrial Designs of 1925, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 
1970. 
One of the most important modern developments in international intellectual property 
protection is the establishment in 1967 of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 
a direct descendant of BIRPI. The original function of WIPO is to administer the existing and 
future international treaties regarding intellectual property protection, and to promote 
harmonization of national legislation.236 WIPO administers twenty-three different treaties 
relating to intellectual property subjects, of which the most important are the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the 2000 Patent 
Law Treaty.  
Other than WIPO, there are three other organisms that are involved in the area of international 
trade aspects of intellectual property. The most obvious of these is the WTO, which manages 
the 1995 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which 
is the most important treaty dealing with developing countries. The administration of TRIPS is 
done through an administrative body known as the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, which consists of the member states of the WTO.237 TRIPS will be 
dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.  
Another organisation involved in trade aspects of intellectual property is the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which administers the 
aforementioned UCC. The role of UNESCO is mostly to encourage the wider exploitation of 
intellectual works attempting to ensure the widest dissemination of science and technology. In 
that respect, it varies largely from the proprietary preoccupations of the WIPO and WTO. 
Another UN organisation that deals with this area is UNCTAD, which as has been discussed, 
deals mostly with establishing international rules on licensing of technological innovations in 
areas like technology transfer. 
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The existence of all of these treaties regulating the protection of the ownership of ideas serves 
as a strong indication of the importance that is given to this field in the international arena. The 
evolution from national intellectual property legislation towards an international body of 
agreements has served to impose the Western model of protection around the world.  
2. The justifications for intellectual property 
From reading the historical development of intellectual property, it becomes clear that the 
institution of awarding individuals and companies with a limited property right to their 
technology is stronger than ever, mostly when considering the giant steps taken in the area of 
international protection. What are the justifications that merit the existence of the system of 
technology ownership that has been discussed?  
This is actually a difficult question to answer. The fact is that there have been many different 
interpretations of the theoretical justifications of intellectual property rights. The opinion on 
what exactly is the rationale behind this institution is a subject of heated debate; it depends 
largely on the philosophy and the ideology of the person discussing it. Intellectual property is 
described as a natural right, as a reward for creators, a stimulus for creativity, a property right, 
an economic reward, as a fence, as a result of capitalism, and as part of the public interest. It 
would take a separate work entirely to try to analyse in detail all of the prevalent discussions 
and classifications for justification of intellectual property rights and their respective critiques. 
However, it is possible to notice a trend that divides the justifications in two main categories by 
using a teleological approach: public interest and private interest justifications, usually 
expressed as moral justifications and utilitarian justifications.238  
2.1 Moral Justification 
The moral justification for intellectual property stems from an ideal view that assigns property 
as a natural right of humans. The moral justification places the existence of intellectual property 
as a natural result of the right of the creator of anything s/he produces. To return to an earlier 
point, this is the classical ownership opinion as viewed by Locke, which states that individuals 
have a moral right to the fruits of their labour. In contemporary thought, this view is strongly 
advocated by libertarian and other “natural rights” capitalists.  Ayn Rand for example claims 
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that “patents and copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: a 
man’s right to the product of his mind.”239  
As discussed in the historical introduction to intellectual property rights, in the past, copying 
another person’s work was considered immoral. Authors then were given moral rights to their 
works, but no economic reward. This moral consideration has subsisted through most of the 
history of intellectual property, and it is an important basis for the international system of the 
ownership of ideas.  
In particular, the law of copyright benefits as the main recipient of this view of intellectual 
property as a moral right, and it derives from natural law ideas that see it as inherent to the very 
nature of creating because it carries the author’s “integrity and personal reputation”.240 It is 
more commonly found in countries with a civil law system that draws from concepts of natural 
law, and by implication, in the Berne Convention. According to this system, every author will 
be entitled to the moral right to ensure that no derogatory use of the work is made (integrity) 
and to make sure that it is rightly attributed under his or her name (paternity). This right is not 
patrimonial in nature, that is, it cannot be exhausted or alienated.  
Patents were also subject to the theory of moral rights, in particular in 19th century France. The 
French patent system goes as far as implying that there should be no distinction between 
intellectual property and normal property, as they both derive from an innate human right to 
own one’s personal creations.241  
The idea that sees intellectual creations as a basic right creates problems as it does not explain 
the reason for the state to limit those same rights in time, which is exactly what happens with 
patents and copyright. This justification is not without its critics, which can be traced back to 
the English patent abolitionism movement of 1852, led by Robert Macfie.242 This movement 
attempted to abolish the patenting system, and Macfie attacked several of the justifications, 
including the moral right attribution of ownership. He did this by commenting that the moral 
right of a patent should not be granted because “Those things that belong to the province of 
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patent right are in their nature capable of being independently discovered or originated, in the 
same identical form, by a plurality of persons.”243  
In a similar line of thought, Hettinger points out that according to the moral or natural rights 
justification, the labourer would be entitled only to the value added by their labour. He states 
that this creates an unworkable system, as it would be impossible to ascertain just how much 
labour has been added.244 Hettinger does not deny creators the exclusive right to possess and 
use for personal purposes what they develop. The problem he sees is in trying to impose that 
right upon society by means of intellectual property. This is not so much a moral right, as the 
result of social circumstances that have decided to allocate certain privileges to creators. He 
claims that: 
“The ‘right’ to receive what the market will bear is a socially created privilege, 
and not a natural right at all. The natural right to possess and personally use 
what one has produced is relevant to the justifiability of such a privilege, but by 
itself it is hardly sufficient to justify that privilege.”245 
Hettinger’s criticism of this natural moral right of innovators and authors would seem extreme. 
Furthermore, it fails to address the other elements of moral rights which make up intellectual 
property; that is, the non-proprietary element of the moral rights awarded to creators. It is 
necessary to separate the natural property right element from the other assumed inherent 
element, that which is protected internationally as the moral rights to paternity and integrity. 
This right of creators would seem a much stronger natural right than the Lockean property right 
criticised by Hettinger. Legislation would seem to agree, making this a natural right which is 
inalienable and, in some jurisdictions, perpetual. This is opposed to the temporal shortness of 
the proprietary protection. It would seem that even if one follows Hettinger’s criticisms and 
questions this theory, the moral right of an author to have their work attributed to them could 
still exist.  
2.2 Utilitarian justifications  
The utilitarian justification can usually be seen as that which states that intellectual property 
exists with the utilitarian purpose of encouraging creation by awarding authors and inventors 
with the means of recuperating their investments. This justification can be subdivided into three 
sub-categories: social contract, economic, and reward. 
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2.2.1 Social justification: the social contract 
The social justification for intellectual property assumes that there is some benefit to society 
benefit society involved, but also a private interest. There are two different ways in which this 
social justification can be seen. The first one would be to recognise that providing a property 
right over intellectual works serves as a stimulus to further creation.246 The rationale is that 
awarding creators with a limited property over the expression of their ideas as a reward for their 
efforts will in turn encourage those rights-holders and others to come up with new ideas and 
new ways to express them. In particular, earlier copyright legislation stressed this point; both 
the Statute of Anne and the United States Constitution recognised that copyright was a way to 
promote science and technological advance by providing authors with the means to obtain profit 
from their works.247 The US Constitution, when talking about the powers of Congress, stresses 
that the legislative body will have “the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries..."248   
The second social aspect of intellectual property is that by having a limited monopoly over their 
works, creators will be more inclined to share their work, which is in the public interest.249 For 
the proponents of this view, intellectual property will be beneficial to the social body because it 
encourages the disclosure of works and inventions, making them available to society. If creators 
believe that they will profit from their work and other people will not steal their ideas upon 
disclosure, then these people will communicate their work to a wider audience.250  
These two aspects of the social justification constitute a social contract between society and the 
individual, particularly in the area of patents. Patents can be seen as a contract between society 
and inventors, society gives the patentee a limited monopoly over their creation, and in return 
the owner discloses the details of their invention so that society can use it and improve upon it 
after the patent has expired.251  
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2.2.2 Economic Justification 
Despite the fact that the origins of intellectual property owe a lot to the ancient idea of moral 
rights, the major influence motivating this legal institution can be attributed to the desire of 
creators to obtain an economic remuneration from their work, as illustrated by the earlier Patent 
legislation and the Statute of Anne,252 and this justification is still relevant today. In the strictest 
economic sense, intellectual property is seen as a way to allow creators to be able to exploit and 
obtain monetary dividends from their works, allowing them to make a living by placing their 
creations on the market. This justification presupposes that without such rights there will not be 
any creation. This economic justification relates closely to that based upon the social.253 In 
1928, historian Roger Fry attacked the idea of the author as some sort of Bohemian character 
unconcerned with monetary affairs. He expressed that:  
“Almost all artists who have done anything approaching first-rate work have 
been thoroughly bourgeois people — leading quiet, unostentatious lives, 
indifferent to the world’s praise or blame, and far too much interested in their 
job to spend their time kicking over the traces.”254 
On a strictly economic basis, this justification also resides on the fact that intellectual works 
have become hugely profitable enterprises in the dawn of the information age. For example, in 
1996, intellectual property industries accounted for a 3.6% of the United States GDP. In 2001, 
copyright industries alone accounted for 5.2% of that country’s GDP.255 Its importance for 
modern developed economies tends to act as enough justification and also serves to illustrate 
the reasons behind the trends towards increasing protection to technology.  
2.2.3 Reward justification 
Reward is closely related to the economic justification. Many types of intellectual creations 
require large monetary investment. Examples abound, such as for scholarly research, scientific 
or technological experiments, software development, recording music and motion picture 
production, just to name a few. The reward justification assumes that it is only fair that creators 
should have an adequate way to receive reimbursement for that investment by obtaining a 
property right over their work. This limited property right would also be awarded as a just 
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recompense to the skill, labour and investment involved in the creative process of the original 
work.256    
This seems like one of the strongest justifications, as some of the most valuable types of modern 
technological developments would not be developed without large sums of money, but it 
illustrates clearly the contingent nature of intellectual property rights and their relationship to 
market development.  
2.3 Criticising the utilitarian justifications 
The utilitarian justifications are the ones that receive more criticism amongst experts. The social 
contract assumed in the existence of intellectual property has two socially desirable effects, the 
stimulation of new innovations and the encouragement of the dissemination of those 
innovations. In other words, awarding creators with a property right over their works will 
stimulate the creation and the distribution of said intellectual products.  
However, this justification also has its problems. The idea of granting ownership rights over 
intellectual products as a means to encourage creation can be easily attacked if one can prove 
that creation takes place even without protection. The evidence would appear to be all around 
us, and even a look at history would seem to support this attack. Homer never earned royalties, 
and Archimedes never applied for a patent. Even in modern times, creation still takes place even 
in societies with minimum protection. As Van der Bergh points out, “literature was no less 
extensive when copyright was non-existent.” 257 Posner goes as far as to give evidence that 
literature output before the Statute of Anne are proportionally similar to today’s, hence 
dismissing the allegation that authors will produce more with copyright protection.258  
Hettinger attacks the utilitarian justification by arguing that the granting of exclusive rights to 
intellectual creators is a paradoxical solution; by granting this right in hopes of encouraging 
creation, distribution of works is lost as it is placed in the hands of a few.259 Another problem 
with the utilitarian justification is that it is always assumed, yet never tested. Several authors 
have pointed out that people created even before they had any access to monetary gains from 
their works. It would seem fair that creators should have the right to recuperate their investment 
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through the granting of a property right as means of a reward. Nevertheless, Volkman points out 
that: 
“Intellectual property is usually justified on the utilitarian grounds that we need 
to protect innovation by guaranteeing innovators a market return on their 
investment of time and effort. Otherwise, no one will create intellectual property. 
But this argument turns on empirical claims that are seldom examined or 
defended. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how such a defense could proceed, given 
that there is no easy way to conduct the relevant experiments.”260 
In that same line, Samuelson argues that intellectual property has an anti-competitive element 
attached to it as it fosters the creation of monopolies.261 These monopolies operate in a separate 
market to that of physical goods and commodities. The distribution of intellectual works rests in 
the existence of a “marketplace of ideas”, where new ideas are shared according to their 
intrinsic value and usefulness. The main proponent of this ideal marketplace is philosopher 
Jurgen Habermas. Habermas explains that in this marketplace, everybody is allowed to 
participate, but eventually the best ideas will win out.262 It would seem evident that although the 
participation in the marketplace is wide in societies that protect the principles of freedom of 
speech and thought, not all ideas get proper distribution, and not always the best idea wins. 
Environmental scientist Brian Martin points out that there is no reason why this marketplace 
should be a market of owned ideas, and further makes the point that the system of intellectual 
property has created a marketplace where only those ideas of economic interest are distributed, 
with no regard to other measure of their value. He goes on to say that: 
“There is a simple and fundamental reason for the failure of the marketplace of 
ideas: inequality, especially economic inequality. Perhaps in a group of people 
sitting in a room discussing an issue, there is some prospect of a measured 
assessment of different ideas. But if these same people are isolated in front of 
their television sets, and one of them owns the television station, it is obvious 
that there is little basis for testing of ideas. The reality is that powerful and rich 
groups can promote their ideas with little chance of rebuttal from those with 
different perspectives.”263 
In strictly economic terms there are other reasons to doubt the utilitarian justification. Paul 
David argues that intellectual property exists because there is a market failure to produce 
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intellectual works unaided; hence the existence of governmental intervention in the shape of 
intellectual property protection. David explains that it is usually argued that, without this 
protection, authors and inventors will not create, as they will not be able to profit form their 
works.264 However, he argues accurately that there is no way to determine if intellectual 
property is indeed the best solution to address this failure of the market to allocate resources to 
creators. The problem he sees with this is that knowledge cannot be easily commodified 
because it is what economists call a “non-rival good”, which means that it can be owned by 
many people at the same time, analogous to a public good.265 This of course does not mean that 
ideas cannot be seen as commodities at all, David makes the case that several parts of human 
knowledge can be seen as public goods, but that in some circumstances the application of 
specific know-how can produce an identifiable intellectual product, which is subject to 
proprietary protection.  
It can even be argued that intellectual property is often used as a method of perpetuating 
economic dominance,266 discouraging competition and innovation. This is achieved by using 
intellectual property, and in particular wide-reaching patents, to create an economic monopoly 
in one field of enterprise. An example of this would be a company that has dominance in a 
market and uses patents to perpetuate its market dominance, often not even exploiting these 
patents.267       
Even the reward aspect of this justification would seem to be subject to attack. Hettinger argues 
that large amounts of research are undertaken with public funds. He explains that there are no 
reasons to try to continue to fund research with a system of public grants, if the results of that 
research are destined to be locked away under intellectual property regimes.268 The whole 
dichotomy between public funding and the reward of private interests should be explored 
further in this debate. 
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3. The end of intellectual property as we know it?  
If one agrees that some of the justifications about intellectual property are problematic, then the 
question must be asked about its legitimacy in the international arena. After all, intellectual 
property is the method to protect technological innovations, and it is assumed that without this 
system, many enterprises there will less incentive to develop new technologies. The question as 
to whether or not intellectual property is the only available system is critical.  This question is 
part of a debate taking place in academic circles with regards to the validity of the modern 
intellectual property system. There is a growing amount of literature that deals with the question 
of whether intellectual property has served its purpose and should be modified, or even 
replaced. 
Talking specifically about copyright, Eve Athanasekou came up with a useful classification of 
those who criticise copyright,269 which can be paraphrased to include the general field of 
intellectual property. The classification is: 
IP Radicalism: is the view held by those who believe that intellectual property law is no longer 
viable, and that it will be replaced by other mechanisms.   
IP Revisionism: is held by legal experts who are pushing for a revision of existing intellectual 
property laws.  
IP Traditionalism: is the view held by those who think that no changes are needed. 
IP Maximalism: is the opinion that intellectual property protection should be enhanced. Some of 
the proponents of this view are the intellectual property industries, such as the pharmaceutical, 
software, publishing and music industries.  
The views from the first two categories will be analysed next, assessing if such criticisms can be 
taken seriously. 
3.1 Standing on the shoulders of giants 
Intellectual property will prove to be a valuable and viable system to encourage technological 
innovation if it proves that the development of new ideas cannot take place without it. However, 
imitation plays a very important role in the dissemination of new technologies as has been 
already established. There is also the interesting phenomenon of the sharing of ideas that must 
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be taken into consideration when discussing intellectual property. After all, if people create and 
share ideas without reward, this would serve to undermine further the existing justifications for 
intellectual property.   
It can be said that the proprietary model of the ownership of ideas is not only recent, but that it 
runs against some basic societal principles and needs. This would seem to be part of the 
political arguments between the individual and the social. Modern economic theories – in 
particular capitalism – tend to view the individual as the ultimate measure, while some other 
models tend to view the human being as a member of society, whose expression cannot be 
separated from the social body. In more socially-oriented cultures, the sharing of information is 
seen as just part of the creative process, making individual contributions a rarity.  
In the end, intellectual property deals with information, yet information is public and is difficult 
to fence. This public nature of information is what makes it remarkably difficult to pinpoint, and 
perhaps why there are so many critics of the intellectual property system. It may seem difficult 
to understand – and perhaps even counterintuitive – to believe that something which is 
incorporeal can indeed be subject to property, and how owners can claim money from the 
public in exchange for the transfer of an idea. Information then would seem to be the logical 
currency to share.   
In this grand scheme of things, information is the result of a communitarian effort. Talking 
specifically about the writing process, McFarland describes the creative process behind writing 
as a community development, instead of an individual effort. He points out that information: 
“…is the product of human thought and not itself corporeal, information is 
constantly changing, growing, combining, and creating offshoots. An intellectual 
work never springs pure and original from a single human mind. There are 
always influences. The language, the characters, the themes, and the structure of 
a novel all have their predecessors.”270    
In the same line of reasoning, Hettinger observes that intellectual creations are not the result of 
individuals, but the result of a society. The creators do not exist in a vacuum, so they cannot 
claim full credit for their creations in that intellectual products are inherently “social 
products”.271 Coombe shares this view. She expresses eloquently that: 
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“Denying the social conditions and cultural influences that shape author’s 
expressive creativity, we invest him with powers of expropriation and censorship 
in the name of property. Representing cultures in the image of the undivided 
possessive individual, we obscure people’s historical agency and 
transformations, their internal differences, the productivity of intercultural 
contact, and the ability of peoples to culturally express their position in a wider 
world.”272 
Similar to this view, designer Victor Papanek strongly criticises the proprietary system of 
intellectual property: “I feel that ideas are plentiful and cheap, and it is wrong to make money 
from the needs of others.”273 Sociologist Michael Polanyi adds his voice to this growing number 
of critics by noting that patent law is deficient because it tries to parcel sectors of the whole 
wealth of human knowledge, which is cumulative by nature.274 The accumulation of knowledge 
has become one of the trademarks of present day innovation in almost all areas of human 
endeavour. Long comments that “Continued product discoveries and innovations also rely 
increasingly on the knowledge gleaned from preceding ones and on generally available 
techniques that have made the process of innovation more predictable.”275  
In his influential essay, “Selling wine without bottles”, author John Perry Barlow suggests that 
information is currency, and that in the modern marketplace of ideas, information is used to buy 
more information. He talks of information as though it is a living organism, expressing that it 
wants to be free, reproduce, change and disseminate. A necessary corollary of Barlow’s ideas is 
that sharing will, and indeed does, occur all the time. Information accumulates, reproduces and 
jumps from one end of the world to the other. Intellectual property would be inconsequential to 
this process, as it fails to account for the inherent inventiveness of human beings. Barlow 
expresses this by stating that: 
“...there are the inexplicable pleasures of information itself, the joys of learning, 
knowing, and teaching. The strange good feeling of information coming into and 
out of oneself. Playing with ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to 
pay a lot for, given the market for books and elective seminars. We'd likely 
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren't so many 
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.”276 
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There is an obvious element shared by all of the criticisms listed and that runs in line with the 
nature of technological and scientific development already described, and it is the value 
awarded to information due to its cumulative nature. Sharing then becomes the means of 
reproduction of information, corroborating Barlow’s views of information as a living organism. 
The analogy of information as a living thing cannot be simply discarded as a ridiculous notion; 
scientific thought has been moving towards the identification of information as something 
analogous to a virus.277 This is the theory of memetics, which views certain ideas as a viral unit 
known as a meme. Memes are ideas that spread and reproduce using humans as their hosts. The 
originator of this theory is biologist Richard Dawkins, who equates memes with genes. He says 
that:  
“Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to 
body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by 
leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be 
called imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on 
to his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If 
the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to 
brain.”278 
This theory sheds new light on the nature of intellectual property. Can we possibly assign 
property to powerful ideas such as memes? If information is always striving to reproduce, how 
can we put a leash on it?   
Scientific research is another field where the non-proprietary sharing of ideas and the 
cumulative process of knowledge is fostered. Scientists share their findings through publication 
in peer-reviewed journals. In fact, science relies heavily in this process, as expressed by Jacob 
Bronowski, who says that science is founded on an “explicit social contract between scientists, 
so that each can depend on the trustworthiness of the rest.”279 Science relies on this continuous 
sharing of ideas, where theories and hypotheses are reviewed and analysed by others; this tends 
to create a dynamic environment that checks scientific thought for errors and flaws. This is the 
real marketplace of ideas, where memes live and interact with one another. As Newton 
famously said, we are standing on the shoulders of giants.    
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3.2 The death of the Romantic author and the Heroic inventor  
It could be argued successfully that the modern system of intellectual property is a direct result 
of the shift in the definition of authorship and invention, from that of a common effort to the 
birth of the ideas of the Romantic author and the Heroic inventor.280 This structure of the 
individual searching to obtain profits from the labour of their mind is indeed one of the 
justifications for intellectual property already explored. The end result of this view is the present 
system in which property in the intellectual expressions of the human mind is protected by the 
law with increasing force, as has been proven in previous chapters. The problem is that this 
view is often at odds with the other element of intellectual property; the need to ensure that 
society has access to the fruits of those intellectual creations in one way or another. This eternal 
struggle between disclosure of information and its suppression is one of the major points of 
debate and criticism in this field. The Bellagio Declaration recognises this struggle by 
commenting that:  
“In general, systems built around the author paradigm tend to obscure the 
importance of "the public domain," the intellectual and cultural commons from 
which future works will be constructed. The assumption of these systems is that 
one must reward creators in order to ensure new production. Yet the "reward" 
has its costs. Each intellectual property right, in effect, fences off some portion 
of the public domain, making it unavailable to future creators. If one is 
concerned about promoting future production of books, ideas, inventions, and 
works of art, then one must be just as careful in one's protection of a vigorous 
and diverse public domain, a "commons" of scientific, literary, and artistic raw 
material, as one is in one's protection of the author's rights and incentives. 
Recently, there has been a dangerous international tendency to suppress the 
former concern and to concentrate only on the latter.”281 
What the experts in the Bellagio Declaration mean by this is that intellectual property was 
created with another era in mind. In other words, the continued use of the paradigm that protects 
intellectual creations, as the result of a figure which no longer exists, is not only problematic, 
but is eroding the existence of the public domain. Yet the cultural images of Thomas Edison, 
Mark Twain, Charles Dickens, Enrico Marconi and Ernest Hemingway as the very 
personification of intellectual property are hard to shake off and are still paraded as a 
justification for the commodification of information, resulting in the system of intellectual 
property. Boyle for example, points out that “…information property rights of scientists are 
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portrayed as necessary incentives to innovation. This assertion is not supported by data or 
analysis. It simply flows from the assumptions of romantic authorship.”282   
The problem presented by adhering to this Romantic view cannot be underestimated. In 
particular, it would appear that this paradigm no longer reflects the realities of the creative 
process. Evidence for this is the fact that in contemporary times, the Romantic author and the 
Heroic inventor are no longer the largest producers of intellectual works; their place has been 
taken over by large intellectual property industries. When the individuals are taken from the 
equation, one can see a case being made for the utilitarian justification. Vaver points out that:  
“Since the onset of industrialisation, the individual creator and inventor has 
been pushed to the sidelines. Most creative and inventive work is not done by 
individuals; it is done by teams, and the creativity and inventiveness is part of a 
process designed to put a product on the market. Occasionally, the creativity is 
that of the team itself. More often, it is directed by the firm that employs the 
team. Most copyrights and patents do not belong to their individual creators and 
inventors but to the firms that employ them.”283 
Perhaps two of the most cited proponents of this view are Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee, 
a copyright lawyer and a literary expert respectively.284 Woodmansee for example makes the 
point that individual creativity was not the norm before the advent of the Romantic author, and 
that many of the works from the 18th century are responsible for shaping this mythical figure 
and helping to cement the nascent institution of intellectual property law.285 The point is that 
this Romantic notion no longer applies – Woodmansee argues that it probably was never 
relevant – and that we are seeing a return to collective authorship. Yet the myth remains. In fact, 
Woodmansee comments that “it would seem that as creative production becomes more 
corporate, collective and collaborative, the law invokes the Romantic author all the more 
insistently.”286  
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Jaszi’s analysis of the subject enhances that of Woodmansee with legal arguments.287 In 
particular, he comments that the legal application of the law has been desperate to use the figure 
of the Romantic author as one of the main justifications for the existing system, sometimes even 
in rulings where the opposite to this individual view was being discussed. An example of the 
latter would include the case of “work for hire”, where the authorship of an intellectual work is 
given to the employer and not the author.288  Another interesting case put forward by Jaszi is his 
valid opinion that modern legislation, doctrine and case law tend to neglect the figure of 
collective authorship and instead focus on the individual Romantic concept.289 This view is not 
without its critics. Fatima for example argues strongly that the law does recognise the figure of 
the Romantic author, but that it also favours the collective approach.290 It would seem that 
Jaszi’s idea is closer to the truth; even a cursory look through present legislation makes it 
evident that individual creators would appear to be at the centre of the written law.  
This erosion of the traditional concept of authorship is made more evident on the internet, where 
users tend to write with anonymity in mind. One of the results of such anonymity is the failure 
to identify authors. In this case there cannot be any sort of proprietary rights, as the creator of a 
work cannot be readily identified.291 This phenomenon of anonymity is one of the defining 
characteristics of internet life because of the prevalent use of internet nicknames or avatars.  
It appears that the idea of the Romantic author is not the only figure under attack. The other 
pillar of the equation, the lone and brilliant inventor, would appear to be a rarity as well, a myth 
created from the example set by a few brilliant individuals. Former US Patent Office 
Commissioner Bruce Lehman even went to the lengths of describing individual inventors as 
“weekend hobbyists”.292 Some statistics would seem to support this monumental shift; patent 
applications from independent inventors in the United States made up 86% of the total of 
applications presented during 1910, while the same figure had diminished to an astounding 15% 
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in 1998.293 These inventors are also 25% less likely to bring their inventions to the market than 
their corporate counterparts.294  
All of these examples serve to enforce the view that authorship of a work or invention is on the 
decrease, while the emphasis increasingly lies with the concept of ownership. The work for hire 
is just one case of this, intellectual property deals more and more with collective works where 
the author has taken second place behind those who pay for the work. The largest and most 
successful intellectual property industries are almost entirely the result of collaborative efforts 
between individuals and commercial interests. The field of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, 
software, recording and film production are just for a few of the examples of this. Even in the 
traditional fields where intellectual property can be more readily identified with the Romantic 
ideas – such as literature – one can make the case that these “Romantic” authors would be 
nothing without the massive support awarded to them by the literary industry.  
3.3 Looking for the elusive commons 
One of the other important aspects that are brought forward by the intellectual property 
radicalism and revisionism is the detrimental effect to the public domain that is caused by the 
seemingly unstoppable trend towards stronger intellectual legal protection. The public domain 
is the intellectual commons, the information that should be accessible by the whole of humanity 
and which lacks proprietary protection mechanisms.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the commons as something “Belonging to all mankind 
alike; pertaining to the human race as a possession or attribute.”295 In other words, the 
“commons” means the public space, the existence of objects and ideas that can be used by all 
the members of the human race. It is of course evident that not everything can belong to this 
common space, hence the existence of the system of private property. However, it is possible to 
distinguish between different types of common property. This is where we return to the 
economic concepts of rival and non-rival resources. Professor Lawrence Lessig draws upon this 
distinction and applies it to the commons. He describes several rival goods that are in the public 
domain, such as roads, parks and beaches; these resources cannot be used by everybody at the 
same time. He also describes several non-rival resources; such as Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
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or poems. 296 The fact that ideas are non-rival in nature gives the public domain for such 
intellectual creations a very different nature from that of their rivalrous counterparts. While rival 
resources may suffer from over-consumption, non-rivalrous ones do not; millions can read the 
works of Shakespeare, yet those works are still there after they have been read.297 The question 
then is whether we should assign rivalrous rules to non-rivalrous resources. The answer to this 
can be found in the justifications for intellectual property. In those justifications, it all comes 
down to trying to encourage people to produce these resources, hence placing them outside of 
the commons for a period of time.  
The commons is one of the most important elements of the social contract that supports some 
elements of intellectual property because part of the contract is an assumption that intellectual 
works will eventually be freed from proprietary restrictions and humanity will be able to benefit 
from them.298 The commons serves as the light at the end of the tunnel; we allow limited 
proprietary rights to intellectual creations as a means of encouragement with the understanding 
that after a period of time those protected ideas will end up in the commons, accessible to all. 
This would establish an intrinsic relationship between public domain and intellectual property 
legislation, where the latter owes its existence and its reason for being to the former. This is 
often forgotten.  
Boyle does issue a warning to all critics of intellectual property, reminding that the public 
domain is the ultimate motivation for the criticisms, and not intellectual property itself. In other 
words, defence of the public domain would appear more desirable than an attack upon 
intellectual property. He says that the comments against intellectual property “are framed as 
criticisms of intellectual property rather than defenses of the public domain or the commons, 
terms that appears rarely if at all in the debates. There is no real discussion of the world of 
intellectual property’s outside, it’s opposite.”299   
The challenge then is to understand that the commons of ideas is the goal of society, regardless 
of the system of ownership that precedes it. Society cannot permit existence of a system that 
protects intellectual creations ad perpetuam. There must be an end which will allow access to 
ideas for the widest possible audience without restriction; these ideas are a non-rival resource, 
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even if the system of protection recognises creators with the rights necessary to encourage the 
production of such works.    
This perception of the commons as a goal is under increased threat. It would seem that 
intellectual property protection is on the increase, diminishing the role of the commons, and 
turning ideas into proprietary environments. Copyright expert Jessica Litman masterfully 
describes another interesting example of the erosion of the public domain by the passing of an 
extension of copyright terms. She explains that as copyright terms were extended a further 
twenty years, publishers of public domain books had to wait that time to make these books 
available, effectively eroding the public domain and restricting the access of the public to such 
works.300 During the debate in the US Congress in which this extension was considered, movie 
industry representative, Jack Valenti, made perhaps the most chilling comment against the 
public domain:  
“Whatever work is not protected is a work that no one preserves. The quality of 
the print is soon degraded. There is no one who will invest the funds for 
enhancement because there is no longer an incentive to rehabilitate and 
preserve. A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. 
But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and 
haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who, then, will invest the funds to 
renovate and nourish its future life when no one owns it? How does the 
consumer benefit from that scenario? The answer is, there is no benefit.”301   
Somebody should perhaps have reminded Mr. Valenti that Homer, Plato and Aristotle are still 
being published centuries after they were written. What this serves to illustrate is that there is a 
growing culture that dismisses the commons because they serve no economic purpose. Under 
this scheme, everything must be owned.  
4. A future without intellectual property? 
Can we envision a future without intellectual property? Despite the fact that there appears to be 
no shortage of those who criticise intellectual property, those who are willing to propose 
alternatives are remarkably few. For all of the criticisms that have been expressed so far, 
solutions and alternatives are in short supply. This does not mean that there are none.  
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4.1 The reward model 
The most valid alternative proposed is that of a reward model, which is based on the award of a 
monetary payment by the government to innovators and authors, with the result of such works 
being placed in the public domain. This system is not new; it dates back to the abolitionist 
debate in Britain, where a similar proposal was put forward as a viable alternative to the patent 
model.302  This is also advocated by socialists in regards to intellectual property rights, as it is 
more in accordance with the socialist view of property, and hence of its intellectual cousin. 
Under this socialist version of the reward model, the existing proprietary model of protection 
would be replaced with a system of state subsidies and social benefits for creators. This system 
was used in the Soviet Union, and Social Democratic nations such as Sweden and Norway have 
considered at some point a similar model; Norway went as far as to implement such a scheme 
for a short period in 1956.303  
Hettinger would appear to favour this view as well, as he advocates a return of a patronage 
system funded by the state. This system would work in a way similar to research funding seen 
in academia, and the effect of such a state reward program would result in the works passing 
immediately to the public domain.304 A similar proposal to this system comes from Barlow, 
who is perhaps one of those few critics of intellectual property who is actually proposing 
alternatives. He states that: 
“The other existing, model, of course, is service. The entire professional class - 
doctors, lawyers, consultants, architects, and so on - are already being paid 
directly for their intellectual property. Who needs copyright when you're on a 
retainer? In fact, until the late 18th century this model was applied to much of 
what is now copyrighted. Before the industrialization of creation, writers, 
composers, artists, and the like produced their products in the private service of 
patrons. Without objects to distribute in a mass market, creative people will 
return to a condition somewhat like this, except that they will serve many 
patrons, rather than one.”305   
At first glance, such a system would appear to be unworkable, the result of wishful thinking 
prompted by a leftist distrust of intellectual property. Nevertheless, there appears to be sound 
evidence to support such a system. In an interesting study by economists, Steven Shavell and 
                                                
302 Dutton, H. I. The Patent system and Inventive Activity during the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1852, Dover (NH): Manchester 
University Press, 1984.   
303 Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, op cit; p.149-150.  
304 Hettinger, op cit; p.51.  
305 Barlow, op cit.  
  
Tanguy Van Ypersele, the reward model is compared with the existing intellectual property 
system from a mere economic standpoint.306 Their reward model is based on the optional co-
existence of a double-pronged reward system, based upon patents and government grants. 
Creators can choose whether they will apply for a patent or for a grant. If they apply for the 
latter, then the work will remain in the public domain. 
Shavell and Van Ypersele’s findings are surprising. They argue that the proprietary model is not 
economically superior to an optional reward system – optional because creators will decide 
whether or not they want to enter into such a scheme. Part of their argument rests on a point 
made earlier in this work, that the existing intellectual property system has been unchallenged, 
and its justifications have gone untested. They contend that these justifications do not survive 
economic scrutiny by saying that under the existing intellectual property system – in particular 
patents – the reward obtained by a creator takes the shape of a limited monopoly. The problem 
with this is that it produces two key negative economic elements:  
“First, incentives to invest in research are inadequate because monopoly profits 
are less than the social surplus created by the innovation. Second, if an 
innovation results, there is a deadweight loss in social welfare because too little 
is sold at the monopoly price.”307 
This would seem to corroborate the observation that imitation often works. It is evident that 
intellectual property rights increase the price of products and diminish their social impact 
because they are not as widespread as they would be if they were in the public domain. In 
contrast, the reward system as described by Shavell and Van Ypersele (and as distinct from the 
reward elements of an intellectual property system) does not have these negative points. The 
authors argue that: 
“Under the reward system, the innovator’s incentive to invest in research is the 
reward he would receive. If the innovator produces an innovation, it will be 
available to competitors and so will sell at marginal cost (perfect competition in 
the market is assumed).”308 
Because there is thus no social loss from the award of a monopoly, the only disadvantage to this 
system would be the initial incentive to conduct innovation in the first place. The incentive to 
innovation may be higher in the proprietary system, but that is its only advantage, and that alone 
                                                
306 Shavell, S. and Van Ypersele, T. “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol.XLIV (2) (Pt. 1), October 2001, p.525-547.  
307 Ibid; p.529.  
308 Ibid.  
  
does not overcome the two inherent disadvantages explained. However, when an optional 
reward system is considered, the model is unambiguously in favour of reward on all counts. 
This is because, according to Shavell and Van Ypersele’s model, in an optional system the 
innovator will choose the reward model over the proprietary one, eliminating the question of 
whether or not the proprietary model induces research.309  
There are still several problems with this model, some of them recognised by the authors.310 It 
rests on many assumptions, such as government efficiency in allocating resources to the 
research that merits funding and the cost of such a scheme to taxpayers, to name just two. The 
advantages are clear: there could be a race to be first in the market, there would also be no 
restrictions towards competitors improving the innovations, and the social benefit of immediate 
access to the innovations around the world cannot be underestimated. The proposal is indeed 
interesting, and merits further analysis from other economists.  
4.2 A technical model: Digital Rights Management  
A system that is increasingly being used by intellectual property owners is that of the 
implementation of technical protection, in particular for digital products such as computer 
software, digital music, and computer hardware.  
These solutions are generally known as Digital Rights Management (DRM). If one thinks of 
intellectual property law as a legislative fence built by the government to protect intellectual 
creations, DRMs would be a fence built by the owners because the legislative one is not enough 
to protect their works, or in some instances, to enhance the rights awarded to them by 
legislation.311  
There is an increased use of DRM to protect digital works, in particular within the copyright 
industry. There are several technological means which can be used to protect intellectual works 
from copying, such as encryption, hardware locking, compression, and many others.312  
Examples of these can be seen in a wide variety of new products, from Microsoft Windows to 
DVDs.  
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The idea behind DRMs is that the owners of intellectual creations will have strict control over 
what is done with their products, opening a can of worms for the legal profession. It is perfectly 
possible that industries will sell CDs which will only play three times, and after that you would 
need to buy a new one. It is also possible that some products will only work with digitally 
approved players or hardware. Another possibility is that in some cases, software and hardware 
will have monitoring and reporting capabilities which will tell vendors if somebody is misusing 
their products, being able to shut them down remotely. This is the case with so-called Palladium 
technology being developed by Microsoft.313 The question is not whether these technologies 
will be developed, but how.314    
The prospect of a completely unregulated set of rights has several implications for intellectual 
property law. One of the most obvious implications is that it may lead to an information lock-up 
to the detriment of the public interest, as owners could simply assume beforehand what types of 
activities users will be allowed to perform with their products, eroding public interest and fair 
dealing of intellectual property works.315 The fact that this system is on the increase, and is 
largely unlegislated, certainly opens up several questions about the validity of intellectual 
property. Thomas Vinje makes an excellent point when he comments that: 
“Even if legislators succeed in retaining an appropriate balance between rights, 
limits and exceptions, to what avail will this be if rightholders can effectively 
replace this copyright regime with a private one of their own making that takes 
no account of copyright limits and exceptions?”316 
DRMs then have the potential to bypass completely intellectual property legislation to make it a 
matter of contractual protection between users and owners. The rights of the consumer will be 
those awarded contractually by the owners, enforced not by the law, but by technological tools. 
A perfect example of this sort of enhancement of intellectual property legislation can found in 
the courts, for example, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg,317 where a contract was used to enhance 
existing intellectual protection of databases.  
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Nevertheless, there are several problems with DRMs. One of them is that DRMs may prove to 
be too expensive and cumbersome to be efficient. Mackaay for example, points out that 
“[digital] property rights are worthwhile so long as they offer a net return over cost 
comparable to other possible investments. Closing a hole in the fence may be costlier than the 
losses it prevents”318 In some other cases, the proposed technological fences have not been well 
received by the public because they impose unrealistic burdens upon the consumer.319 These 
schemes are still vulnerable and open to being cracked or hacked. It can be argued that technical 
fences show a large amount of naiveté by underestimating hacker resilience and inventiveness. 
The sheer amount of hacked web sites and cracked software can serve as significant evidence of 
the urge of the internet hacking community to look for new ways of bypassing any type of 
protection.320  
4.3 Other alternatives 
Although the two alternatives mentioned are some of the most viable ones, they are not the only 
ones suggested.  
The most viable alternative to the existing system of intellectual property, and in particular to 
copyright, is being used widely in the software community within the growing field of non-
proprietary software development. Because this field has huge implications as a means of 
providing information technology to the developing world, it will receive more detailed 
coverage in the last two chapters. What is important to note here is that this model can be 
considered as further evidence that there are viable alternatives to existing proprietary models of 
intellectual creation; in fact, the popularity of the non-proprietary model of software 
development has to be taken as direct evidence against some of the utilitarian justifications for 
intellectual property, as it proves that creators will produce even if there is no economic reward 
waiting at the end of their labours.   
Another model that has been proposed is that of offering real time intellectual creations in a 
pay-per-view model. Barlow strongly advocates such a system, stating that: 
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“One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual property is real-
time performance, a medium currently used only in theater, music, lectures, 
stand-up comedy, and pedagogy. I believe the concept of performance will 
expand to include most of the information economy, from multicasted soap 
operas to stock analysis. In these instances, commercial exchange will be more 
like ticket sales to a continuous show than the purchase of discrete bundles of 
that which is being shown.”321   
Some recent developments in internet technology may be providing the required basis for such 
pay-per-view schemes, perhaps fuelled by the widespread problem of piracy of digital works 
encountered in cyberspace. Examples of intellectual creators placing their works for a small 
initial fee or through pay-per-view schemes are starting to gain considerable ground in the 
academic arena.322 One example would be the several file-sharing systems; these systems allow 
users to exchange music files which have been cleared by the authors, but require those users to 
subscribe to the service by means of a small fee.323 With the further development of the internet 
as a place of commerce, it would seem possible that users will become more sophisticated, and 
purchasing works online will become more commonplace. This system would have the benefit 
to owners of immediate remuneration. As the marketplace becomes flooded with more creators, 
and the distribution chain is shortened because of the internet, it is possible that authors will 
simply not be that bothered with intellectual property rights, moving instead towards 
subscription systems based on micro-payments. This model has now become possible with the 
development of online payment models designed to encourage the system of small payments by 
means of electronic cash.324  
After listing some of these suggestions, the question remains of how all of this could come 
about. How do these intellectual property radicals suggest that the present system can be 
overthrown? This question appears to have been neglected, but there are some willing to tackle 
it, albeit rather obliquely. Martin suggests that the inherent cost of the intellectual property 
system is expensive because of “patent offices, legislation, court cases, agencies to collect fees 
and much else”325 and that such costs should be studied and publicised. He argues that after 
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these costs have been presented to the public, the alternatives to intellectual property should 
become more appealing from a mere economic standpoint.  
4.4. Necessity for change 
Despite all of the listed criticisms to intellectual property, it would seem that the system is here 
to stay. To start with, it is evident from the previous section that there are several problems with 
the suggested replacements to intellectual property. Some appear sound, and in some cases they 
are even being successfully applied, but the problem with most of them is that they would 
appear to work better as a complement to existing intellectual property legislation, and not as an 
entirely different and novel set of proposals that would immediately serve to overhaul the 
proprietary system. Something else that has become evident is that none of the criticisms that 
have been presented would appear to be the silver bullet that kills intellectual property; they are 
more appropriately understood as calls for reform rather than calls for abolition. It would be 
disingenuous and perhaps even naïve, to believe that intellectual property law will simply 
disappear, and that owners of intellectual creations will give up their lucrative businesses to 
accommodate some few disgruntled individuals. The viable solution is then to move towards a 
rational change to the existing system to accommodate these criticisms.  
Some of the critics mentioned agree with this view. Talking about the patent system in 
particular, Lessig points out that “No doubt we are better off with a patent system than without 
one. Lots of research and invention wouldn't occur without the government's protection. But 
just because some protection is good, more isn't necessarily better.”326   
Other authors claim that even the internet serves as an example of the necessity for intellectual 
property protection: 
“Although there may be a small but high-profile gift economy that flourished 
especially in its early experimental days, and a second wave of Internet 
“trading” in which companies are prepared to wait to see profits generated 
from their market activities after markets could be established, the current 
reality of the Internet is that much of the material that is now being published 
and traded there relies very strongly on copyright.”327 
Infringement of intellectual property resulting from inadequate protection can also be a problem 
for the developing world. Alford warns against the consequences that such an abolitionist view 
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would have. Commenting on the Chinese economy and the effects that widespread intellectual 
property infringement has had, he states that: 
“Emerging entrepreneurs are all too often unable to realize the fruits of their 
innovation. Businesses and educational centers find that the costs of needed 
foreign technologies and materials have risen to take account of infringement, if 
they are even available. The reassertion of artistic creativity…is threatened as 
authors and other artists are unable to collect royalties needed to sustain 
themselves in the absence of the state support they once enjoyed.”328 
If reform is to be the solution, what shape should it take? This question is more difficult to 
answer. One of the most important suggestions would be to maintain the system roughly as it 
stands, but to enhance it by encouraging with public funds the development of various non-
proprietary sharing schemes. There are several examples of such programs that further the ideas 
of public domain-based knowledge. One of these proposals is the Global Ideas Bank,329 a group 
dedicated to the diffusion of non-technological ideas for the betterment of society, providing a 
cash prize each year to the best ideas. Another interesting scheme is Project Gutenberg,330 an 
online group which digitises books that are in the public domain and makes them available 
online for free in an attempt to promote the distribution of ideas. Another interesting proposal is 
that of the Commons Group,331 an organisation that provides technical assistance for non-profit 
organisations that want to provide public domain material online to a wide audience. There are 
many groups like these whose efforts could be well directed by public funds, as long as their 
goals of attempting to provide free distribution of ideas remain.  
Nevertheless, such ideas are not enough without some sort of actual legal reform, both at 
national and international levels. This reform must start with the understanding that the 
relentless push towards stronger national and international protection is counterproductive. At 
the national level, the first step towards redressing this trend would be to stop the continuous 
extension to the scope of intellectual property rights, in particular in copyright. IP maximalism 
has been given too much time to reign, and it is time to give the revisionists a go. 
The international agenda with regards to developing countries will be discussed next. 
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Chapter 4. Intellectual property and developing countries 
“Intellectual property rights have to do with protectionism. The U.S., and in fact 
the rich countries generally, have led the insistence that the GATT agreement, 
like NAFTA, include strong intellectual property rights. That's protectionism. 
That means increasing the power of patents. Patents are protectionist devices. 
They are designed to insure that the technology of the future is in the hands of 
transnational corporations, most of which, incidentally, you guys pay for. 
Remember they don't believe in a free market. They want to be publicly 
subsidized in research and development and controlled markets and so on. The 
strength of intellectual property rights means longer patents.” 
Noam Chomsky  
 
The intellectual property system is here to stay, as it is unlikely that any sort of reform will take 
place in the foreseeable future. This protection system is on the increase, not only in length of 
protection, but also geographically and in the amount of rights awarded to owners. How then 
does this system affect the acquisition of technology by developing countries? This is not just 
an academic question. A strong international system of intellectual property could be considered 
a negative for developing countries because one could argue that it makes technology more 
difficult to come by. If developing countries rely on this initial acquisition of high technologies, 
then who owns it, and how, becomes of critical significance for their development prospects. 
Some may argue that less developed countries have a lot to lose and not a lot to gain from 
implementing the Western model of intellectual property.332 Is this correct?  
1. Intellectual property in the global village 
1.1 Trends of protection 
Perhaps it could be considered an overstatement to emphasise that the ownership of technology 
is well covered by national intellectual property legislation in developed nations. Nevertheless, 
the trends of national protection become crucial to the study of its effect to developing countries 
because those trends are being exported to developing countries.  
National protection of ideas is on the increase. Perhaps one of the best examples of this trend is 
to chart the gradual extension of copyright terms at national level. To illustrate this point, the 
Statute of Anne gave authors a copyright that lasted 21 years after the first publication of the 
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work.333 Later, the Copyright Act of 1814 increased the term to 28 years after publication. In 
1842 the term was increased to the lifetime of the author plus seven years, or 42 years after first 
publication, whichever was longer.334 The French Declaration of the Rights of Genius of 1873, 
allowed for copyright protection to last for the lifetime of the author plus ten years after their 
death.335 But the most influential determination for the extension of copyright terms took place 
with the Berne Convention. After the first revision to the Convention, which took place in 
Berlin in 1908, the minimum term of copyright for which signatory countries should allow was 
extended to the lifetime of the author plus 50 years, which remains in the latest revisions to the 
text. The United Kingdom followed suit and enhanced the protection with a new Act of 
Parliament in 1911.336 
The European Union, in an attempt to harmonise the various copyright terms amongst its 
member states, increased yet again the term of copyright from 50 years to 70 years after the 
death of the author with the approval in 1993 of the Copyright Duration Directive, implemented 
in the UK in 1995.337 This Directive was the direct result of the enormous economic interests at 
stake, and of the considerable lobbying power of the copyright owner industries, as most of the 
countries in the European Union had maintained the Berne Convention’s copyright term of the 
lifetime of the author plus 50 years.338 It would have been logical to maintain this term as a 
minimum, and to allow for the countries with longer terms to continue doing so. These 
increases have spread further than the European borders. In the United States, the original 
period of protection was for 14 years, and was later amended to 28 years. Although the US did 
not sign the Berne Convention until 1988, it did extend the term of copyright to fit with that of 
this treaty in 1976, and followed suit and implemented the new European standard with the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.339  
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This serves to demonstrate that the national trends towards more protection are generally 
translated into international protection, and developing countries are being encouraged to 
implement the idea of intellectual property prevalent in the West.  
1.2 A Western institution?  
It is relevant to the question of whether developing countries should adopt the Western system 
of intellectual property, to analyse whether this concept is endemic to Western values, and 
whether it goes against customary cultural practices in other parts of the world.  
In general, it could be argued successfully that modern intellectual property is indeed a Western 
concept, developed from the requirements of mercantilist Britain in response to the growing 
proprietary and private ownership concepts in vogue in the 18th century. Charting the evolution 
of intellectual property in Europe, one can soon notice how the international development of the 
protection of ideas has spread from industrialised nations, a process that has been accelerating 
with the growing process of globalisation and the increase in international trade.  
There is some evidence that points towards the finding that the modern international intellectual 
property system is indeed alien to many cultures, and not only that, some even argue that the 
whole modern concept of human inventiveness and creativity is slanted towards a Eurocentric 
view, where cultural expressions and ideas do not necessitate protection unless they are part of a 
Western product. An interesting case is put forward by Rosemary Coombe, who explains that 
Art and Culture (capitalised nouns) as we know them today are the result of 19th century 
colonial expansion, and therefore alien to a wider and more inclusive way of viewing 
intellectual creations. She says that the system of authorship inherent to the Western intellectual 
property system only serves to “culturally impoverish the West”, while alienating the rest of the 
world.340    
Historically, China presents a great example of a millenary culture where intellectual property 
would seem to clash with traditional methods of intellectual dissemination. Some authors have 
pointed out that there is evidence that the Chinese culture was slanted towards collective 
attribution of creativity and widespread sharing of knowledge, at least in the elite classes.341 It 
has been noted that the Chinese first developed black powder, paper, the printing press, matches 
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and the compass, technologies that were later adopted by Western nations. It could be argued 
that if China had first developed intellectual property, perhaps these inventions would have been 
translated into an Industrial Revolution, but it is difficult to assert this categorically. The 
historical fact remains that Chinese society favoured sharing of knowledge.    
Ideas are non-proprietary in many other societies. Joost Smiers points out that in artistic 
expressions for example, the trend in many parts of the world tends to be towards communal 
efforts. He gives the example of many sorts of musical expressions, for example, raï, calypso, 
reggae, samba, and African music, which rely heavily on borrowed elements, and where 
performers are free to add on to existing tunes as part of the creative process. Smiers also points 
out that Japanese culture tends to regard claims of individual ownership of ideas as 
“dishonourable or undignified”.342 Several other examples of communal “ownership” over 
intellectual creations are found in Australian aboriginal societies, where paintings, oral 
traditions, medicinal remedies and other artistic methodologies are not to be subject to 
individual ownership, but are the result of a complex system of tradition, transmission and 
sacred meaning that place all of these results of the human psyche beyond the traditional 
Western ideas of property – a conflict that has been making itself felt in Australian courts.343   
In an unprecedented meeting of intellectual property experts in areas as diverse as law, 
anthropology, information technology, biology, and the arts, several experts in intellectual 
property issued the Bellagio Declaration, which recognises the Western centrism of existing 
protection of ideas. The Declaration concludes that “in an era in which information is among 
the most precious of all resources, intellectual property rights cannot be framed by the few to be 
applied to the many. They cannot be framed on assumptions that disproportionately exclude the 
contributions of important parts of the world community.”344 
The pervasiveness of illegal copying of works in many parts of the world would seem to 
support the view that intellectual property is a system alien to many cultures. Global software 
piracy figures would seem to indicate that the illegal copying of software is concentrated in the 
Asia/Pacific region, with losses in revenue calculated at $4.75 billion USD.345 Another report 
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by the Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA) identified Taiwan, South Korea, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia as the major copiers of computer and video games 
around the globe.346 Music piracy runs rampant in Latin America, where more than 50% of 
music sales are of pirated copies in most countries.347   
1.3 Globalisation 
The Western institution of intellectual property cannot be divorced from the modern concepts of 
globalisation and international trade. The reason for this is that as international commerce 
between nations increases, developed nations will be interested in making sure that the 
proprietary protection of technologies that they have enacted within their countries applies as 
well when exporting those technologies around the world.   
The general understanding of the meaning of globalisation is that it is a process in which the 
world is moving from a system of national economies into a trade regime where barriers of 
different types are disappearing to create one global marketplace.348 It is believed that this 
process of globalisation is being driven by the fall of trade and investment barriers, the rapid 
technological advance in transportation and telecommunications, and the increase in direct 
investment of companies into third markets.349  
A symposium held by the OECD has stated that globalisation is not an isolated phenomenon, 
but it is the latest stage in the development of the international economy. The OECD Industry 
Committee established that the characteristics of globalisation are: 
“- The organisation of production on an international scale, enabling firms to 
establish a presence in major foreign markets, gain efficiencies and customise 
products for local markets. 
- The acquisition of inputs and supporting services from around the world, 
enabling firms to exploit the specialisation of many countries and minimise 
costs. 
- The formation of cross border alliances and joint ventures with other 
companies, enabling firms to combine assets, share costs and enter new 
markets.”350 
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It can be stated that this globalisation trend means that enterprises are crossing borders more 
frequently when investing; precisely what makes them into multinational corporations. 
Globalisation is a process that encourages the use of local labour, local enterprises and local 
expertise in order to maximise efficiency and reduce costs, which implies a certain degree of 
cooperation between the multinational corporation and the recipient country.351 One could argue 
that this would be welcomed by developing countries, as those partnerships would allow some 
sort of transfer of technology to take place, as expressed earlier. However, enterprises that rely 
heavily in the protection awarded to their technology have it in their best interest to make sure 
that their intellectual property will also be protected wherever they invest because staying ahead 
in the highly competitive information markets requires a lot of investment.  
It seems like the present push towards globalisation is not going to slow down, and it is actually 
speeding up as more trading barriers fall down. Moreover, international organisations such as 
the WTO are very sympathetic to the opening of markets and the increase in international trade.  
It is easy to see why developed countries are pushing for a stronger international regime of 
intellectual property. If globalisation is a process of capitalism directed towards the opening of 
trade borders in search of new markets and resources, then it also must be understood that 
globalisation is expansionist by nature. One of the results of such expansionism is the 
exportation of all systems that assist globalisation.352 This is translated often into the installation 
of financial and structural reforms in developing countries to “modernise” their economies by 
means of privatisation and opening of trade barriers. The implementation of legal institutions 
that assist globalisation will also be a priority, particularly for countries that do not have any of 
those systems in place, or have inadequate versions of the legislations in place in the West. This 
is particularly important with regards to the protection of intellectual products. Bettig 
comments: “Given the expansionary logic of capital, it is ‘natural’ that existing and emerging 
forms of human artistic and intellectual creativity increasingly are being integrated into the 
global market system.”353  
The end result of the relentless globalisation process is the generation of a North–South trade 
route, which includes the trade of culture, knowledge and technology. However, this is a 
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disproportionate and one-sided trade of ideas because developed countries receive intellectual 
products for free, while exporting technology at the highest price. Boyle expresses this process 
by noting that: 
“The author concept stands as a gate through which one must pass in order to 
acquire intellectual property rights.  At the moment, this is a gate that tends 
disproportionally to favor the developed countries' contributions to world 
science and culture.  Curare, batik, myths, and the dance 'lambada' flow out of 
the developing countries, unprotected by intellectual property rights, while 
Prozac, Levis, Grisham, and the movie Lambada! flow in--protected by a suite 
of intellectual property law, which in turn are backed by the threat of trade 
sanctions.”354      
It is this sense of isolation in the decision making process which makes the implementation of 
intellectual property protection in the developing world such a difficult task. It has to be said 
that there is no single solution within an intellectual property model. The assumption that the 
Western model is the only appropriate way to protect intellectual creations fails to recognise the 
many viable alternatives to be found in other cultural systems of ownership.  
2. Intellectual property and development 
2.1 The imitation dilemma revisited 
The trend towards globalisation and the exportation of stronger intellectual property systems to 
developing countries protection seems to be unstoppable. One could assume that all of this 
protection should have a detrimental effect on developing countries because technology will be 
more expensive and difficult to acquire without infringing on the owner’s rights. Is this an 
accurate assumption?  
It has already been discussed that imitation of technology existed long before the creation of 
intellectual property models and that imitation is one of the most important vehicles of 
technological advancement, and perhaps even of development.  
There appears to be plenty of evidence showing that when a country is in its developing stages, 
the emphasis on the protection of intellectual creations seems to be of secondary concern. 
Examples like these abound in the annals of the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, where the 
transfer of industrial technology from Britain was done by hiring skilled British workers in an 
effort to overcome some of the early patent restrictions, so much was done in this way that the 
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British government had to ban skilled worker migration.355 In fact, the UNDP remarks that 
“…many of today’s advanced economies refused to grant patents throughout the 19th and early 
20th centuries, or found legal and illegal ways of circumventing them.”356   
In the same line, Muchlinski points out that the developed world currently places a much larger 
emphasis on intellectual property rights than they did when they were becoming industrialised, 
which may account for the speed with which the development took place.357 This phenomenon 
may be an indication that developed countries have facilitated their own technological 
development by protecting their markets from external patent suits against companies that are 
imitating the inventions of others. An example of this is that of Switzerland, home of some of 
the largest pharmaceutical companies in Europe, which did not even recognise product patents 
until 1977.358   
Another example can be found in the development of intellectual property protection in the 
United States. Although from the start it inherited some of the economic justifications for the 
existence of intellectual property from Europe, the United States has been remarkably reticent, 
until recently, to advocate for international intellectual property. The main example of this can 
be seen from the early stages of international protection prior to the Paris and Berne 
Conventions. Copyright expert, Siva Vaidhanyanathan, points out that the attitude of the 
American publishing industry for most of the 19th century was one of carefree copying of 
European works, going as far as not signing a bilateral copyright protection treaty with Britain 
as it would mean that American authors would not be able to obtain cheap British books. The 
reason for this is that it was widely believed that cheap books would help on the literacy efforts 
in the American frontier.359          
This carefree atmosphere would eventually change on the domestic front. In 1906, Mark Twain 
delivered a moving speech to the joint Committee of Patents in the American Congress, asking 
for stronger legislation to protect the rights of authors. This plea eventually led to stronger local 
protection with a new copyright bill that was passed in 1909, and would remain in effect for 
almost 70 years. Mark Twain had become involved in the copyright debate after witnessing his 
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works being pirated in Canada and Europe, and not being paid a penny for his published works 
in those countries. Despite his efforts, he was not able to convince the United States Congress to 
join the Berne Convention.360 As noted in West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law: 
“Influenced greatly by its early status as a net importer of copyrighted 
materials, the United States resisted joining the Berne Convention for over a 
century. Adherence to the treaty's conventions would have required U.S. 
publishers of foreign works---many of whom produced pirated copies---to pay 
royalties and fees to foreign copyright holders, thus causing a significant 
amount of money to go overseas. However, by the end of World War II, the 
United States had become a major exporter of copyrighted materials, and it 
became clear that it would be to the country's economic advantage if its own 
authors and copyright holders could be assured of receiving royalties from 
overseas publishing.”361     
This led the United States to eventually join the Berne Convention, and it also prompted its 
ultimate change of heart towards international intellectual property, to the point that it has now 
become one of the most outspoken proponents of stronger international regulation, as is evident 
from the vast lobbying performed by the United States government and intellectual property 
industries during the negotiations of international agreements.362  
If intellectual property was neglected during the early stages of development of the West, the 
same applies in modern times with some developing countries that have become technologically 
self-sufficient. In recent years, some of the countries in South East Asia started to experience 
considerable signs of industrialisation due to the manufacture of high-technology products. The 
UK’s Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report points out that:  
“…the best examples in the recent history of development are the countries in 
East Asia which used weak forms of IP protection tailored to their particular 
circumstances at that stage of their development.  Throughout the critical phase 
of rapid growth in Taiwan and Korea between 1960 and 1980, during which 
their economies were transformed, both countries emphasised the importance of 
imitation and reverse engineering as an important element in developing their 
indigenous technological and innovative capacity.”363     
From the examples of the early reliance in imitation, one could conclude that there is a 
dichotomy between two different aspects of technological advance between innovation and 
imitation. In countries where innovation is considered as the tool for development, strong 
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protection is likely to be favoured (i.e., the United States and Europe). In countries where 
imitation of technology is considered as the vehicle for development, intellectual property 
protection will not be a priority (i.e., Southeast Asia).364  
The examples shown above certainly point towards the existence of a double standard when it 
comes to the innovation and imitation dichotomy. It would appear that countries will desire to 
favour imitation while being in the technological development stages, but once that position has 
been attained, then the emphasis will come in attempting to protect that technology by 
advocating for stronger mechanisms to shield that technology from being imitated by others.  
2.2 Implications of technological ownership for the developing world 
The implications for the developing world of stronger international protection of intellectual 
property start becoming clearer. Developing countries cannot hope to generate their own 
technology right away, so they must acquire high technology from developed countries. One of 
the problems is that the richest Western countries largely own technology in the form of 
copyrights and patents. For example, of the global number of patents, developing countries own 
only 5%, and if the largest developing countries such as Brazil and India are taken from the 
equation, the number drops to an astounding 1%.365 Therefore, wherever this technology is 
owned, it costs money to obtain a licence to use it from the owner, and in many instances, large 
amounts of money. Because of these reasons, it would be fair to assume that stronger 
international intellectual property protection may hinder development, because intellectual 
property related industries have large and fast growing economic power. With such large 
amounts of money at stake, it should come as no surprise that the pressure to increase 
international protection of technology is not likely to stop.  
This problem has been recognised by government agencies, international organisations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and many other pressure groups. For example, the subject 
was discussed during an UNCTAD seminar that took place in Moscow in 1990; the participants 
stated, “It is likely that in the 1990s the implications of intellectual property rights in technology 
transfer will assume a considerably enhanced role”.366 The issue of development and 
intellectual property was also brought up in the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
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Development. During a meeting that took place in 1998, there was a heated debate between 
representatives from developed and developing countries. Representatives of some countries 
with less economic power, in particular the Chinese, expressed that although intellectual 
property protection is important, too much defence might hinder technology development 
efforts, thus creating a problem for fair development. The United States representative argued 
that intellectual property protection did not damage developing countries, maintaining that 
strengthening their observance will promote development by promoting foreign investment.367  
The claims made by the American representative to this Commission are not isolated; they seem 
to be part of the pitch with which the developed world is selling the strong regime of 
international protection to the developing world.368 Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
arguments in favour of the international regime of intellectual property have also been put 
forward by representatives of some poor nations. For example, the Chief State attorney of the 
African nation of Ghana has expressed that there are several advantages for the developing 
world in passing stronger intellectual property legislation. She says that increased enforcement 
of intellectual property will encourage invention and creativity, attract foreign investment, help 
to protect emerging technologies, and facilitate new development infrastructure.369  
Besides the suggested advantages for the poorer nations, some countries have decided to use the 
“big stick” approach by threatening to use their economic might against countries that do not 
meet the Western standards of intellectual property protection, mostly in the shape of trade 
sanctions. The United States for example, has in place several provisions established in Section 
301 of the 1974 Trade Act, and the subsequent awarding of Special 301 status to countries, 
implemented in 1988. This statute is explained like this:   
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“Special 301 requires the U.S. Trade Representative to identify those countries 
that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or 
deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual 
property protection. Countries which have the most onerous or egregious acts, 
policies or practices and which have the greatest adverse impact on relevant 
U.S. products must be designated “Priority Foreign Countries,” and at the end 
of an ensuing investigation, risk having trade sanctions levied against them. 
Countries can also be placed on other lists which do not result in immediate 
trade sanctions, such as ‘Priority Watch List’ and ‘Watch List’.”370      
Some other developed countries, particularly in Europe, are trying to take a look at this problem 
with a less aggressive outlook. The United Kingdom, for example, has created a Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), which is part of the Department for International 
Development. Although the Commission still insists on linking adequate intellectual property 
with foreign investment, and urges less developed countries to implement domestic intellectual 
property legislation, it has a more realistic and understanding approach to the problems that 
such protection may have on development.371  
Some NGOs agree with some of the expressed views that minimum standards of international 
intellectual property protection should be taken up by the developing world, but at the same 
time they argue that stronger protection may hinder development. In a paper by the charity 
organisation Oxfam, several problems that may emerge from stronger protection have been 
identified and enumerated. They believe that the new international regime of strong intellectual 
property protection will have the following effects:  
a) It will exclude poor countries from access to vital technologies, such as medicines, new 
seeds, software, educational materials and other intellectual creations due to high cost of 
acquisition.  
b) It will increase the already existing technology gap between rich and poor countries. 
c) It will increase the cost of technology imports by forcing licensing of intellectual creations.  
d) It will encourage a direction of research and development towards the rich economies and 
away from the research needs of poor countries, as that sort of research is more profitable.372  
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Despite all of these disheartening implications of intellectual property, developing countries still 
need the system as there are no viable alternatives to this system of protection. Ways of working 
with the existing framework must then be found. Perhaps the solution can be found in the same 
agreements that are being used to increase international protection of intellectual creations.    
3. TRIPS  
The TRIPS agreement is the most important developments for international intellectual property 
since the adoption of the Berne and Paris Conventions in the 19th century. This is because this is 
an agreement that regulates the international trade of intellectual creations within the larger 
issue of globalisation. Although there are many other treaties and agreements that regulate 
international intellectual property, this work will concentrate on the TRIPS agreement because 
the issue of the transfer of technology to developing countries is ultimately a matter of trade.  
3.1 Brief introduction to TRIPS  
As it can be gleaned from its very name, the 1995 TRIPS agreement is the international treaty 
that handles the international trade issues that arise from intellectual property protection. TRIPS 
was one of the results of the long Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), a process that had its origins in the end of the Second World War, and included 
lengthy discussions that would eventually end up in the framework that created the WTO.  The 
agreement provides a comprehensive set of rules that signatory states should implement in their 
national legislations in a wide range of issues, including copyright, patents, trademarks, designs, 
geographical indications and undisclosed information.373 The goal of the agreement is to 
“reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade.”374 
There are three main features in which the agreement attempts to reach the goal of establishing 
trading rules that apply to international intellectual property protection: 
a) Standards: The treaty tries to establish minimum standards of protection in each area of 
intellectual property for the member states. As stated by the WTO:  
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“Each of the main elements of protection is defined, namely the subject-matter 
to be protected, the rights to be conferred and permissible exceptions to those 
rights, and the minimum duration of protection. The Agreement sets these 
standards by requiring, first, that the substantive obligations of the main 
conventions of the WIPO, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) in their most recent versions, 
must be complied with.”375   
b) Enforcement: The treaty sets minimum standards of domestic procedures and remedies, 
allowing for protection for foreign nationals in each of the member states. It also contains 
“provisions on civil and administrative procedures and remedies, provisional measures, special 
requirements related to border measures and criminal procedures, which specify, in a certain 
amount of detail, the procedures and remedies that must be available so that right holders can 
effectively enforce their rights.”376 
c) Dispute settlement: TRIPS uses the multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms established 
by the WTO to resolve conflicts between signatory states.377 This dispute resolution is set out in 
articles XII and XIII of the 1994 GATT agreement.    
3.2 Relevant provisions and concepts in TRIPS 
There are several important provisions and principles in TRIPS that are of particular interest to 
developing countries. These are:  
3.2.1 Exhaustion and parallel imports 
Exhaustion is a legal concept that states that once a product is sold that is subject to intellectual 
property protection, the owner cannot prohibit the subsequent resale of the product as rights to 
that product are said to have been "exhausted" by the first sale.378 It must be pointed out that the 
rights can only be exhausted only with respect to the market of which the goods were put, so the 
concept of exhaustion will change in application from one country to the other because it will 
all depend on the concept of market that is being used. For example, the European Union is a 
single a market, which means that exhaustion applies throughout the entire EU. Other 
legislations recognise only national exhaustion because they recognise their own country as the 
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single market. International exhaustion would eventually mean that the rights are exhausted by 
being placed anywhere in the world.379  
TRIPS deals with exhaustion in a curious way. Article 6 mentions exhaustion only to say that 
exhaustion will not be covered by the dispute settlement mechanisms. This is curious because it 
simply refuses to make a statement about the national or international exhaustion of rights for 
all practical purposes; this is because no country can be brought to the WTO dispute resolution 
for an exhaustion matter, which leaves it unregulated for all practical purposes.380  
The importance of exhaustion for developing countries is that it is closely related to the concept 
of parallel imports. Parallel imports are the result of the disparity in prices between economies 
around the world. Some items tend to be offered in developing countries cheaper than in 
developed nations because of the disparity of acquisitive power. This disparity encourages the 
application of a policy of parallel importation. The concept of parallel importation is explained 
eloquently by Rigamonti:  
“In some industries, the global distribution of goods is accomplished through 
systems of distributors carefully selected by the producers of these goods. The 
distributors are generally exclusively authorized to distribute the respective 
goods within a certain territory. The selective distribution system enables the 
producer of the distributed goods to control the distribution, to minimize intra-
brand competition, and to charge different prices in different territories. If the 
prices vary too much between different territories, however, there may be 
competitors outside the selective distribution system trying to exploit the price 
differences by buying the goods from an authorized distributor in a "cheap" 
territory and subsequently selling them to consumers residing in an "expensive" 
territory at a price slightly beneath the price charged by the authorized 
distributor in said "expensive" territory. This business practice relies on so-
called "parallel imports".”381 
Intellectual property owners do not favour parallel imports because usually they would like to 
control the markets in which they place their products. When a country is importing an article 
from another market, in which it is offered at a much cheaper price than that offered by the 
company in the domestic market, the company will lose profits.  
This is where exhaustion comes in. If the intellectual property rights of a product are exhausted 
internationally, then the item can be resold anywhere in the world. On the other hand, if the 
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exhaustion is national, then the owner can continue to impose restrictions on the distribution of 
these items. This is particularly relevant in some technologies, such as pharmaceuticals.  
3.2.2 Compulsory licences 
Intellectual property rights under TRIPS are not absolute, particularly in patents. In most 
countries, there are some situations in which the patent owner will be forced to provide a 
licence to a third parties to exploit the patented invention in a specific way. These are known as 
compulsory licences, and they are dealt Article 31 of TRIPS. This article explains that member 
states should grant compulsory licences when there is overriding necessity because of an 
emergency that calls for the granting of a licence to use the technology. Other reasons to allow 
compulsory licences are a refusal to deal from the owner, the existence of anti-competitive 
practices from the owner, or for non-commercial purposes. However, TRIPS allows countries to 
provide compulsory licences for other reasons because this list is not exhaustive.382   
It must be pointed out that the compulsory licences granted through this mechanism are limited 
to a severe regime of restrictions. The licence should not be granted without first consulting 
with the owner, and then adequate compensation should be given. Another important restriction 
is that the licence can only be used in the domestic market where it was granted, and the use of 
patented materials will be subject to judicial review. 
The importance of compulsory licences for developing countries is evident, as it allows them to 
be able to licence some technologies under specific conditions, which could become extremely 
useful in cases of requiring access to specific technologies that are of greatest importance, such 
as could be the case for pharmaceuticals.  
3.2.3 Technology transfer under TRIPS 
The TRIPS agreement contains particular mandates for technology transfer and technical 
cooperation between the developed signatory members and developing nations. The issue of 
technology transfer is first introduced in TRIPS as a principle in Article 8.2 It reads: 
“Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” 
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This is an encouraging principle and a welcome addition to TRIPS. It is further expanded 
through Article 66.2, which reads:  
“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them 
to create a sound and viable technological base.”383 
Another important tool is provided in article 67, which encourages developed countries to 
provide technical assistance to developing countries when drafting new intellectual property 
rights legislation.  
3.2.4 Transitional arrangements 
Under Article 66.1, Least Developed Countries are allowed an extended period to implement 
the agreement. The reason for this was that it was considered that “In view of the special needs 
and requirements of least-developed country Members, their economic, financial and 
administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological 
base…”384 This meant that LDCs had the opportunity to implement TRIPS until January 1, 
2006, with the possibility that the Council for TRIPS could extend the dates, which has 
happened with regards to pharmaceuticals, which will be explained in more detail later.   
3.3 Effect of TRIPS on developing countries 
It could be said that TRIPS is an agreement is of particular importance to developing countries 
because it serves as another mechanism that furthers the imposition of the Western intellectual 
property system onto developing countries. However, it is fair to say that TRIPS goes to great 
lengths to try to accommodate the needs of developing countries, particularly with regards to 
LDCs. This is because although TRIPS offers a comprehensive set of obligations to signatory 
states, there are some issues in which developing countries have been awarded some leniency, 
or that are not specifically covered by the agreement, therefore offering developing countries 
more room to exercise with regards to the protection of intellectual works. Correa recognises 
this when he comments that “this Agreement contains elements that, duly applied, may permit a 
certain balance in its implementation.”385 The WTO is keen to make sure that this idea of the 
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Agreement as a provider of benefits and opportunities for developing countries is maintained. In 
the words of Mike Moore, director of the WTO:  
The WTO’s TRIPS Agreement plays a vital role in tackling these problems. It 
strikes a carefully-negotiated balance between providing intellectual property 
protection – which is essential if new medicines and treatments are to be 
developed – and allowing countries the flexibility to ensure that treatments 
reach the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people.386 
However, the full implementation of the TRIPS agreement has some implications that could 
still affect developing countries, even if it is conceded that it contains several attempts to 
balance the needs of developing nations.    
One of the goals of the TRIPS agreement is to establish a wide-ranging international intellectual 
property protection system by requiring every member of the WTO to implement a series of 
measures in the form of national legislation that will provide adequate protection of ideas all 
around the world. The most important part of TRIPS that relates to technology is the setting up 
of a strict system of international patent protection. Article 27.1 states that: 
“The TRIPS Agreement requires Member countries to make patents available 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology 
without discrimination, subject to the normal tests of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial applicability. It is also required that patents be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention and whether 
products are imported or locally produced.”387  
This means that all member states will have to allow patents that are recognised by other 
members, while allowing exceptions on the areas of morality, medical treatments or biological 
organisms.  
The end result of the international strengthening of patent rights and other technology protection 
is that TRIPS serves to ensure a steady income of intellectual property related revenue for those 
countries that own a large percentage of patents of high technology. The relevant claims that 
there are some concessions to developing countries should be met with scepticism if we notice 
that even with extended terms to implement changes in their legislation; developing countries 
have not been able to acquire technology before those deadlines are met. Drahos in particular 
presents the burning question of why have developing countries signed up to an agreement that 
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benefits exporters of intellectual works and not importers. He mentions that the clue is the 
negotiation process:  
“Put starkly, the intellectual property regime we have today largely represents a 
failure of democratic processes, both nationally and internationally. A small 
number of US companies which were established players in the knowledge game 
captured the US trade-agenda-setting process and then, in partnership with 
European and Japanese multinationals, drafted intellectual property principles 
that became the blueprint to TRIPS. The resistance by developing countries was 
crushed through trade power.”388     
However, the WTO still claims that there are adequate provisions that will allow developing 
countries more leeway when attempting to obtain technology, but these could be considered a 
cosmetic attempt at appeasing the developing countries. The main way in which this is achieved 
is stated in Article 8 of the Agreement, where two principles are established. The first principle 
says that the member states may formulate special protection in areas such as public health, 
nutrition or other public interest issues, as long as these special areas of protection are consistent 
with the Agreement. The second principle states that special provisions may be used in cases in 
which a right owner is unreasonably restricting access to technology, as has already been 
covered. The problem with these principles – and in particular with the first one – is that it 
appears to be a resort to circular reasoning. Member states will be able to impose some 
provision that will protect public interest technologies, but only if they are not against the 
provisions of the Agreement. The Agreement itself is very specific, however, so it may be 
difficult to find a situation in which this principle would apply without going against any of the 
existing provisions contained within it. Another problem may arise when trying to analyse what 
exactly constitutes an unreasonable access to technology. It could be argued that the patent 
system itself is an attempt to do exactly that.  
4. TRIPS after the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration 
4.1 The Doha Process 
As originally framed, the international system of intellectual property protection embodied by 
the TRIPS agreement seems to be slanted towards the owners of technology despite some of the 
concessions to developing countries. Most of the concerns expressed by the developing world 
were not addressed in the original text of the treaty. Since its implementation, TRIPS has been 
gathering growing criticism regarding the problems imposed by increasing intellectual property 
                                                
388 Drahos and Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, op cit, p.12.  
  
protection in LDCs. The most important concern is the access to certain types of basic 
technologies.  
Although the specific issue of intellectual property and pharmaceuticals falls outside of the 
scope of this work389 and is the of a separate document from the WTO Ministers,390 it is 
important to consider here some of the growing efforts by the WTO to address these concerns 
by developing countries in light of the TRIPS agreement and that culminated in some promising 
changes, particularly spearheaded by the concern about medicines.   
An important meeting of the international ministers of the member states took place in Doha, 
Qatar, in November 2001. Before this meeting, representatives from the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) met in Zanzibar and voiced several concerns regarding aspects of the 
international trade system, which they felt was marginalizing the poorer sectors of the world’s 
population. One of these concerns centred on the access to essential medicines. The final 
Zanzibar Declaration states that the LDCs are keen on “Reaffirming the right to apply the 
TRIPS Agreement in a way that allows member countries to have easy access to medicines to 
combat HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other killer diseases”.391   
Other earlier statements served to underline the importance of health and the implications for 
developing countries. The European Union presented a paper in June 2001 where it was 
admitted that health concerns were of importance, although it continued to stress the need for 
strong levels of international protection. This paper states that: 
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“The TRIPS Agreement has increasingly come under fire for allegedly standing 
in the way of developing countries' efforts to implement an effective public 
health policy. The EC and their member States take such criticisms seriously 
and stand ready to engage in a positive manner in the discussion, leading where 
necessary to clarification, of certain of the Agreement's provisions [...] 
However, the TRIPS Agreement cannot be held responsible for the health crisis 
in developing countries, while it must not stand in the way for action to combat 
the crisis.”392 
The reactions of other representatives towards suggestions of softening the implementation 
schedule of TRIPS were not as lukewarm as that of the EU. The United States delegation 
presented a paper before the Ministerial meeting to request that TRIPS should remain as it was. 
Their argument is similar to the line expressed by United States trade representatives to other 
bodies, such as UNCTAD. They argued that patent protection provides an incentive to 
investment in developing countries, because patent owners will not invest in a country where 
they cannot recover the costs of research and development which they have incurred. They also 
argued that patent owners had to disclose the technical details of their innovation, which 
ensured the future public benefit.393  
Despite these concerns, it can be said that the results of the Doha Ministerial meeting were 
positive towards the developing countries as the discussions went to great lengths to try to 
address these issues in their entirety. In one of the most important parts of the Declaration, the 
Ministers state that: 
“We recognize the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and 
the special structural difficulties they face in the global economy. We are 
committed to addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in 
international trade and to improving their effective participation in the 
multilateral trading system.”394 
On a separate declaration, the Ministers go further by listing a series of flexibilities that will be 
awarded to developing countries regarding medicines and other public health issues.395 
Nevertheless, it can be said that the issues raised by the Doha Declaration are an important step 
towards assisting the less developed nations in regards to the acquisition of technology, as some 
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of the restrictive rules imposed by the international system of protection expressed by TRIPS 
are loosened somewhat. As expressed by Vandoren: 
“All interested parties should be happy with the balanced result which meets the 
long-term interests of all, including the poor populations of the globe. The 
Declaration provides a delicate balance between the interests of those who had 
put the relationship between TRIPS and public health on the agenda of the 
TRIPS Council, and those whose major preoccupation was to safeguard the 
TRIPS Agreement.”396 
4.2 Doha and technology transfer 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration introduced one of the best options for a broad agreement in 
regards to the transfer of technology is through the international intellectual property regime. 
The issue of technology transfer is closely related to intellectual property protection, and any 
new attempts to try to regulate it will have to deal in one form or another with intellectual 
property treaties.  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration makes a strong call to continue with the regime set out in 
articles 63 and 66.2. The Declaration recognises the need to encourage the transfer of 
technology by stating that:   
“We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide 
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage 
technology transfer to least-developed country members pursuant to Article 
66.2.”397 
As part of the encouraging steps towards a more comprehensive treatment of technology 
transfer, the Doha process created a Working Group on Trade and Technology Transfer, which 
was supposed to report back to the WTO in Cancun’s Ministerial Conference in 2003. The 
Working Group started in an encouraging way by issuing a research paper about the state of the 
art in technology transfer,398 and by accepting submissions by interested countries, NGOs and 
other stakeholders. These meetings ended with a report to the Council for TRIPS.399 While very 
comprehensive, the report begins to show that there may be some issues of concern that could 
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derail the debate in a similar manner to what happened with the UNCTAD TOT Code process. 
One particular sticking point appears to be the issue of intellectual property. The report 
mentions that some countries are stating that intellectual property rights are a basic precondition 
for technology transfer. In particular:  
“…some other Members believed that a good IPR regime would facilitate the 
transfer of technology, especially technology otherwise viewed as being 
sensitive.  According to those Members an appropriate IPR regime could play a 
crucial role in technology transfer as an inducement to direct investment;  as a 
stimulus to innovation;  and as a source of inexpensive technological know 
how.”400 
Although the developments within this Working Group are encouraging, the failure of the 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting401 would seem to indicate that there will probably not be much 
official action in this area. However, there are some encouraging signs, particularly a recent 
decision by the Council for TRIPS.402  This decision decrees that developed countries will have 
to provide a yearly report about the action taken in order to ensure the encouragement of 
technology transfer to developing countries. This report will have to contain which regimes are 
in place to foster technology transfer; which incentives to private industry have been made; 
which enterprises qualify within their territory; ad statistical data.403    
Although it can be said that the existence of such rules are encouraging, it must also be said that 
there is no real evidence that these articles have encouraged any new technology transfer 
agreements. This is a point well made by the CIPR, which expresses that these articles have not 
been effective in creating incentives for private enterprises to implement some technology 
transfer schemes.404 Nevertheless, any opinions on this aspect would have to wait until the 
Working Group on Trade and Technology Transfer provides a more comprehensive discussion 
of other steps to take.  
The CIPR goes as far as stating that TRIPS is not the ideal treaty to deal with the issue of 
technology transfer as it is an agreement that deals with the ownership of technology.405 This is 
erroneous in the opinion of the author. TRIPS is the most likely tool to deal with this issue, as 
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ownership is not the only concern of TRIPS. Its raison d'être is to regulate the trade-related 
aspects of intellectual creations, and technology transfer would definitely fall into this category. 
The way in which technology is transmitted is certainly part of the agreement.  
For instance, there is enough in the Agreement about licensing to warrant its existence within 
this legal instrument. Evidence of this is the tacit approval of compulsory licensing in TRIPS. 
Compulsory licensing could be considered a technology transfer tool taking into consideration 
the definition examined earlier; although the technology transaction is not necessarily done with 
the consent of the owner, it will still be notified and in some instances even compensated. 
Despite the general flexibility of TRIPS in the area of licensing and the article 66.2, the CIPR is 
correct in stating that the efficiency of these measures is not enough to establish a coherent 
international framework of technology transfer, and such an international instrument is sorely 
needed in this field. As things stand, developing countries are placed in a weakened position in 
the negotiation of technology transfer agreements, and are also easy prey for abusive business 
practices.  
5. Beyond TRIPS?  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration is just one of the elements that may serve as an indication that 
the tide may be turning for developing countries. There is growing concern about the need to 
overhaul TRIPS in order to provide better solutions for developing nations, particularly LDCs. 
As was mentioned earlier, the UK government created the CIPR, formed by different experts 
and industry representatives from around the world. Their Report was recently published, and it 
is certainly generating a large amount of talk in the intellectual property circles.  
What is generating so much excitement is the fact that the CIPR has postulated some 
controversial findings in regards to the relationship between less developed countries and 
international intellectual property protection. They begin the Report by recognising that there is 
a problem for the poor countries which have no access to technology, and that “Developing 
countries - and in particular poor consumers of products which may be protected by IP rights - 
negotiate from a position of relative weakness. There is a fundamental asymmetry in 
relationships between developed and developing countries, based ultimately on their relative 
economic strength.”406     
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Besides dealing with some specific issues, the Report goes into great detail to describe some of 
the problems with the existing system of international intellectual property, and in particular 
those posed by the implementation of TRIPS. The Report recognises and applauds the efforts to 
deal with some of these issues in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, but asks for more action in 
some other key areas. The Report makes a set of recommendations to WIPO, the WTO, and to 
developed and developing countries: 
• WIPO should recognise that the implementation of intellectual property protection may 
have both costs and benefits for developing nations, and that it should ensure that the 
former do not outweigh the later.  
• If a balance between costs and benefits cannot be achieved within the existing 
framework, WIPO should revise the treaties in order to be able to provide such balance.  
• WIPO should be more responsive to the specific needs of particular developing 
countries when assisting to frame new IP legislation and this process should include 
more people.  
• The implementation timetable for developing countries recognised in TRIPS should be 
extended to at least the year 2016.  
• When adopting bilateral/regional agreements with developing nations, developed 
countries should take into consideration the terms of implementation recognised by 
TRIPS.  
• WIPO and the WTO should have adequate representation from developing countries 
during important meetings.  
• UNCTAD should appoint two intellectual property experts in developing countries to 
help during difficult negotiations.  
• The WTO and WIPO should open more opportunities of participation for civil 
organisms, such as NGOs.  
• WIPO should fund more research in the area of the relationship between developing 
countries and the international system of idea ownership.407    
These recommendations are very specific and timely, and address some of the problems of the 
misrepresentation of developing countries in the global intellectual property institutions. It is 
difficult to tell if this Report will be taken seriously by the organisations in charge of setting the 
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agenda of international intellectual property protection, but its mere existence serves as a very 
important indication that the tide may indeed be turning in recognition of the special needs of 
the developing world.  
Nevertheless, the imbalance still exists and developed countries have the upper hand in any sort 
of intellectual property discussions because they still control the technology. This imbalance is 
evident in many different issues. The next chapter will illustrate the way in which the 
international regime of technology ownership is actually affecting some developing countries in 
the acquisition of information technologies. 
 
  
Chapter 5. Information Society and the Digital Divide 
“Freedom of the Internet is guaranteed only to those who own a computer.” 
Marjorie Heins  
 
The previous chapters have shown some of the problems faced by developing countries when 
dealing with the international transfer of technology. In most works that deal with access to 
technology, the subject of discussion is generally that of patenting because it is the method of IP 
protection best suited to some of the works related to pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.408 It 
is not surprising that the issue of copyright has received less emphasis until now, as the main 
tool of ownership of intellectual creations in the area of invention and technological advances is 
patenting.  
Nevertheless, copyright must not be underestimated when dealing with the issue of access to 
technology by developing countries, as there are some areas in which this method of ownership 
is indeed important for the problem explored. The protection of literary works409 would not 
appear to be a big issue, although the high price of technology related publications could be 
considered a major problem for some poor parts of the world. Literary works can be made 
available through libraries, and some relatively small investment can provide copies which can 
be eventually read by many people (notwithstanding the need for increased literacy rates).  
One of the biggest problems relating to copyright is the ownership of an increasingly important 
technology: computer software. The generally high prices of proprietary commercial software 
in developed countries serve as yet another example of the technology gap that exists in the 
world, a gap that when seen in the specific area of ICTs is generally referred to as the digital 
divide. If we consider information technology as the steam that drives the new global economy, 
there cannot be any doubt that developing countries may find a lack in this area to be an 
insurmountable competitive block in their attempts to become developed. Proficiency in 
information technology will mean greater possibilities for attracting investment and generating 
other technologies indigenously.     
The digital divide has generated a large amount of literature the recent years, mostly due to the 
fact that the advent of the information society is seen as a primary asset and a basic requirement 
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for development strategies in poor nations. However, most of the existing literature does not 
concentrate on the issue of intellectual property, but tends to be seen mostly through economic 
or sociological lenses. It is for this reason that the treatment of this subject will be examined in 
this chapter. It is also important to explore the digital divide and add it to the other evidence 
collected so far, in order to examine some of the open source solutions that will be proposed in 
the next chapters.  
1. The Digital Divide 
One of the main difficulties in dealing with such a general term as “digital divide” is that it has 
become an instant sound-bite that encompasses any sort of inequality in the use of information 
and communication technologies. There is a danger with these instantly popular phrases to 
become simply an empty buzz-word bereft of any sort of meaning. This is why a clear 
understanding of what is meant by this term is of immediate concern.  
In the widest possible context, the digital divide is usually referred to as the “inequality of 
access to the Internet.”410 The emphasis on the issue of access to the global network is made 
because there is growing belief amongst many observers that the internet represents a 
momentous shaping force of modern society in almost all aspects of it, from education to 
politics.411 The possibility of empowering people by providing them access to the internet is 
seen as a positive step that must be encouraged. This assumption that the internet is an excellent 
feature for society as a whole carries the inevitable consequence that those who lack access will 
be at a disadvantage to those able to connect to the Web. This is based on the idea that 
information has become the commodity of the future, and those without access to it will be 
relegated to poverty. In the words of Titus Alexander, “In a world governed by information, 
exclusion from information is as devastating as exclusion from land in an agricultural age.”412      
The definition provided in the last paragraph is still too broad. Norris usefully enhances the 
definition of digital divide to explain the different aspects in which it will manifest itself. She 
specifies that there are three types of digital divide: 
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“The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between 
industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap 
between information rich and poor in each nation. And finally within the online 
community, the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do 
and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize and 
participate in public life.”413 
There are several important points in this definition. Firstly, the main problem with access is not 
access to telecommunication tools in general, or ICTs in a more specific way. Rather, Norris 
centres her definition on internet access, just as Castells does. Other researchers use a much 
wider definition, such as Sciadas, who see the digital divide as the gap in access to ICTs, 
measuring it in the level of “ICT-ization” achieved by a country.414  This is a useful delimitation 
of the subject, but it may prove too broad. There can be no doubt that internet access is not the 
only important factor in the area of information technology advance in developing countries; 
opportunities for access to computers and other communication technologies are also important, 
in particular in the area of creating efficient government structures. To this end, the training to 
use computers is also very important. Nevertheless, the narrow definition of the digital divide 
will be favoured here.   
The second part of the definition worthy of notice is the distinction of the digital divide in three 
different spheres – global, domestic and political. Although the social divide and the democratic 
divide display a wide variety of very interesting issues that deserve further study, the so-called 
global divide is of more relevance for the present work, as it is precisely the difference in access 
to information technologies between developing countries and developed nations that is central 
to the present chapter. Nevertheless, a look at domestic differences in access to the information 
society within developed nations can show interesting facts that can be extrapolated later 
towards analysing the global perspective and finding solutions.  
The best set of figures for domestic access to the internet can be found in the United States, 
where most relevant studies have taken place. Figures for 2000 showed a marked difference in 
access to the internet between racial and social groups. For example, while 46% of Whites had 
access to the internet, only 23.5% of Blacks and 23.6% of Hispanics were online.415 At the same 
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time, 86% of households earning $75,000 USD and above per annum had internet access, 
compared to 12.7% of households earning less than $15,000 USD.416 Statistics like these 
indicate marked contrast in access to the information network along income lines, which is to be 
expected as the internet requires that the user have access to proper tools and infrastructure, 
such as a computer and phone lines.  
Despite these figures, many commentators have noted that the digital divide in the United States 
is decreasing. For example, in 2002 the amount of people online in households with incomes 
lower than $15,000 USD had increased to 25%, and access in both Black and Hispanic 
households had also increased.417 This trend shows that the digital divide is not irreversible, but 
it may be misleading to extrapolate too much from the domestic case to access in a global 
context. After all, the United States already has a comprehensive infrastructure in place, which 
cannot be said for most developing countries.418  
This is why every effort to encourage access to the global computer network must take into 
account the appalling state of telephony in the developing world. By the end of the 1990s, 
people in the richest countries had at their disposal 74% of all the telephone lines around the 
world.419 Countries in the OECD have an average 523 telephone lines per thousand people, 
while the high-income OECD countries have an average 597. In contrast, developing countries 
in general average 87 telephone lines per thousand inhabitants. The situation in the least 
developed countries is even more worrying, with only 6 telephone lines per thousand people.420   
The figures do not lie when dealing with the facts about the digital divide. Using internet access 
as an illustration, it is thought that only 2% of the world’s population have access to it, and 88% 
of those connect from developed countries.421 It is thought that by September 2002 there were 
605 million people online, of which only 6.31 million came from Africa.422 OECD countries 
average 332 users per thousand people, and high-income OECD countries average 400 users per 
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1000. In contrast, developing countries average only 26.5 internet users per 1000, while least 
developed countries average only 1.8 users.423 
It is important to keep in mind that figures may be deceiving. It has been calculated that by 
2005 China will have more internet users than the United States,424 but this may simply be 
caused by the sheer volume of inhabitants. Looking at percentages the figures are still 
disheartening, with China having only 25.7/1000 people connected to the internet.  
2. The causes behind the digital divide 
Having established the existence of the digital divide and having provided a specific example of 
how the divide may be extremely harmful for developing countries, the reasons for the 
existence of the divide must be explored. Information technology must be seen as comparable to 
any of the other technologies, and as such would be susceptible to the same intellectual property 
regimes.  
What causes the digital divide? An initial analysis of some of the statistics presented in the first 
section would seem to indicate that there is a strong link between economic wealth and internet 
access within a population. It was pointed out that high-income OECD countries had the highest 
percentages of internet access, and that the poorest countries showed much lower access.425 
This trend would seem to be corroborated by looking into the performance of some individual 
countries. The United States has a GDP per capita of $35,277 USD, with internet access of 
501.5 people per 1000 inhabitants. On the other side of the equation, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo has only a GDP per capita of $99 USD – one of the lowest in the world – and the 
internet access is the lowest in the world, with only 0.1 persons per 1000 inhabitants being able 
to access the global network.426 These figures are consistent with the hypothesis that internet 
access is directly proportional to the country’s wealth. However, this analysis may prove to be 
superficial, as a deeper look at the figures yields some interesting surprises.  
Iceland for example is the country with the leading figures in internet access for 2003, with a 
staggering 599.3 people online per 1000 inhabitants, but has a lower GDP (at $27,312 USD per 
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capita) than other countries with lower internet access figures. The country with the highest 
GDP per capita for 2003 is Luxembourg (with $42,041 USD), but has only moderate internet 
access figures (359.8/1000 people). Another discordant statistic is that of three countries that 
have similar GDP figures per capita are Estonia, Chile, and Costa Rica, all averaging around 
$4,000 USD in the year 2003.427 However, Estonia has internet access figures of 300.5/1000 
people, Chile has 201.4/100 and Costa Rica only has 93.4/1000. At the lower end there are 
other discrepancies. Kenya and Gambia have very low GDP per capita figures, with $371 and 
$291 respectively. However, their internet access figures are much higher than most of other 
LDCs – 16/1000 and 13.5/1000 respectively – and considerably much higher than other 
countries within the same GDP per capita bracket, such as Nigeria.  
Something else must be at work here. A recent study about internet access in Central American 
countries may help to elucidate the reasons for the inconsistencies described above.428 The 
study calculated differences in cost for an average family to connect to the internet, taking into 
account the cost of a telephone call and any additional charges for internet connections provided 
by local companies. When the costs were calculated for a monthly access averaging 30 hours 
per week, including phone calls, some interesting facts emerge (See Table 1). The two countries 
with the highest access figures are Costa Rica and Panama, with both presenting very similar 
average connection costs. However, cheaper connection rates do not seem to translate 
immediately into higher access, as the cases of Guatemala and Honduras indicate. It would 
seem logical to assume then that if the cost of connecting to the web is higher in a country, only 
the wealthiest inhabitants would be able to go online. But when one contrast the figures of 
access, cost and the number of telephone mainlines, a clearer picture begins to emerge.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Table 1 shows that there is a strong correlation between the number of telephone mainlines and 
online connection figures. This indicates that cost is not the only determining factor, as 
evidenced by the inconsistencies shown in this table and in GDP figures. It appears that there 
must also be an existing infrastructure otherwise people will not be able to connect. Further 
evidence can be found in the three countries with similar GDP per capita figures mentioned 
above: Estonia, Chile, and Costa Rica. Estonia has very high telephone per capita figures 
(354/1000), which translate into high internet connection ratings (300.5/1000).429 However, 
Chile and Costa Rica have very similar telephone mainlines per capita (230/1000 and 233/1000 
respectively), yet as previously mentioned, Chile has much better internet connection rates than 
Costa Rica. The difference may be explained by costs, as a flat-rate internet connection in Chile 
can cost as low as $21.430 Cost and income figures are therefore important in calculating the 
reasons for the digital divide, but actual access to the infrastructure seems to be the vital factor 
in the ultimate figures. 
Another factor to consider is that access to the telecommunications network will only be 
possible with computers. The statistics mentioned will be useless if the country does not have 
computers to connect to the network, and software is required to run the computers. Norris 
recognises this when she lists several other determining factors in the existence of the digital 
divide, transcending the mere economic analysis of GDP per capita distribution. She lists cost 
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of software and hardware, connection costs, and research and development as some of the other 
reasons that explain the digital divide,431 but fails to establish the obvious correlation between 
telephone lines and internet access exposed above.  
3. Ghost machines: hardware and the divide 
If there is ever going to be an effort to solve the digital divide, then the access to computer 
hardware would have to be at the top of the list, and it would initially seem like the most 
difficult area to solve, but it may actually be one of the easiest problems to start tackling. The 
high cost of hardware is one of the main problems affecting the development of information 
technology in the developing world, but trends in hardware prices demonstrate that the 
technology is becoming more accessible every year, with hardware prices continuing to fall. 
Although a study in 1995 showed that Personal Computer (PC) prices had remained at around 
$1000 USD for entry-level computers during the first half of the decade despite the drop in 
costs, this was attributed to hardware and software improvements for each model.432 
Nevertheless, studies charting the price of PC during a longer period of time have demonstrated 
a continuous decrease in price over time, particularly accelerated at the end of the 1990s.433 
However, top-level computers still cost around $500 USD per unit.  
The solution to this problem could lie in the use of charities to provide old hardware from the 
developed countries and donate it towards less developed ones. It is calculated that each year in 
the United Kingdom alone, 1.5 million computers are thrown as garbage, and an equivalent 
amount are kept in storage unused.434 In the United States, 2 million computers are thrown out 
each month.435 Something that could be done in this respect is to have projects that transfer 
some of this old equipment to poor countries. Another solution for the hardware cost could be to 
involve socially-minded private industries. Large industries like Microsoft, Sun Microsystems 
and IBM have already committed funds to provide some computing services for developing 
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countries, including hardware and open source office application software.436 Small computer 
donations could go a long way in establishing information hubs and provide wider access to the 
web. 
3.1 Telecommunications infrastructure  
The figures presented seem to indicate that the improvement of telecommunications 
infrastructure must be a priority for those developing countries that wish to increase their 
internet access rates. This strategy must run in two separate streams; one is to ensure that the 
international connections are in place and are suitable for internet transactions, and the second is 
to improve national telecommunications infrastructure.  
There is already an international internet backbone, but the way in which it is configured may 
prove to pose yet more difficulties for developing countries. The reason for this is that the 
internet backbone is extremely US-centric – this means that most of the internet traffic passes at 
some stage through the United States, even if the exchanging countries are close to each other. 
Cukier cites the example of Singapore and Malaysia, two neighbouring countries that send more 
than 10 times the amount of internet traffic to the United States than to each other.437 Another 
example of the inefficient infrastructure is Africa, where every country – with the exception of 
South Africa – needs to connect to the internet using an industrialised nation.438 This status-quo 
inefficiently increases prices for developing countries because they must lease bandwidth in 
foreign servers, increasing their costs.  
One of the solutions to this problem would be to increase local networks so as to overcome the 
reliance on developed nations, and in particular on the United States. One way to do this would 
be for governments to provide tax-credits for telecommunications companies that would 
decrease internet costs.439 It must also be noted that although international connection prices 
remain high, they are constantly decreasing. An example of this is the AC-1 transatlantic cable 
installed in 1998, which decreased prices across the board. According to Kelly, the price of this 
cable for an ISP “is just over US$ 300 per 64 kbit/s circuit per year, whereas the TAT-8 cable, 
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completed a decade earlier, cost more than US$10,000 per circuit per year.”440 Although the 
architecture still shows problems, it must be said that the network is continuing to grow to 
provide for more efficient routes between countries, generating increasing traffic between large 
cities in nations around the world. In fact, Townsend comments that the global efficiency of the 
network is being improved in places like Europe and Asia, serving as new hubs of internet 
bandwidth transport for other countries.441 Looking back at the history of the development of 
the World Wide Web, there should be no doubt that the process of international 
interconnections will continue to develop as time goes by, something that will undoubtedly 
benefit developing countries.  
The national telecommunications infrastructure is a more difficult problem to tackle. It has been 
suggested in earlier sections that internet connection rates are largely dependent on the 
existence of an adequate phone network system in the country in question. The problem is that 
the cost of wiring a country to provide improvements in connection rates is considerable. It is 
difficult to determine the cost of every new line in a developing country because calculations 
must take into consideration the fact that most of the technology must usually be imported. 
Even conservative estimates put the cost of each new telephone line at around $1000 USD in 
areas that do not possess any wiring.442  
However, the lack of existing copper telephone lines may prove to be an advantage because 
developing countries may be more likely to use other technologies to connect to the internet 
instead of relying on existing and outdated telephone networks. The obvious solution would be 
to take advantage of the rapid growth in the quality of wireless networks and forego the 
physical wire telecommunications route in favour of adopting wireless communication as the 
route to increase connectivity. The 2002 World Telecommunication Development Report points 
out that wireless is the most efficient way to increase telecoms connection figures in countries 
with minimal advances. The report makes the case of Uganda as a least developed country 
where the mobile route has increased rates. It points out that “Uganda’s overall telephone 
density quadrupled between 1998 and 2001, rising from 0.41 telephone subscribers per 100 
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people to 1.72. [...] Over 50 per cent of the population is now covered by mobile cellular and 
some 80 towns have service.”443 
Setting up a working internet wireless network is much cheaper than wiring up a remote 
community using traditional connections, thus providing a potential solution to internet 
connection problems. Estimates for the cost of setting up an entire rural wireless network have 
been calculated at under $450 USD per hub;444 but with decreasing prices and the capability of 
wireless hardware increasing every day, this cost may be much smaller. The costs may still be 
considerable, but the advantage of this approach is that it can be implemented almost 
immediately, without having to wait for an entire rural telephony wiring programme to get 
underway.  
There are different wireless technologies that can be used to achieve fast internet connections in 
remote locations. Some of these are actually being deployed in developed countries to provide 
broadband internet access in locations where it is otherwise not economically feasible.445 The 
way to go appears to be the creation of public wireless access networks run by small 
foundations or volunteers. These networks create a “wireless commons”, a network that 
everybody in town can access.446 
The two most viable technologies for fast deployment are via satellite or by creating line-of-
sight wireless networks. Each of these solutions offers different advantages and problems, and 
they may be adopted to fit different situations. Satellite communication would be preferable in 
very remote areas with smaller connection requirements, and could be used for remote clinics, 
hospitals or small education centres where only one or two computers will be online. This is 
more expensive, but prices are steadily on the decrease. Wi-fi447 local area networks can 
provide much larger numbers of connections to computers with wireless network capabilities.  
The wireless route can also be used successfully in education centres as a community solution. 
The establishment of low-cost public access wireless internet centres would enable the 
                                                
443 International Telecommunications Union. World Telecommunication Development Report 2002. http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/publications/wtdr_02/material/WTDR02-Sum_E.pdf 
444 Jhunjhunwala, A; Ramamurthy, B; and Gonsalves T. “The Role of Technology in Telecom Expansion in India”, IEEE 
Communication Magazine, November 1998.  
445 Rubens, P. “Fast track to the shires”, Guardian Online, July 31, 2003. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,1008879,00.html 
446 An example of this is the town of Leiden in the Netherlands. For more details about this project, go to: 
http://www.wirelessleiden.nl/english/index.shtml  
447 Short for "Wireless Fidelity", a set of wireless communication standards.   
  
provision of services to larger numbers of people for educational purposes. The first stage of the 
process would be to obtain hardware for this purpose. A study by the Pan African Development 
Information System places the cost of each internet-ready system in Africa at about $800 
USD.448 That expense coupled with the already mentioned cost of setting up a wireless network 
would amount to expenses of just over $1000 USD for a small centre connected to the internet, 
making sure that a community stays connected to the web. 
A successful case study of wireless connectivity for education is that of Bangladesh, where 
there are only two phones per 1000 people, with virtually no traditional telephone lines in rural 
areas, connection fees in excess of $500 USD, and waiting list of 5-10 years.449 Recently, 
wireless technology has been used to connect agriculture students to the capital, located 100 km 
away, something that would not be possible without wireless connections. 450 There are similar 
examples in Nepal, where farmers in remote regions of this country are using wireless internet 
connections to access the internet.451 
This solution would be the first step in a wider strategy designed to create training hubs where 
targeted international assistance could have a much bigger effect. This would possibly open 
high-speed connections and technical training in colleges and universities, attempting to create a 
small foothold to provide access to people online. A meeting of experts in Mexico in 2001 
suggested that “International co-operation has in some cases to be rethought: more attention 
has to be paid to the creation of high-quality training and apprenticeship. Elite institutions such 
as universities and scientific training facilities have to be valued for their vital role in the 
process of development.”452  
Nevertheless, even if remote and deprived communities are able to connect to the web with 
wireless networks and donated equipment, there are still serious problems that need to be 
addressed. The first one would be sustainability; each of these centres would have to be able to 
sustain itself after international help has dried up and even if the local political will directs 
priorities away from ITC connectivity. This is an unresolved question that must remain open for 
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the time being. It is easy to imagine centres opening up all over developing countries that will 
eventually have to shut down because of lack of funds. If these centres eventually start charging 
for their services it is possible that the amount of money generated would not be enough to 
provide enough funds to maintain the centre. Charging for services would also defeat the ethos 
that must prevail at the start of the bridging of the digital divide. This is a serious consideration 
that governments, aid agencies, and NGOs involved in solving the digital divide must keep in 
mind.  
The other serious problem that has to be taken into consideration is the issue of content and 
software, which are questions that are considerably linked to copyright, and will be dealt with in 
the next section.  
4. Beyond access: content and ownership  
The problems of access to the internet that have been explored so far have dealt primarily with 
hardware and connectivity to telecommunications networks, issues that while relevant to this 
work, do not have that much importance to the issue of intellectual property and developing 
countries. The issue of copyright starts becoming more relevant when we move from the realm 
of telecommunications to the problem of content. Even if the problem of access to the internet 
was miraculously solved tomorrow and large sectors of the world’s population were able to get 
online, some questions would still remain. What awaits the people of the developing world once 
they connect to the internet? Is the content relevant to their needs? Who owns the content? And 
most importantly, will they be able to understand any of it?  
The first problem for developing countries is one of literacy; one fifth of the world’s population 
remains illiterate. Considerable numbers of the populations of the developing world remain 
immersed in illiteracy, with figures for 2003 standing at an average of 74.5% of the population 
being able to read and write. The figure for least developed countries is 53.3%,453 which means 
that even if the people in these countries could access the internet, almost half of them could not 
understand what is on the screen.  
The problem of content is made worse by the predominance of English as the language of 
choice for content online. A survey by the research firm eMarketer found that out of 313 billion 
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pages searched, 68.4 of them were in English.454 It must be said that these figures are better than 
those for 2000, where search engine Inktomi found that 86.55% of one billion indexable 
documents were written in English.455 This should take into consideration that only one tenth of 
the world has English as its native language456 and that about a quarter of the world’s 
population speaks it either as a native or a second language.457 Figures for 2003 indicate that 
only 35.2% of the internet population are native English speakers. At the same time Chinese, 
Japanese, German and Spanish native speakers make up a combined 36.8% of the internet 
population.458 This must necessarily mean that many people are forced to surf the internet in 
English, as the majority of the content is found in that language, even though 43% of web users 
do not speak English at all.459 The implications are severe for the future of a diverse internet full 
of content that can be understood by people in developing countries. Therefore, any solution to 
the digital divide must take into consideration the problem of content.    
The other problem faced by people in developing countries is one of ownership of online 
materials. In the early days of the internet, free access to information was the norm, with great 
numbers of materials provided online free of charge, or only requiring registration to access 
content. But there is a growing trend by content providers to request subscription fees to be able 
to access online materials in content-rich environments, such as online encyclopaedias, 
dictionaries, specialised magazines, journals, research reports and databases. In fact, research by 
the Online Publishers Association (OPA) in the US estimated that “by the end of 2002, one in 
ten online users in the U.S. were regularly paying for some form of content, and total content 
sales for the year reached $1.3 billion dollars.”460 The same report estimates that the trend of 
providing paid content will continue to grow as the market gears itself to give rich content to 
niche industries that can afford to purchase increasingly expensive subscription fees.461 Content 
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rich sites like the Encyclopaedia Britannica or Oxford University Press (OUP) are already 
offering a considerable amount of online materials at subscription costs. OUP for example 
offers materials with annual subscription fees of approximately $250 USD for schools, and 
between $395 to $3,000 USD for multiple-user accounts.462 
The end result of this trend towards privatisation of content is that the web might become a two-
tier environment, with high-content sites locked away by subscription fees, while the public 
web contains less valuable information – a negative scenario for those who see the internet as 
the natural repository of human knowledge. There cannot be any doubt that companies that 
provide services will have a valid interest in recuperating their investment by selling their 
content, but the result of this may be to increase the digital divide. Another result of this would 
be related to the language barriers expressed above; it is natural that content providers would be 
interested in offering their services only in English because the US market is the one with the 
purchasing power, while there would be no interest in providing content in other languages 
because other countries are unable to pay for the content.  
The problem of ownership of content is made more severe by the existence of infogopolies, a 
term used by Drahos and Braithwaite to describe the emergence of small clusters of companies 
that own vast amounts of copyright works in the areas of publishing, software, music and 
film.463 These infogopolies have a vested interest in making sure that as much content online as 
possible will be protected by copyright, hence providing that information under licences to 
consumers for economic gains. The area of more concern for the digital divide with regards to 
ownership by infogopolies is the proprietary software industry. This is an industry that 
continues to grow at amazing speed despite the global economic slowdown – the industry was 
worth only $30 billion USD in 1980-1981, but had increased to $400 billion USD in 1995.464 In 
2002 the software industry boasted $73.5 billion USD in profits alone.465  Because of the 
substantial profits involved, the software industry is in the process of lobbying intensely for 
stronger protection and enforcement of copyright laws relating to software around the world; 
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the signing of the TRIPS and the various TRIPS-plus agreements are just some of the many 
international efforts that have been made in this respect. That is why the software industry has 
created a powerful industry group called the Business Software Alliance to enforce protection 
of proprietary computer programmes and fight piracy around the world.466 It can be assumed 
that increased protection could result in increased prices for software.     
It is difficult to ascertain completely the full effect of proprietary software prices in developing 
countries. Maskus undertook an interesting study into the effect on software prices caused by 
stronger enforcement of intellectual property legislation. He looked at the price of proprietary 
software in Hong Kong, where a pirated copy of Microsoft Office 97 could be found at $6 
USD, while the licensed copy was to be purchased at $1,000 USD.467 This is surprising when 
contrasted with the average software retail prices in the United States, where the same software 
sells for about $200 USD. According to Maskus, this phenomenon responds to dissimilar 
pricing strategies, as software companies may want to sell small volumes at higher prices in 
developing countries to accommodate higher piracy rates and lower sales figures.468 This 
pricing dissimilarity could have severe economic effects in countries where lower prices are 
needed, as only a few wealthy firms can afford such restrictive pricing strategies and even the 
slightest increases in software could have serious detrimental effects upon access to information 
technologies.  
Although there are several different areas where all of the above would become relevant, 
perhaps it is in the education sector where the effects of the digital divide could be felt more 
intensely. The following section will look at this case in more detail.    
5. A case study: Education and information technology 
5.1 Education and the developing world 
There can be no doubt that education is one of the most important topics whenever the issue of 
development is discussed, as any effort towards achieving certain acceptable levels of human 
development must include education as one of the most important tools. In particular, 
technological education is pinpointed as a very important tool for economic development. As 
expressed by education expert Jacques Delors: 
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“The developing countries should not neglect anything that may allow them an 
indispensable entrance to the universe of science and technology, which 
includes adapting their culture and modernizing their mentalities. Considering 
this perspective, investment in education and research constitutes a necessity, 
and one of the main motives for preoccupation by the international community 
must be the danger of   marginalizing those excluded from the progress of a 
global economy in rapid transformation.”469  
With the evident importance of education to poor countries, information technology can be an 
important vehicle for improving education standards in the developing world, and its potential 
value cannot be neglected. Talking about information technology and education, Mitchel 
Resnick, from the influential Media Laboratory at MIT, says that “These new technologies have 
the potential to fundamentally transform how and what people learn throughout their lives. Just 
as advances in biotechnologies made possible the “green revolution” in agriculture, new 
digital technologies make possible a “learning revolution” in education.”470 
The experience in the developed world in using information technology in education has been 
widely regarded as a success. It has been noted that students learn more, and more rapidly, in all 
areas of study from pre-school to higher-level education. There appears to be a tendency to 
higher efficiency when using computers for learning, allowing teachers to cover more with less 
resources and time, ultimately being able to reduce class sizes.471   
It should be noted that not everybody agrees that spending in information technology is the best 
thing for education, particularly in developed countries.472 Nevertheless, the benefits of using 
information technology in poor countries would potentially have a knock on effect, as it is 
possible that it would enhance the interest in technology, and increase the chances of 
development in other areas. 
The problem of implementing technological aids to education in the developing world is that it 
is expensive to do so. It is in this area of education that intellectual property rights play a very 
important role, as the ownership of some education materials – such as books – can play a 
negative role in the ability of developing countries to acquire knowledge.  
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The existing system allows for some exceptions in education related subjects. For example, 
existing copyright protection allows for some limited copying of works for educational 
purposes such as can be expressed in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, which allows 
signatory countries to pass exceptions to copying in certain instances where the public interest is 
involved.473 At some point, there were discussions to allow poor countries to have more rights. 
For example, during the Revision Conference to the Berne Convention held at Stockholm in 
1967, a proposal was made to give developing countries the possibility of enacting exceptions 
to international agreements in education related works, such as translations, and other 
exceptions relating to works of scientific, research or educational interest. Unfortunately this 
proposal was not ratified, and it was only implemented in a weaker version in a different 
meeting which took place in Paris during 1971.474  
5.2 Yet another technology gap 
Having established that information technology can be beneficial for education, it is important 
to point out that this is yet another field where the technology gap between the developed 
countries and the developing world is evident. There is growing political recognition that ICTs 
play an important role in the development prospects of poor nations, and that the lack of 
connectivity and access to information will have an immense negative effect in those efforts. 
The World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS) produced a declaration that recognises 
this problem. Their Declaration states that:  
“We recognize that education, knowledge, information and communication are 
at the core of human progress, endeavour and well-being. Further, Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have an immense impact on virtually 
all aspects of our lives.  The rapid progress of these technologies opens 
completely new opportunities to attain higher levels of development.”475 
While wealthy countries such as the UK talk about linking every single school to the internet,476 
the scenario in the less developed countries in the area of technology is bleak. As stated by 
Oxfam, “there is a grave danger that developing countries will be excluded from new areas of 
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learning. And as information technology is integrated more extensively into production systems, 
the risk of future marginalisation will intensify.”477 
The study by the CIPR in the United Kingdom serves as one of the most worrying reports on 
access to technology in education. The CIPR states that several consultations within developing 
countries have shown serious problems of access to software, textbooks, and specialised 
technical material. The Report explains: 
“The arrival of the digital era provides great opportunities for developing 
countries in accessing information and knowledge. The development of digital 
libraries and archives, Internet-based distance learning programmes, and the 
ability of scientists and researchers to access sophisticated on-line computer 
databases of technical information in real time are just some examples. But the 
arrival of the digital era also poses some new and serious threats for access and 
dissemination of knowledge.  In particular, there is a real risk that the potential 
of the Internet in the developing world will be lost as rights owners use 
technology to prevent public access through pay-to-view systems.”478 
All of these studies seem to agree on one point; implementing information technology in 
education is expensive. A recent study in the United States indicates that in 78% of schools, 
students have daily access to computers. According to the study, “The bulk of technology 
spending is directed toward hardware, accounting for 67% of total technology spending. 
Schools spend 20% of their technology budget on software and 14% is devoted to professional 
development.”479 Even though large amounts of money are spent on hardware, software budgets 
are still considerable. In 1995 schools in the United States spent a total of $750 million USD on 
software alone. It is calculated that for that year, the total expenditure in computer technology 
was $2.6 billion USD.480 A recent survey calculates that technology spending per pupil in the 
United States for the 2001-2002 school year was $96 USD.481 In contrast, a study in Argentina 
calculates that the prices for software licenses in the Microsoft 2000 series (which includes 
Microsoft Office 2000 Pro, Windows 2000 operating system, and Windows 2000 server CLT) 
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would cost $2020 USD per educational institution in the developing world.482 This trend is 
corroborated throughout the world; Alan Story reports that software licences per desk cost the 
same whether one is located in the developed world or in a developing country.483 Alan Story 
notes that: 
“…Microsoft licensing officials in Vietnam and Ecuador have confirmed that the 
“per seat licensing fee” for universities in those two countries is essentially the 
same basically the same as Microsoft charges Harvard or Oxford University; an 
elementary school in Soweto is treated the same way as is a school in a suburb 
of Boston.”484  
Another huge problem is the lack of even the most basic tools required to run the computers, 
even if they are found. A study by Oxfam estimates:  
“Probably most schools in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia lack electricity 
and the telephone lines needed to use computers and access international web 
sites, let alone the financial resources to purchase them [...] The extension of 
computer technologies to schools requires substantial financial expenditure for 
the purchase of equipment and the training of staff. Some governments in the 
industrialised world have turned to the private sector for assistance. But schools 
in the developing world face enormous financial and technical obstacles in 
obtaining basic computer equipment, with the result that inequalities in access 
to information technology will start to increase at a far earlier age.”485 
If there is such a problem with spending and software, it must come as no surprise that access to 
the internet by educational institutions matches that of the country’s online figures.486 A recent 
study for 2001 shows that secondary schools in developed countries have excellent connection 
ratios to the internet; in the United States, 94% of schools are online, while data for England 
and Wales places this figure at 88%.487 On the other hand, some developing countries show 
much less favourable rates; in South Africa 52% of schools are online, while in Thailand only 
25% of its secondary schools are online.488  
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With the serious problems already enumerated in the area of telephony, the prospects for 
connection to the internet are bleak. And even after solving these, the problems of content and 
language of the internet would still remain.  It is needless to point out that the amount of money 
required to ameliorate such shortcomings is beyond the budgets of most poor countries. The 
problem with this scenario is that while developed countries have the economic means to 
continue to spend heavily on technology for education, poor countries do not have that 
possibility. The evidence is a marked lack of education funding in developing countries. A 
report by Oxfam calculates that although only 21% of the world’s population lives in developed 
countries, they have 84% of the world’s education spending. The picture is made worse when 
considering the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has only 1% in this field.489   
The example of Peru also serves as a bleak reminder of the many different problems that 
developing countries must overcome before connecting educational institutions to cyberspace. 
In this country, only 31% of all public primary and secondary centres have access to both 
electricity and a telephone line. 22 % of all educational centres have no access whatsoever to 
either telephony or electricity in their towns.490  
These figures serve as a reminder of the technology gap that exists between developed and 
developing countries. Low spending in education, and in particular, low spending in 
information technology education, merely reinforces the existing technology gap; students 
coming out of school in the developing world will not have the means to compete with their 
well-equipped and trained counterparts, continuing the vicious circle of poverty in which they 
are immersed.  
Even if new education centres the centres can provide access online, what will the education 
centres provide as content? Will the inhabitants of the developing countries be able to use the 
internet to its fullest potential or will they find a web filled with subscription content in 
languages they cannot understand?  Part of the strategy in each country must be to look towards 
developing content as well, perhaps even involving the communities in that same purpose. This 
would have the added bonus that access to the internet would not be a passive endeavour; the 
members of the newly connected communities would become contributors of content as well, 
furthering the diversity of the internet.  
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One excellent example of a carefully considered strategy that attempts to solve the digital divide 
in the educational system through collaboration between the government, NGOs, and local 
communities, is that of Programa Huascaran in Peru.491 This is an ambitious project that 
attempts to connect all public education centres in Peru to the online environment. The project 
also provides a wide-ranging online solution for the Peruvian education system by the 
incorporation of different strategies such as course management, access to a national student, 
and staff registration database that can be updated directly by the teachers. It also provides 
different types of content to use in classes. What makes this project unique is that it provides 
tools not only in Spanish, but also an online dictionary in various indigenous languages such as 
Cuzco and Aymara. The project also has been attempting to connect remote communities by the 
use of satellite connections, which have been donated by NGOs and foreign governments. 
Although the project is in its early stages, this approach seems like a worthwhile effort to solve 
some of the most pressing issues about online access in least developed nations.  
6. Redressing the divide: A new sharing ethos 
The evidence presented so far seems to indicate two very interesting trends that are relevant to 
the present work. The situation regarding hardware, connectivity and telecommunications 
networks seems to be getting better with the advent of wireless technologies and decreasing 
prices. On the other hand, access to materials online, and particularly, access to the software 
necessary to run the hardware is an increasing problem for developing countries.  
However, the picture is not as negative as it seems. There are other trends with regards to the 
internet and software that appear to provide evidence that challenge the traditional trends of 
ownership of content and the use of intellectual property that stop developing countries from 
accessing, using and copying information technology and content. There is increasing evidence 
that there is a growing number of people and organisations that are empowering the sharing of 
information as a powerful ethical reply to the often selfish and individualistic trends towards 
more protection.  
The internet is the perfect experimental ground for some of these sharing ideas. The sharing of 
one’s works – and in many cases the works of others – has become routine in cyberspace. 
People create and innovate in a digital environment in which ideas pass through the network 
without leaving a trace, crossing borders without passports, providing the perfect environment 
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in which the ownership of ideas is no longer relevant. As expressed by Nicholas Negroponte, 
the famous Internet guru, “In a digital world, the bits are endlessly copyable, infinitely 
malleable, and they never go out of print. Millions of people can simultaneously read any 
digital document - and they can also steal it.”492 
Barlow, for example, points out that the digital environment has created a new paradigm for 
intellectual property. He notes that: 
“The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without our 
knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we protect it? How 
are we going to get paid for the work we do with our minds? And, if we can't get 
paid, what will assure the continued creation and distribution of such work?”493 
The answer to this question is the sharing of information. Returning to previous statements, 
sharing is being used on the internet as the currency of that borderless country known as 
cyberspace. The fact that people continue to post content online has to constitute hard evidence 
against some of the classic mantras expressed in the utilitarian justification for intellectual 
property.  
As the example of science has shown us, sharing has its advantages. In the online environment 
where electronic bits can be exchanged almost simultaneously, sharing is the obvious result. If 
users want to obtain something, they learn quite quickly to share their own works as well. 
Internet activists Mark Surman and Darren Wershler-Henry explain the sharing synergy 
exhibited online by commenting that “In a digital environment, sharing […] costs you nothing 
and earns you a great deal: respect, feedback and good turns in kind.”494  
This sharing ethic is born from the strong sense of community taking shape on the internet. 
People from around the world realise that they can find anything on the internet for free, and 
develop a sense that you also have to provide the community with information, following from 
that premise. Mowbray and Bays use the cookie analogy to explain this phenomenon. They 
notice that there is a gift philosophy taking shape on the internet, arguing that “Individual 
Internet users donate content for other Internet users to use free of charge. In return, each 
individual receives access to all the content made available by others. The amount an individual 
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receives is much more than they could ever produce, so the gift economy works in the interest of 
Internet users.”495 This gift economy works as a cookie recipe for sharing, where a community 
is encouraged to share their own cookie recipes to the wider audience. 
One of the fields in which this type of ethic is more evident is in the hacker movement. Hacker 
philosophy rests on the premise that the internet is a free medium that cannot be regulated. In 
this scheme of things, the general feeling in hacker circles is that the internet has no laws, but 
hackers achieve a sense of community in which sharing of information becomes essential. In 
fact, the first rule of hacker ethics actually states that “information-sharing is a powerful 
positive good, and that it is an ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by writing free 
software and facilitating access to information and to computing resources wherever 
possible.”496 Anthropologist Steve Mizrach analysed several hacker texts and came up with a 
set of common ethical practices that could be seen throughout the computer underground 
community. Among those was the elevation of sharing as an ethical hacker imperative and the 
expression that information is alive and wants to be free. The use of the word “free” has three 
related aspects: freedom of movement of information, freedom from control, and free of cost. 
This is exemplified by one of the hacker maxims: “Information increases in value by sharing it 
with other people. Data can be the basis for someone else's learning; software can be improved 
collectively.”497 
These ideas of sharing as powerful creative tools are simply the logical extension of the 
memetic theory discussed earlier. Powerful ideas will reproduce online, and the internet acts 
like a giant cultivation dish for information. Doing so, ideas will be reviewed by the largest 
audience in history, exchanging better solutions, constantly evolving and creating better content. 
The review is done by clicks instead of words, with links instead of journals. The sharing 
revolution is being spearheaded by this sense of freedom. Anybody can be an editor on the 
internet; anybody can post their stories, music, novels, paintings, holiday photographs, crude 
animations, bad jokes, and recipes online. There is no censor, nobody to say that your work is 
not good enough for publication, the community is the ultimate reviewer. Technology 
commentator Michael Lewis expresses this by stating that: 
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“Technology has put afterburners on the egalitarian notion that anyone-can-do-
anything —especially in fields in which “expertise” had always been a dubious 
proposition. Amateur book critics published their reviews on Amazon; amateur 
filmmakers posted their works directly onto the Internet; amateur journalists 
scooped the world’s most powerful newspapers.”498 
A more detailed analysis of the new sharing economy on the internet can be found in the 
interesting book by Swedish Internet experts Alexander Bard and Jan Söderqvist called 
Netocracy.499 In this work, they explain that the traditional capitalist economy does not fare 
well in the digital domain. Their argument is that the old aristocratic elites are being replaced by 
a netocracy, a technophile and cosmopolitan class of individuals who have turned cyberspace 
into their own country, with the defining characteristic that they are more concerned with 
information than with property or the production of tangible goods.500 In the new netocracy, 
intellectual property has little space. They comment that: 
“…since the central value of the informational economy does not lie in the 
information itself, but in the sorting and combination of information, the most 
powerful netocrats need not concern themselves with ownership of copyrights 
and patents […] The ability to network and gain an overview of large amounts 
of information that is sought by everyone cannot be copied or stolen; the owner 
is threatened by nothing but the possibility that someone will prove themselves 
more talented.”501 
It would appear that the cybernetic experiment has certainly eroded some of the justifications 
for intellectual property by proving that people are willing to create without hope of 
remuneration, and caring little for the strength of protection awarded by laws that protect 
intellectual creations. The exchange and unlimited flow of information in the digital economy 
has become the ultimate goal.  
Another interesting result of this new medium for the sharing of ideas is that developing 
countries may also start to try to obtain access to technology by means of the internet. This of 
course, will presuppose that the access problem itself may be solved with new and cheaper 
technologies.  
There is another field where the sharing ethos can be felt in its widest form, and that is in the 
realm of software development. It has already been noted that software is a very profitable 
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business, and the software industry is one of the most powerful and influential infogopolies in 
the world. Keeping in mind the tremendous interest of the software industry in maintaining and 
enhancing intellectual property protection of their works, it must come as a surprise that perhaps 
the largest theoretical revolution against the traditional justifications behind intellectual property 
has taken place in the midst of the software industry. This revolution is the emergence of the 
software development methods called open source software and free software. This 
phenomenon is of such importance to this work that it will be dealt with separately in next 
chapter. 
 
  
Chapter 6. Non-proprietary technology: The open source software 
experience 
“The idea that Bill Gates has appeared like a knight in shining armour to lead 
all his customers out of a mire of technological chaos neatly ignores the fact that 
it was he who by peddling second-hand, second-rate technology, led them all 
into it in the first place.” 
Douglas Adams 
 
Earlier chapters have provided some evidence of the problems faced by developing countries in 
acquiring technology. The last chapter presented some evidence about the specific problem with 
regards to access to information technology, but it also pointed out that there is a growing trend 
towards the emergence of a new sharing ethic in the internet that presents some new 
opportunities for developing countries. This chapter will expand on this sharing ethic in the 
specific area of software development.  
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, most technology is proprietary in nature. Non-
proprietary technology is a relatively recent model by which the technological know-how is 
made available to the public with few distribution restrictions, although it is usually owned with 
any of the traditional methods of intellectual property rights, such as patents or copyrights.  
The best example of non-proprietary technology can be found in software development with the 
free software (FS) and open source software (OSS) models being the most popular systems of 
non-proprietary technology available today. Although these models have received a reasonable 
amount of coverage in specialised literature recently, they have seldom been suggested as a 
possible method of acquisition of technology by less developed countries. In the context of 
developing countries, there is one field in which non-proprietary technology can make the 
biggest impact, that is, the field of education. Less developed nations cannot hope to compete in 
a global market if they lack human resources, that is, people with adequate training for tackling 
some of the technological challenges faced by them. By providing low-cost means of acquiring 
technology, in particular information technologies, it would be possible for these countries to 
prepare their workforces on a more equal footing and bridge this technological gap.   
This chapter will examine the non-proprietary model as it exists in the software industry. The 
reason for the extended treatment of this model is that legal interest in Europe has been slow to 
commence, and therefore some of the core concepts and definitions are often confused or 
  
imprecise. After this introduction, the advantages of this system to cash-strapped countries will 
be discussed, as well as the potential importance for the developing world.  
1. Non-proprietary software 
1.1 What is non-proprietary software?  
It has already been remarked that several types of technology are owned by proprietary means, 
as expressed in intellectual property legislation. It was later considered that some of these types 
of proprietary ownership models have received criticism from several commentators, but it was 
generally concluded that most of these attacks lacked depth, and did not serve to dismiss 
intellectual property as a viable legal system of protection.  
Nevertheless, there is one type of criticism that is winning followers in influential technophile 
spheres in the richest nations of the world, and it is centred on wider criticisms of copyright as a 
means of protecting some intellectual creations, in particular software. Software502 is a set of 
variable instructions required to operate computer equipment, known as hardware, and as such, 
it has been classified as subject to the protections awarded to copyright – and in most countries 
with intellectual property legislation, it is protected as a literary work.503   
Because of the huge impact of personal computers in the last quarter of the 20th century, 
software development has become an amazingly profitable business, as expressed in last 
chapter. Some of these huge profits have been made based on a system of strong copyright 
protection, where software is developed as a proprietary creation, and later distributed by the 
manufacturer at a price. But not everybody is following this scheme; there are growing number 
of people in the software development community that are not using the traditional copyright 
ownership rights, hence creating a new category of software that could be classed as being non-
proprietary.    
This scenario is so unlike anything that has been experienced in the last centuries of capitalist 
values in the West that it is producing a vast revolution in the way some people think about 
intellectual property. Some of the traditional justifications for the existence of intellectual 
property come to mind, in particular the economic ones. It has been a basic assumption in the 
period since the creation of copyright that authors will not share their work if there is no 
promise of economic remuneration at the end of it. It seems increasingly obvious that these 
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justifications rest on shaky evidence, as it has become evident that the whole economic 
justification for intellectual property – and in particular copyright – relies heavily on prior 
assumptions that have not been thoroughly tested, and will likely never be tested. This means 
that everybody assumes that the economic justification is sound, but there is no evidence to 
support it. On the other hand, it may be successfully argued that the contrary is true, that there is 
evidence to indicate that people will still create regardless of whether they will obtain economic 
rewards from their works.  
Non-proprietary software serves as important evidence of this contrary position. It is important 
to note that the term in itself does not mean that the software will be automatically free, or that 
it will not be subject to some sort of ownership such as that provided by copyright. In its more 
general form, it is simply defined as software which is subject to later modifications by the user 
or other developers by providing the source code504 to it. In this light, non-proprietary software 
is considered such if it “is released with a licence that would permit others to "fork" the 
software and release their own modified versions without onerous restrictions, even though the 
copyright may remain in the hands of a single individual. At least in theory, control has been 
conceded.”505  
It is important to stress that it is technically incorrect to refer to non-proprietary software as 
either open source or free software, which are the two main types of non-proprietary software, 
but are not the only ones by far. This is why the author prefers the use of the term non-
proprietary as an umbrella definition that refers to the different sub-categories encompassed by 
this movement. This is important because, as will be discussed later, the use of each of these 
terms presupposes that a specific development philosophy is being followed. It is also better to 
use this term because it encompasses all different types of works, from those offered in 
exchange for payment, to those that are offered freely to the public. This would include works 
that are in the public domain,506 something that is not included in the OSS or FS definitions. 
Another acceptable term is “Libre Software” – now in use by the Information Society 
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Directorate General of the European Commission.507 The Spanish word ‘libre’ does not have 
the same meaning as its equivalent in English, and encompasses better the philosophy behind 
non-proprietary development systems. Another valid way of describing this is to refer to Free, 
and Open Source Software (FOSS), or even the catchier Free, Libre and Open Source Software 
(FLOSS). 
Having discussed the general definition of non-proprietary software model, it is necessary to 
explain how it fits with other types of software development, particularly commercial software 
ownership and proprietary software. Proprietary software is usually defined as a computer 
program for which its “use, redistribution or modification is prohibited, or requires you to ask 
for permission, or is restricted so much that you effectively can't do it freely.”508 This would of 
course be the opposite of non-proprietary software, for which there is a possibility of having 
access to the code and changing it. It must also be stressed that commercial software is a subset 
of proprietary software, but not all proprietary software is necessarily commercial.  
Commercial software is a program that is created specifically to be marketed and sold.509 There 
are several types of software that are offered free of charge, but cannot be changed. Examples of 
this would be other types of proprietary software, such as freeware and shareware. Freeware is 
software that is offered to the public free of charge, but cannot be changed in any way because 
it is copyrighted and closed, so that the user cannot incorporate its programming into anything 
else they may be developing. Shareware is software that is distributed free on a trial basis with 
the understanding that if the user wants to continue using it, they must acquire a licence for it. 
Some software developers offer a shareware version of their program with a built-in expiration 
date (for example, after 30 days, the user can no longer get access to the program). Other 
shareware (sometimes called liteware) is offered with certain capabilities disabled as an 
enticement to buy the complete version of the program.510 Another type of proprietary software 
that should not be confused with non-proprietary software is called a demo, which is software 
that presents a limited edition of a program, distributed at no cost over the internet, usually 
before the general commercial release of the software. The objective is to promote the program 
                                                
507 Working group on Libre Software. Free Software / Open Source: Information Society Opportunities for Europe? April 2000. 
http://eu.conecta.it/paper/paper.html  
508 Stallman, R. Categories of Free and Non-Free Software, December 29, 2002. http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories.html  
509 Ibid.  
510 Ibid.  
  
to a wider audience by presenting some of the wider features available in hopes that users will 
later buy the full version. 
 
1.2 A brief history of non-proprietary software 
The development of non-proprietary software can be traced back to the creation of the UNIX 
operating system,511 which was developed between 1969 and 1970 by a small team at AT&T 
Bell Labs. AT&T had been the subject of an antitrust suit back in 1949, and because of that it 
had entered into a consent decree since 1956, in accordance with stipulations established by the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and as a result of a settlement of said suit. This consent required the 
company to reveal any patents they held, and to inform them to competitors. The effect of this 
was that AT&T could not profit from its work on UNIX, so they disbanded the team that had 
been developing the operating system and started selling it cheaply and with no guarantees, 
support, or bug fixes of any kind.512 This prompted users and to band together and start working 
on fixes to known problems, as the source code was offered to the public as well.513 By 1974, 
AT&T was the subject of yet another antitrust suit, which resulted in breaking away from the 
Bell part of the enterprise, allowing it to commercialise UNIX. Eventually, the company 
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released a definitive version of the software in 1979, which increased its price, and the source 
code was no longer made available.514  
However, as early as 1973 the software had been rewritten to accommodate new hardware 
variations, and it kept receiving changes from different teams within Bell labs and the wider 
academic community, in particular in the University of California at Berkeley. The unique 
environment of sharing between experts, which led to the creation of UNIX, set the tone for the 
future evolution of the free software and open source movements.515  
The 1980s saw a culmination of the development of UNIX. Many companies started selling 
their own versions of the operating system, and the academic community started distributing 
their own version called Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD).516 In 1984, a software 
developer who had been involved with MIT named Richard Stallman formed the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF) to support the nascent ideas of sharing information in the shape of developing 
free software and to accommodate the GNU project, which is a repetitive acronym that means 
GNU is not UNIX.517 The 1980s saw the development of software under the auspices of the 
FSF, encouraging the sharing of code between developers that had never met each other. The 
FSF had been attempting to generate a new UNIX system, but they were missing some key 
components, particularly a kernel518 for their operating system.519  
Nevertheless, the movement did not gain mainstream recognition until 1990 with the 
development of a UNIX-based kernel called Linux, which began as a hacker project by Finnish 
programmer Linus Torvalds. Torvalds had been waiting for the developments coming from the 
FSF and Stallman about their UNIX-based clone system, but wanted to run it right away. The 
fact that the FSF had not created a kernel yet prompted Torvalds to develop his own kernel, 
named it Linux and then placed it on the internet for free, asking programmers to improve it.520 
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Torvalds managed to get feedback from other programmers by making sure that he was giving 
the source code for Linux operating system to be examined by everybody. This led to different 
versions (known as distributions) of Linux being developed, giving this operating system an 
unparalleled amount of stability and security as many people were involved in improving it.521  
The term “open source” itself is relatively new; it was created by a group of Linux developers in 
1998 as a reaction to the news that Netscape was going to provide to the public the source code 
for its internet browser in an attempt to gain an advantage in its ongoing battle with Microsoft 
for the browser market.522 The originators of the term wanted to break away of what they 
deemed was a business unfriendly term, such as free software, and they decided to go for the 
term open source.523 
There is a growing animosity between both camps, and this enmity is not only because of the 
use of different terms. The differences between both camps are deeper than they appear. They 
both share common criticisms to copyright legislation, and both have the same sharing approach 
to software, but this is where the similarities stop. The debates between the activists tend to 
have the strength of an ideological debate, with unrelenting points of view from both sides. The 
next sections will deal with each of these philosophies separately.  
2. Free software 
2.1 General characteristics of free software 
The free software movement, although centred on the concepts and philosophies of developing 
programs and distributing them freely, is considered by their creators to be part of wider issues. 
As expressed by Tony Stanco, a securities lawyer who has become an advocate for free 
software, "This movement is really about basic freedoms of everyone, not just developers."524 
Free software is not new, it has been noted that software sharing is “as old as computers, just as 
sharing of recipes is as old as cooking.”525 The description of the rise of free software mirrors 
that of the early non-proprietary movement described in the previous section, and therefore its 
history has been that of the FSF and Stallman’s work. For a while, the term free software was 
synonymous with the non-proprietary philosophy of software development. As personal 
                                                
521 UNESCO. Free Software History, 2001. http://www.unesco.org/webworld/portal_freesoft/open_history.shtml 
522 Open Source Initiative. History of the OSI. 2001. http://www.opensource.org/docs/history.html  
523 Ibid.  
524 Stanco, T. We are the New Guardians of the World, May 16, 2001. http://lwn.net/daily/guardians.php3  
525 Stallman, The GNU Project, op cit.  
  
computers started getting more widespread, software programmers continued to exchange 
pieces of code amongst themselves, providing better ways to develop software in more quickly. 
Other factors that served as an important motivation for the birth of the practice of sharing code 
came from the fact that earlier software programmers were hired by an academic institution to 
produce software, so the ownership aspect of software had less importance than it has 
nowadays.526 The atmosphere of sharing was vital in these early stages of the movement. 
Stallman describes it like this: 
“Whenever people from another university or a company wanted to port and use 
a program, we gladly let them. If you saw someone using an unfamiliar and 
interesting program, you could always ask to see the source code, so that you 
could read it, change it, or cannibalize parts of it to make a new program.”527 
The decision to create the FSF and the GNU project came from the personal disillusionment felt 
by Stallman after the collapse of the early software sharing community, and a notable increase 
in the development of proprietary software. Stallman explains that software began to have 
restrictions imposed in the shape of restrictive proprietary licences with which software 
companies started telling users that they could not access the source code to modify the 
software, or share it with other people with the purpose of enhancing its functionality. If the 
user did that then the user stopped being a hobbyist and became a pirate.528 Eventually, 
Stallman and other like-minded programmers created a powerful software development force 
under the general principles of non-proprietary software.  
It is vital to note that the meaning of the word “free” in free software does not mean free as in 
having no price, but rather free as in “freedom”. Stallman defines free software as having the 
following four characteristics:  
• “The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom0).  
• The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs 
(freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.  
• The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor 
(freedom 2).  
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• The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to 
the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). Access to 
the source code is a precondition for this.”529 
As understood by the proponents of free software, programmers and other developers can 
charge for the software if it is their desire to do so, but the same underlying freedom behind the 
software must exist whether or not it is acquired for a monetary fee. The user must still have all 
of the freedoms described, with access to the source code as the most basic requisite.530 
Stallman and the FSF go as far as stating that “The freedom to use a program means the 
freedom for any kind of person or organization to use it on any kind of computer system, for any 
kind of overall job, and without being required to communicate subsequently with the developer 
or any other specific entity.”531 
According to the GNU project, there are several types of free software, some conflicting with 
the values advocated by the FSF, and some that are not. The main category is an overreaching 
free software definition, which states that the software qualifies as free software if it “comes 
with permission for anyone to use, copy, and distribute, either verbatim or with modifications, 
either gratis or for a fee. In particular, this means that source code must be available.”532 Free 
software that fulfils this broad definition can be distributed in many different ways, the most 
common of which is public domain software. Distribution in the form of public domain 
software means that the author has specifically renounced the rights to any copyright in the 
work, leaving it in the public domain, free for everybody to use.533 
Stallman justifies this freedom by attacking the traditional justifications of the existence of 
proprietary software. He argues that the social restrictions imposed by the proprietary nature of 
intellectual property legislation are damaging to social welfare because they obstruct access to a 
work, thus damaging the social cohesion and limiting the improvement and further development 
of ideas.534 Because of the damage caused by the restriction of works, in particular software, 
Stallman believes that society should not allow ownership of computer programs. Responding 
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to the contention that if software is free authors will not be encouraged to get involved in the 
creative process, Stallman argues that this view is restrictive and does not consider that people 
do not always create with profit as their objective. Stallman maintains that some people create 
because of their fascination with a field of work.535 
The FSF has enacted a policy on granting software with the label free software, where that 
software follows the philosophy described. If the program is deemed to be imposing too many 
restrictions, it will not be granted with the certification. Nevertheless, certain restrictions are 
regarded as acceptable if they are not deemed excessive.536 One of the main restrictions allowed 
is that of subsequent licensing to maintain the software as “free”. Some of these restrictions will 
be analysed next.  
2.2 Copyleft 
From the many different types of free software recognised by the GNU project and the FSF, the 
preferred type of distribution is by means of copyleft software. Copyleft is free software with a 
twist. It maintains the general freedoms awarded to users of free software, but by acquiring a 
copylefted programme, the user has to sign a licence agreement that states that the software will 
not be used to develop commercial closed source applications derived from it.537 The FSF has a 
specific definition of what a proprietary commercial program is for the purposes of copyleft. 
According to them, a proprietary program is one that is “software that is not free or semi-free. 
Its use, redistribution or modification is prohibited, or requires you to ask for permission, or is 
restricted so much that you effectively can't do it freely.”538  
Copyleft was developed from a perceived need to protect the fruits of non-proprietary 
development. After several years of producing computer programmes with a sharing mentality 
and offering the code to the public, it became evident that some companies started using this 
output in a parasitic fashion, obtaining the source code, tweaking it, and selling it as commercial 
proprietary software with very low costs.539 Copyleft licensing became the only solution to stop 
companies from profiting from non-proprietary products and then creating products that go 
against the spirit of the free software mentality.  
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For GNU software, the recommended contract to use is the General Public License (GPL). The 
GPL is a form contract that ensures that the software code is passed on, but anyone who 
redistributes the software, with or without changes, must pass along the freedom to further copy 
and change it. This places a burden on the person transferring the software; the burden is that 
the software must remain “free”, as defined by the FSF and the GPL. This is different from just 
placing software in the public domain because the person making use of the free code can 
subsequently copyright it.540  
The GPL is the legal framework that sustains the copyleft system.541 It reads as a mixture of a 
legal contract and an ideological manifesto. The preamble to the work restates clearly some of 
the most common beliefs of free software and the non-proprietary approach, with several 
admonitions about the meaning of the word “free”. The main point is that, as mentioned before, 
the source code must be made available to the users. The preamble states: 
“For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for 
a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make 
sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them 
these terms so they know their rights.”542 
The licence specifies that this is achieved by two means: by protecting the software by means of 
copyright; and by providing the users with a licence that gives them the freedom to use and 
modify the software in any way they see fit. The main body of the licence reiterates these ideas. 
Section 1 for example states:  
“1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code 
as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and 
appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice and 
disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the notices that refer to this License and 
to the absence of any warranty; and give any other recipients of the Program a 
copy of this License along with the Program.”543 
This section also mentions that the user can make monetary charges when passing the copy as 
long as the charges are for expenses about making copies of the software, which is also 
consistent with the general free software characteristic that does not discriminate against 
commercial software as long as it is not proprietary commercial software.  
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Many of the provisions of the GPL can be found in other non-proprietary licences, including 
several OSS ones. What makes the GPL unique is the section 2(b), as this is where the 
restrictions against using the software to create commercial software are specified. The section 
reads: 
“2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, 
thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such 
modifications or work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also 
meet all of these conditions: […] b) You must cause any work that you distribute 
or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or 
any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under 
the terms of this License.”544   
What this means is that any software developed by using the open source code of the copyleft 
program must not charge for the derivative product, and most importantly, must ensure that the 
GPL is transferred to further users of the derivative software. This type of licence has been aptly 
named a “viral contract” by Professor Radin, defining them as “contracts whose obligations 
purport to ‘run’ to successor of immediate parties”.545 These contracts would then spread in a 
viral form, as the licensee must include the terms of the GPL in any subsequent licence they 
will include to their derivative work because that obligation is part of the contract, and then 
those subsequent licensees will have to impose the same contractual terms in further licences 
that they perform, ad perpetuam.  
Despite the fact that copyleft licences tend to promote the free software principles and the 
definitions drafted by the FSF and Stallman, it must be pointed out that some of the contractual 
restrictions existing in licences such as the GPL have prompted criticism from enterprises and 
commercial users, as it will be expanded in the next section. There appears to be a contradiction 
about the restrictions against the use of software for charging only for the expenses in making 
copies as too constrictive, something that does not allow copyleft software to make it to the 
mainstream. The restrictions imposed by copyleft would seem to go against some of the 
principles of free software because of the viral imposition of restrictions and obligations, thus 
denying the very freedom of doing what one desires with the software. The FS proponents 
should face the fact that this may very well include the freedom to profit from the subsequent 
use of the code. The use of non-proprietary software to create a proprietary or “closed source” 
software may be morally suspect, but one cannot elevate freedom to the highest pedestal and 
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begrudge those who will use that freedom for purposes that are philosophically and politically 
adverse to those of the creator of the programme.   
Another conundrum that must be understood is the distinction between contractual 
enforceability and copyright protection awarded to computer programs. It could be said that 
copyleft licences create a double-pronged protection of the software. On the one hand, it poses 
contractual restrictions in the shape of a licence, in particular by the contractual enforceability 
of the GPL licence and its clauses. On the other hand, works protected by copyleft use 
copyright protection to be able to make this licence enforceable. This certainly creates a very 
interesting relationship between the predominant nature of copyright, which is directed towards 
the protection and regulation of ownership, and a system that seems to advocate the exact 
opposite. The irony that such a contrary system requires copyright to survive cannot possibly be 
lost, and it is something that Stallman and many copyleft advocates have trouble answering, 
even though the websites belonging to the FS advocates are filled with essays that criticise 
copyright and intellectual property.546  
Regardless of these problems, the restrictions imposed by copyleft have a good number of 
outspoken defenders set on furthering the copyleft model regardless of any opposition.547 Eben 
Moglen, an outspoken defender of the FS movement and copyleft, has dubbed copyleft as 
creating a commons perpetuated by the use of copyleft to maintain software free for generations 
to come. Moglen tries to defend the reliance of copyleft upon copyright by saying that this is an 
ideological victory: 
“This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in cyberspace is the 
central institutional structure enabling the anarchist triumph. Ensuring free 
access and enabling modification at each stage in the process means that the 
evolution of software occurs in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable 
acquired characteristic of others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the 
speed with which the Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary 
predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are welcome, which 
resolves one of the central puzzles of collective action in a propertarian social 
system.”548 
The most interesting relation is that between free software as understood by the FSF, and the 
concept of open source. This will be discussed in the next section.  
                                                
546 For example, see: Free Software Foundation, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 1996. 
http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/reevaluating-copyright.html 
547 For one such defender, see: Moglen, E. “Anarchism Triumphant”, First Monday, Vol. 4, No. 8, August 2, 1999. 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html 
548 Ibid.     
  
3. Open source 
3.1 Open source basics 
As it was stated, the term open source was coined during a strategy meeting in February 1998 in 
Palo Alto California by a group of software developers with links to the Linux operating 
system, consisting of Todd Anderson, Chris Peterson, John Hall, Larry Augustin, Sam Ockman, 
and Eric Raymond.549 The group met to plan a new strategy in response to the groundbreaking 
announcement by Netscape that they would be opening their operations and providing the 
source code of the popular Netscape internet browser to the public. Netscape decided to do this 
prompted by fierce competition by Microsoft.550 They believed that this gesture would give 
them a precious opportunity to sell the open source software development approach to the 
corporate world.551  
The need to create a term to describe this approach had become evident because until then, the 
prevalent way to describe all output produced by the non-proprietary approach was by using the 
expression “free software”, based mostly on the philosophies described.  It was apparent to 
many software developers that this movement had a tarnished reputation in the business world 
as a result of the more radical ideas held by people linked to Stallman and the FSF. In short, it 
was thought that trying to sell a more commercial non-proprietary approach would not work if 
they kept referring to the work as “free software”. A more business friendly philosophy was 
needed, and a new name as well. This is where the term “open source” came in, as it was 
deemed less ideological.552 Many developers welcomed the new term, helped in great part by 
the Linux community with the massive assistance of an existing network use of websites, 
message boards and magazines.553 
In the widest sense, open source is the opposite of “closed source”, the traditional proprietary 
approach to software development in the commercial world. Closed source is software “in 
which the customer gets a sealed block of bits which cannot be examined, modified, or 
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evolved.”554 The main idea behind open source is to provide software for which the source is 
available for examination, modification, and peer-review.  
The official definition of open source came out of the original meeting and was coined by Eric 
Raymond, the main proponent of the open source movement. He wrote it based on the Debian 
Free Software Guidelines, a licensing model written by software developer Bruce Perens, which 
accompanies the Debian GNU/Linux system, a Linux distribution.555 These existing documents 
were improved and modified by Raymond, and they form what is known as the Open Source 
Definition (OSD). The definition not only requires that open source software should make 
available the original code, but also sets the following characteristics that all open source 
software should have: 
1. Free Redistribution: this means the software will have no restrictions regarding further 
distribution as part of another package. 
2. Source Code: the source code will be made available for examination by everybody, 
either by including the software in the distribution, or by making it available at a public 
location.  
3. Derived Works: the licence must allow modifications and the development of derived 
works.  
4. Integrity of The Author's Source Code: the licence may allow restrictions about changes 
to the original source code only if the distributor assumes the responsibility of fixing any 
problem found with the software.  
5. No Discrimination Against Persons or Groups: OSS can be used both for “abortion 
clinics and anti-abortion activists”.556 
6. No Discrimination Against Fields of Endeavour: the licence will not discriminate the 
usage of the software for specific fields of work.  
7. Distribution of License: there will be no need for the development of additional licences 
for those who receive the software from any party other than the licensee.  
8. Licence Must Not Be Specific to a Product: if the software is distributed within a larger 
software bundle, the software will still be subject to the larger product license.  
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9. The Licence Must Not Restrict Other Software: this means that there will not be any 
restrictions placed on other software being distributed under the same software 
bundle.557  
The main characteristic of open source as defined by these points is the idea of peer-review of a 
work. By allowing more people access to the code that makes up software, the software will 
gain in dependability, stability and security. In the words of Raymond “open source puts the 
software customer in the driver's seat, dramatically lowers total cost of ownership, and is the 
only recipe that works for high reliability.”558  
Since the original coining of the term, open source has gained substantial recognition in many 
different spheres, but the success has come at a price. As the term gained more credibility and 
popularity, there was nothing to prevent a software developer to release a software program and 
label it “open source” as a marketing ploy. This was possible without the software actually 
fulfilling any of the requirements set by the definition, or worse, maybe even falling into the 
proprietary category altogether. This lack of enforcement prompted several activists to create 
the Open Source Initiative (OSI), which analyses software licenses and measures it against the 
definition, certifying if the software is open source or not.559 The OSI maintains a public list of 
all software that it has certified, enabling consumers to ensure that the software they are using is 
indeed open source.   
OSI certified licences display a broad range of licensing models, and it is important to note that 
some copyleft licences are OSI certified, such as the GPL. Perhaps the licence that exemplifies 
the OS model most accurately is the BSD licence,560 which is very short and concise. The main 
part of the licence is the assignation of rights, which states: 
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“Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 
- Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list 
of conditions and the following disclaimer.  
- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this 
list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other 
materials provided with the distribution.  
- Neither the name of the ORGANIZATION nor the names of its contributors 
may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 
specific prior written permission.” 
It is interesting to contrast this grant of rights with a copyleft licence such as the GPL. The 
licence is very permissive, as it allows the redistribution of the software both in binary and 
source code.561 Other short and elegant OSS licences maintain a very similar approach. For 
example, the MIT licence562 is another short licence that has proved to be very popular, and it 
similarly maintains minimal restrictions.  
The most comprehensive non-copyleft, open source licence is the Apache licence.563 This is a 
much longer licence than the BSD or MIT licences, and therefore it contains more restrictions. 
The Apache licence maintains the freedom to redistribute the software in binary or source code 
form that is prevalent in most OSS licences, but it also adds the right to create derivative works 
from the original.564 The redistribution and modification of the work are allowed provided that 
the copy or derivative works are provided with proper attribution to the originators of the 
program, and that it also includes the copyright notices attributing ownership of the code to the 
original programmers. This falls short of the viral clause included in copyleft licences, and it 
demonstrates one of the main differences between both licensing models. Another interesting 
feature that is included in the Apache licence is that it includes an assignment of copyright, but 
it also contains a grant of patent licence, this despite the fact that the Apache Software 
Foundation, which drafted the patent, have expressed that they do not own or have applied for 
any patents.565   
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3.2 Open source or free software? 
A superficial glance at the two main non-proprietary software camps has uncovered some 
differences in the licences themselves, but there are some other important aspects to consider 
that differentiate both movements. There are some points shared by both models, in particular 
one could point towards their common opposition to large closed source software manufacturers 
like Microsoft, and a shared dislike for the some of the abuses of intellectual property 
mechanisms, exemplified by constrictive proprietary licences and the patenting of software.566 
Stallman explains these similarities by saying that “We disagree on the basic principles, but 
agree more or less on the practical recommendations. So we can and do work together on many 
specific projects. We don't think of the Open Source movement as an enemy. The enemy is 
proprietary software.”567 Similarly, Raymond writes that the sharing of information can only 
result in improvement of the products and that sharing is beneficiary for society,568 an opinion 
echoed by Stallman.569 He also agrees with the FSF that there are many creators who will be 
content with non-economic rewards for their labour, such as recognition, but he disagrees that 
this is always the case. One of the main points Raymond makes is that there is a certain type of 
proprietary nature to open source; furthermore, he recognises that there are many occasions in 
which commercial creations work better than free ones.570  
The main disagreements that these models have are over the level of the emphasis added to 
achieve their goal of providing free software. David Wheeler exemplifies this by stating that: 
“The term ``open source software'' […] is often used by people who wish to 
stress aspects such as high reliability and flexibility of the resulting program as 
the primary motivation for developing such software. In contrast, the term ``free 
software'' (used in this way) stresses freedom from control by another (the 
standard explanation is ``think free speech, not free beer'').”571 
The differences are also about the definitions and restrictions of each of the licensing models. 
Open source requires access to the source code and an adherence to the principles established 
by the Open Source Definition. On the other hand, free software requires the strict 
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implementation of FSF approved licences, with the preference of copyleft licences such as the 
GPL. This means that open source is less restrictive than free software. At a practical level, the 
main difference is that open source allows the distribution of derived software through 
commercial purposes, while the GPL does not. Another important distinction is that the OSS 
movement believes that commercial and proprietary software plays an important role in 
development, and accept that some companies may choose to produce proprietary software. 
OSS will then be a choice, an alternative development model. FS activists on the other hand, 
believe that all software should be free; hence they do not see a role for the existence of 
proprietary software.  
There are also some ideological distinctions, in particular in regards to their approach towards 
businesses. Free software seems to be inspired by a socialist left-wing ideology, and open 
source responds better to libertarian sensibilities. However, this ideological clash hides a certain 
inevitable personality clash between the two main proponents of each of the movements, with 
the figure of Linus Torvalds as the moderator.572 One of the many complaints that Stallman 
makes of the open source philosophy is that it is not strong enough in trying to keep software 
free, and that it simply allows anybody to name their software “open source” even if it is not.573 
This is something that has been acknowledged by the open source proponents, which is why 
they have created the OSI certification.  
It seems ironic that the main difference between the two movements is the expression of 
freedom, but it would appear that the less free of the two is the free software approach. By 
imposing free software licences to use copyleft, it would appear that free software is trampling 
on the same freedoms that the movement appears to defend. On the other hand, open source 
would seem freer, as developers may decide later if they want to turn their versions of open 
source software into commercial software. It does seem that Stallman has a point about the 
ethical implications of this: companies may very well obtain open source code from one of the 
outlets available on the internet, tweak and change it slightly, and sell it using a “closed source” 
proprietary approach. This of course is why the FSF insists on the use of copyleft and the GPL 
licensing systems.  
It would appear that the open source approach is more honest, and commercially more viable. 
The success of this model can be seen in the almost universal adoption of the term “open 
                                                
572 Moody, op cit; pp.31-40.  
573 Stallman, R. Why “Free Software”' is better than `”Open Source”, op cit. 
  
source” to label all non-proprietary software and in the term’s instant recognition by the public. 
Free software has almost disappeared from public consciousness, with a lot of people not even 
noticing a difference between both terms. As has been explained, the differences are there, but 
they are increasingly academic. It would seem that open source is winning the battle for the 
hearts and minds of those who advocate and defend the non-proprietary system.  
Yet again, the example of this can be seen in Linux. Although it started as a compliment to a 
free software project, Linux has evolved into an operating system that follows the open source 
approach more than free software one, as evidenced by the embrace of the open source term by 
the larger Linux developing community and by various popular distributions.574 This 
popularisation of Linux has prompted some FS developers to claim that Linux should not be 
called Linux, and insist that it should be called GNU/Linux in recognition of the role played by 
GNU software and the FSF in the kernel released by Torvalds. This seems to be more evidence 
of the ideological battle from FS activists.  
Another advantage of open source against free software is flexibility, as the open source 
philosophy recognises the need for companies and developers to go with “closed source” in 
some occasions.575 The copyleft approach favoured by free software advocates also presents 
serious problems, as it constrains the future development of the software. Nevertheless, the zeal 
of the FS defenders should not be underestimated. The GPL is still the most popular licence of 
all non-proprietary licences, with surveys estimating that more than 70% of this type of all non-
proprietary software uses it as their main contractual mechanism.576 
4. Why does non-proprietary software work?  
Regardless of which non-proprietary licensing model is preferred, it would be adequate to ask 
the question of whether it works in practice. On paper, FLOSS appears to be a counterintuitive 
system of development computer code. Where are the incentives to authors? Why should a 
company invest in non-proprietary software? How can a system that is programmed by a rag-
tag army of part-time programmers be more secure and dependable than proprietary products 
created by professional programmers?  
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Traditional methods of project management and software development that were prevalent up to 
the 1990s seemed to spell trouble for non-proprietary software. The traditional model of 
software development was usually expressed in the following way: “Adding manpower to a late 
software project makes it later”.577 This is what is known as Brooks’ Law,578 which basically is 
translated as follows: if more programmers are added to a project to finish it earlier, this will 
create communication problems which will proportionally increase the amount of time that it 
would take to finish the work. This view of software development seemed to provide proof that 
software development involving too many different programmers spread around the world 
would produce mediocre code at very late intervals, but the rise of non-proprietary software 
proved Brook’s law wrong. Nowadays, another law is prevalent. Raymond criticises Brooks’ 
Law by stating that:  
“[Brook’s law] rests on a hidden assumption: that the communications structure 
of the project is necessarily a complete graph, that everybody talks to everybody 
else. But on open-source projects, the halo developers work on what are in effect 
separable parallel subtasks and interact with each other very little; code 
changes and bug reports stream through the core group, and only within that 
small core group do we pay the full Brooksian overhead.”579  
Raymond has named this new way of looking at software programming Linus’ Law, which is 
exemplified by the phrase “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”. This would mean that 
when more people are involved in a project, there are more probabilities of finding errors in the 
code, making the resulting program more stable and reliable. Non-proprietary software 
enhances and requires an environment of sharing that is common in the hacker communities. 
The resulting environment of FLOSS development is one of constant exchange of ideas and 
relentless peer-review of the code, resulting in full flexibility and enhanced feedback. The non-
proprietary model relies on the three pillars of development advocated by Linus Torvald: 
“release early and often, delegate everything you can, be open to the point of promiscuity”.580  
Raymond likens this environment to a bazaar in his influential essay, The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar.581 In it, he likens the development of open source software, and in particular Linux, to a 
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chaotic bazaar of “differing agendas and approaches.”582 In this bazaar, programmers work as 
vendors, always responding to the constant feedback from customers and other vendors. 
Opposed to the bazaar, there is the cathedral model exemplified by proprietary software and 
some free software projects. Proprietary software, like cathedrals, are built as grand projects 
with some experts providing most of the input, involved in a strict working environment, with a 
development schedule and concise set of rules and a chain of decision making that makes 
feedback much less important. The resulting software is large, expensive, but perhaps much 
easier to use, but changes, fixes and updates have long release intervals because they rely on the 
small group of experts. Raymond admits that some projects require the cathedral model, but he 
says that the bazaar has proved to work best for fast releases and fixing bugs.  
The evidence supports Raymond’s astute reading of the non-proprietary model, proving that it 
can produce good software, and it is gaining recognition amongst developers and enterprises. 
The most successful example of the non-proprietary model is the Linux operating system. As it 
has been stated, Linux started as a single user project to provide a UNIX-like operating system. 
The first Linux version developed by Torvalds in 1991 had 10,000 lines of code583 and one user. 
By 1998, Linux version 2.1 boasted more than 7 million users and consisted of 1.5 million lines 
of code, most of them written in collaborative work between growing communities of 
enthusiasts.584 The latest Linux kernel (version 2.6) contains about 3 million lines of code, while 
a full Linux distribution contains approximately 30 million lines of code. To put this in context, 
if a large distribution of Linux had been developed as proprietary software, it would have taken 
8,000 person-years of development effort, and it would have cost between $1 billion and $1.9 
billion USD, depending on the size of the distribution.585         
The development model means that FLOSS is much more cost effective than proprietary 
software. But users also keep rating OSS very highly in reliability, stability and security when 
compared to proprietary software, and in particular Windows operating systems.586 
Surprisingly, some other praises to the non-proprietary model come from within Microsoft. The 
large software manufacturer has begun showing nervousness about the cult-like status that 
                                                
582 Ibid.  
583 Lines of code are lines written in a computer language which express a set of instructions that the computer will undertake.  
584 Moody, op cit; pp.69-77.  
585 Wheeler, D. More than a Gigabuck: Estimating GNU/Linux's Size. June 2001.  http://www.dwheeler.com/sloc  
586 For some interesting analysis of Linux vs. Windows in security issues, read:  Lyman, J. W. “The Great Security Debate: 
Linux vs. Windows”, OS Opinion, March 7, 2001. http://www.osopinion.com/perl/story/7907.html  
  
Linux has on some expert circles and its rising market share in the profitable server business. In 
a series of damaging memoranda that were leaked to the public –aptly named the “Halloween 
Documents”– several Microsoft engineers stated:  
“OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to Microsoft, 
particularly in server space. Additionally, the intrinsic parallelism and free idea 
exchange in OSS has benefits that are not replicable with our current licensing 
model and therefore present a long term developer mindshare threat […] The 
ability of the OSS process to collect and harness the collective IQ of thousands 
of individuals across the Internet is simply amazing.”587   
The statistics would seem to support the optimism and enthusiasm shared by the non-
proprietary software proponents. These are some of the facts that serve to illustrate the 
reliability of this model:588 
• Apache (non-proprietary internet software) is the number one web server software in the 
world since 1996.589   
• Linux was found to be the fastest network operating system at serving applications, 
beating any other commercial proprietary software.  
• Linux outperformed Windows 2000 (a commercial/proprietary product) in tests 
performed for two years running by PC Magazine.  
• Various versions of Linux support more hardware than any other commercial operating 
system.  
• In several tests, non-proprietary operating systems were found to be more secure against 
hacker attacks than Windows OS. 
• Linux is less likely to be attacked by viruses or worms. For example, the most serious 
attack to Linux servers affected only 3,500 servers around the world.590 In contrast, 
MyDoom virus, designed to attack Windows vulnerabilities, infected a total of 33 
million computers at its peak in January 2004.    
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• Non-proprietary software costs considerably less than its commercial counterparts, not 
only on cost of ownership, but on hardware costs (it runs on older systems), support and 
upgrade costs.591    
Despite all of these advantages, several problems remain with non-proprietary software. Bill 
Gates sums up these problems by stating that:  
“Open-source software's strength is massive customization but this works 
against consistency. Consumers don't know what to expect when they load the 
software; corporate customers find it hard to stay current as each version is 
customized; developers don't get a volume market because there are multiple 
flavors of the same product.”592 
One of the biggest complaints is that non-proprietary operating systems are remarkably user-
unfriendly, and difficult to install and configure, making it difficult for users to become 
proficient in this type of software. Another complaint is that, although cheap when compared to 
proprietary software, non-proprietary software suffers from availability problems and lack of 
support. It has also been repeatedly considered by many critics that non-proprietary software 
suffers from compatibility issues, as it is not widespread enough to make its general use 
feasible.593  
Perhaps the greatest obstacle that non-proprietary software has to overcome in regards to the 
proprietary model, however, is the widespread reluctance of consumers to forego the Microsoft 
standard in exchange for something new. Consumers and businesses that have been using 
Windows for years are reluctant to try a new interface and different file formats that will require 
them to spend more time learning to use new methods of doing everyday tasks. The problem 
here is not quality, it is inertia.   
Regardless of these problems, it is evident that low-cost non-proprietary systems present an 
interesting opportunity to developing countries. The next section will deal with the possibilities 
of using non-proprietary as a cost-effective mechanism to acquire technology for the developing 
world.  
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5. Non-proprietary software and developing countries 
5.1 Goodbye proprietaryware 
The lengthy exposition of the characteristics and strengths of non-proprietary software has had 
the objective of demonstrating the potential benefits of non-proprietary software for developing 
countries, and such benefits should be clear by now.  
A simple cost comparison should suffice to establish some clear advantages of this type of 
technology for countries that do not have the resources to purchase expensive proprietary 
commercial software licences. For example, German Linux distributor SuSE calculates that the 
cost of proprietary licences for operating system and applications generally used for 
constructing a Windows-based web server would cost almost €6,000 EUR; this generally 
includes the licences for one system.594 In contrast, a SuSE Linux distribution that contains all 
of those applications and can be installed in an unlimited number of systems would only cost 
€90 EUR; while many Linux distributions can even be downloaded directly from the internet 
without cost. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that free or low-cost Linux distributions come with no support, 
something that must be purchased. It must also be pointed out that some Linux distributions 
such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux are offered at considerably higher prices than the free 
download ones, but these costs generally offer full support, and these packages usually cover 
unlimited licences. A study by Forrester Research amongst 140 large firms in North America 
found that even taking into consideration some of the more expensive Linux distributions, the 
cost of every server machine running Linux was 60% less than a comparable server running 
Windows.595 Others have pointed out that the migration from an environment running 
proprietary software and operating systems into a FLOSS operating system is considerably 
more expensive than expected. For example, the local government in Munich commissioned a 
study to find out what would be the cost to migrate from Windows to Linux in their computers. 
The study found that there was no noticeable difference in cost between migrating to Linux and 
migrating to a later proprietary Windows version. On the contrary, the study estimated that the 
migration may cost as much as €3000 EUR per client in hardware, software and training.596 
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However, this implementation may have been badly managed, as there are other examples of 
cheap migrations.597 It must also be pointed out that many developing countries, particularly 
LDCs, do not have any problems about migration, as they do not have any operating systems to 
migrate from.  
Coupled to the obvious cost benefits, non-proprietary software has many other advantages over 
proprietary software for developing countries. Source code is made available in all open source 
and free software, which means that programmers can make changes to how the software 
works. This would give developing countries a good amount of flexibility in adapting the 
software to their own needs. On the contrary, proprietary software is offered to the user as a 
block of sealed bits that cannot be changed. Even attempting to reverse engineer and decompile 
proprietary software could be considered illegal in many jurisdictions.598 Another advantage for 
developing countries is the reliability and security of non-proprietary software when compared 
to proprietary software, as faulty, vulnerable or buggy software costs considerable amounts of 
money. For example, a survey of IT specialists from CIO Magazine found that companies spend 
7% to 8% of their computer-related budgets on security. Another report from 2001 calculates 
that faulty software costs companies in the United States a staggering $78 billion USD a year.599  
However, the ultimate advantage of FLOSS in developing countries is the fact that it offers a 
powerful tool to encourage the development of native technologies, moving from imitation to 
innovation. True, there will be an initial need to copy and share source code originating from 
developed countries, but once this has been achieved, then indigenous innovation could ensue. 
In the words of Wayne Marshall, a UNIX programmer in Guinea: “Open-source advocates can 
be sure that Africans get community; Africans get bazaar.”600  
With these advantages, one should not be surprised that public institutions in developing nations 
are looking into non-proprietary software in a favourable manner, as it has the potential of 
helping less developed nations in bridging the digital divide in many areas, assisting in the 
development of the technological capability of these countries.  
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One area where there can be invaluable assistance of new technologies is in government 
agencies. Information technologies can be used effectively to enhance governance by reducing 
administrative costs and bureaucracy, making government smaller and more efficient. It can 
also enhance communication between government, citizens, and other stakeholders in decision-
making. The use of information technologies could automate processes and allow access to 
government agencies from remote areas with the use of remote technologies that would be 
relatively cheaper to run than a local office.601 The improvement of democratic institutions is 
another subject that could have significant effects in poor nations. Skrzeszewski points out that: 
“An E-Democracy infrastructure will enable democratic participation through 
online government (live two-way broadcasts of political debates and systems to 
track legislation), electronic voting, online campaigning, online advocacy and 
lobbying, and community consultations.”602 
Non-proprietary software could become an invaluable tool in this push towards e-governance 
and e-democracy by allowing cost-effective, stable, and secure access to information 
technologies. There is growing evidence that this phenomenon is taking place even in the 
developed world. The German Federal government has recently signed an agreement with IBM 
to purchase computers for use in its offices that will have Linux installed, greatly reducing their 
costs and increasing security.603 The Spanish region of Extremadura has decided to move into 
open source operating systems in public institutions, with a total of 100,000 computers installed 
with Linux by the end of 2003.604 Another important development in the European Union is the 
creation of a non-proprietary unit called “Libre Software”, which has conducted a 
comprehensive study about the viability of introducing non-proprietary software to the EU 
institutions, which has resulted in a positive outlook.605      
There is no reason why this phenomenon should not be replicated in developing nations, with a 
strong emphasis in public institutions and government offices to implement OSS and FS. Some 
countries are already trying to invest heavily in e-government, an example of this being Costa 
Rica, where efforts by the UNDP have been able to convert large sectors of the administration 
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into a “Digital Government” scheme, looking to reduce bureaucracy and increase efficiency.606 
It would be advantageous for efforts like this to try to benefit from the advantages posed by 
non-proprietary tools.  
The best frame of reference in this respect is China, a country that is heavily involved in the 
development of OSS tools for e-governance. The flexibility of the non-proprietary model can be 
seen in the development of a Chinese distribution of Linux called Red Flag Linux, which has 
been developed with Chinese consumers in mind.607 Another version of Linux called Yangfan 
Linux (which means “raise the sails”) supported by the Chinese government is set to replace 
Windows and UNIX in all computers and servers in the Chinese government.608 A survey of 
Chinese software developers, conducted by Evans Data Corporation, has found that about two 
thirds of those developers are planning to write OSS-related applications in the next year, a 
figure that shows the strength to which this model is growing in China.609 India is another 
country where non-proprietary software is making strong advances. It is calculated that by 
January 2004, 10% of all commercial computers sold in India contain Linux as their operating 
system.610  
The eventual success of non-proprietary software in such populous countries as India and China 
would become the greatest encouragement for this model for developing nations. The size of 
these markets alone would provide serious incentives for other countries to replicate the 
experiences in China and India – and if successful, it might even create a proprietary and non-
proprietary divide. 
5.2 Non-proprietary software in education 
The last chapter provided clear evidence of the need for developing countries to acquire 
information technology for educational purposes. This chapter also demonstrated just how 
expensive it is for these countries to bridge the digital divide in education.  Cost has become one 
of the main reasons for the existence of the gap displayed in educational ITC tools between rich 
and poor countries, a gap that will not be easily solved in the near future. Solutions to the 
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problem of educational access to technologies are complex and involve several different types 
of strategies, some of them already discussed. Nevertheless, one specific area that can be 
tackled almost immediately by developing countries is the use made of non-proprietary 
software for educational purposes.  
Proprietary software has several disadvantages that make it less appealing to poor countries. 
One of the main reasons is cost, as even with different pricing schemes proprietary software 
will be more expensive than its non-proprietary counterparts. An example of this is the Proyecto 
Huascarán in Peru, one of the examples offered earlier in which there has been a concerted 
effort by the government and aid agencies to provide a comprehensive ICT infrastructure for 
educational centres. This Project has a budget of $553 million USD from 2003-2010. A large 
part of this budget is taken up by the acquisition of the technological tools required to connect 
all educational centres to the internet – a total of $304 million USD. Although this amount of 
money includes hardware purchases, software licences and development will take up more than 
$100 million USD, mostly through the acquisition of proprietary software.611  Although it is 
difficult to ascertain just how much would be saved by the use of non-proprietary software, it is 
not difficult to imagine that the use of non-proprietary software has made the project more 
expensive.  
Another important concern for developing countries that consider the possible implementation 
of non-proprietary software is the access to the source code. The source code of proprietary 
software is closed, which places developing countries in the unfavourable position of having to 
accept the software as is, with few opportunities to change it and adapt it to their needs – such 
as language, currency, and other local needs. Changing content may prove extremely difficult if 
the source code is closed.  
On the contrary, many of the advantages of non-proprietary software listed earlier make it a 
very attractive tool for education institutions, facilitating giant strides in education in the 
developed world, evidenced by the growing use of non-proprietary software in educational 
institutions around the world. For example, the largest cluster of computers running Linux 
exists at the State University of New York in Buffalo, where a network has been established for 
use by researchers as part of the decoding of the human genome project.612 This proves that 
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Linux is one of the most viable non-proprietary software schemes that could be used in the 
developing world. The wide success of the Linux operating system in some institutions in 
developed countries should be taken into account by educational authorities throughout the 
developing world. The stability of the system – coupled with its low cost, both in price and 
maintenance – makes this operating system a very attractive proposition.  
Linux is becoming more and more popular, in particular in the higher circles of programming 
excellence. Top software developers have demonstrated confidence in Linux, and use it on their 
computers. Linux’s obvious stability and growing popularity is a demonstration that the non-
proprietary model works, and that quality software can be delivered by using the non-
proprietary approach.613 All of these advantages make Linux a tool of choice for education. As 
Raymond comments: 
“The indirect effect of open-source on total cost of ownership is even stronger. 
Cash-strapped educational institutions love inexpensive software; they love 
open-source software especially, because it lets students examine and 
experiment in ways extremely valuable for learning. Universities and technical 
schools are now beginning to turn out an increasing flood of Linux-aware 
graduates, each one far more knowledgeable about the operating system than 
any MCSE can possibly be about closed-source Windows. The potential impact 
of this on personnel and training costs should not be hard to imagine.”614 
When taking all of this into consideration, the role of non-proprietary technology for the 
developing world becomes clear. There is obvious potential for reducing the amount of money 
spent in software licences by using non-proprietary software, making information technology 
marginally more accessible to developing countries. An example of this is the Scholar Project in 
Mexico, which will be installing non-proprietary software Linux in the 140,000 school 
computer labs in Mexico City, making it the standard operating system in most public schools 
of the largest city in the world. The project directors in this case came to the conclusion that 
using commercial software was out of the question, as the amount of money that would have to 
be spent would have been considerable. As expressed by the project objectives:  
“The primary reason for reaching this decision was the kind of money we would 
have had to pay if we went for proprietary software: at US$55 for each machine 
with Win98 and Office, US$500 for every NT licence and an average of six 
workstations and one server for 140,000 labs, that's a lot of money.”615 
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Another country that is considering moving into non-proprietary software is Brazil. A large 
project has now been implemented in the populous state of Rio Grande do Sul in which public 
education will start using free software, in conjunction with the local Projecto Software Livre 
RS.616 The University of Rio Grande do Sul has also moved substantially towards full reliance 
upon information technology based on the non-proprietary model. The university has 22 
campuses all around a large geographical area, and they have decided to interconnect them to 
share resources with technology running Linux. This amounts to a total of 750 computers, 47 
network servers which otherwise would have required installation with commercial licences, 
thus decreasing the amount of computers for which they could have budgeted.617  
Non-proprietary software could also help many developing countries to develop their own 
applications, based on local needs and requirements, and also assist them to avoid becoming 
what one expert calls "Microsoft client states”. Chapman states: “Not only will they save money, 
they could build an alternative software development market and model so they're not just 
sending their money to the United States all the time”.618  
Another important consideration for developing countries is that there is much less reluctance in 
trying out new software interface, as is the case in the developed world. Because the education 
system would begin from the early stages of software training and implementation, it would be 
much easier for people to become acquainted with the information technology world from the 
non-proprietary end. Users are not yet “hooked on Microsoft,” which means that the 
implementation of new approaches and technologies will not be met with the transition costs 
that have made FOSS more difficult to implement in developed nations. It is easier to train users 
with Linux if they have never used any other operating system. Moreover, developing countries 
would also be acquiring a cost-effective, stable and secure platform.  
Despite the positive steps in education, there are still several problems with the use of non-
proprietary models, in particular with software. Proprietary software still has several advantages 
that make it attractive. Users will always be sure to obtain support from proprietary products, 
and they can make sure that their applications will run with most versions of Windows. On the 
contrary, non-proprietary software comes in so many distributions that they may not be able to 
talk to each other – creating a problem of harmonisation of technological solutions. There is 
                                                
616 The project can be found here: http://www.softwarelivre.org/index.php 
617 D’Elia Branco, M. “Free Software RS Project”, IT4All Conference, Bilbao, February 2003.    
618 Chapman, cited by Scheeres, J. "Mexico City Says Hola to Linux”, Wired, March 16, 2001.  
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,42456,00.html 
  
also the fact that the user interface in proprietary products is less complicated, hence the 
learning-curve for proprietary products tends to be lower.619 A solution to some of these 
concerns is to use proprietary operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows, but not to buy 
expensive Microsoft applications, using non-proprietary applications instead. A proponent of 
this scheme points out that: “Contrary to the opinion on many Microsoft critics, using Windows 
does not mean that you need to use other Microsoft applications.”620  
The road is indeed difficult, but non-proprietary software still offers some small relief to some 
of the problems faced by the education authorities in the poorer countries of the world. Perhaps 
most of the efforts in poor countries should go towards adopting non-proprietary software on a 
smaller scale, possibly directed at higher education at first. This could allow developing 
countries at least to gain a foothold in the information technology arena, and it could also make 
it possible to acquire technology that is in use in developed countries. This would have the 
benefit of introducing some parts of the population to non-proprietary software. As further 
updates of FLOSS would not require additional expenditure, the future effects could be 
immense. A core of software professionals trained in the use of information technology could 
eventually filter through other areas, such as helping to provide technical assistance to local 
government agencies, helping them to become more efficient.  
 
                                                
619 Although Linux is still difficult to learn, there are improvements in this respect. See: Shankland, S. "Morgan Stanley aids 
Linux learning curve", CNET News.com, January 22, 2003. http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-981696.html  
620 Bezroukov, N. Linux as a magic bullet for poor countries myth, Version 0.40, 
http://www.softpanorama.org/Articles/linux_as_a_magic_bullet.shtml 
  
Chapter 7. Open access, free licences 
“Information wants to be free.” 
Stewart Brand 
 
Previous chapters have dealt with the issue of technology transfer as a problem of imitation and 
control of high-technology generated in developed countries. The issue of the direction of the 
flow of knowledge rests greatly on the problem of the ownership of the technology. Technology 
generally flows from developed to developing countries in a limited fashion, constrained by 
intellectual property protection. Some solutions have been discussed already to address this 
problem, but there is an obvious solution that has received less attention up to this point. It is 
possible to suggest that knowledge flows should not only be North-South, the discussion should 
move towards encouraging the trade of technology amongst developing countries – the 
emergence of South-South technology transfer and collaboration. It is also useful to think of a 
common pool of knowledge that can be accessed by all; a common space where the direction of 
the flows of information become irrelevant.  
This common space has been already experimented and explored with the free software and 
open source software licensing models described in the previous chapter. The non-proprietary 
software experiment has demonstrated that open development models are viable and sometime 
even commercially successful. Amongst these models, one of the most interesting licences is 
that offered by so-called copyleft licenses, those licences that allow software to be transferred 
with the insurance that the source code will remain open, with the caveat that anyone who 
redistributes the software, with or without changes, must pass along the freedom to further copy 
and change it.  
However, software development is not the only area in which this licensing model could be 
applied. The viral nature of copyleft licenses has generated a considerable amount of interest in 
circles that transcend software development. The idea of sharing materials is not new, and has 
been made more evident by the chaotic and sometimes anarchic nature of the internet.  
However, shared materials tend to suffer from the possibility of third parties that use the freely 
acquired information to turn them into proprietary works. That is why many different 
organisations are turning to the copyleft model to protect works that are being freely shared 
online.  
This chapter will explore the possible application of non-proprietary software licences to other 
areas of research that are relevant to developing countries, particularly those that have been 
  
highlighted already during the work – namely health, biotechnology and digital content. To do 
this, several different licensing models will be explored and particular licences and clauses will 
be suggested.  
1. Trouble with definitions 
Whenever the subject of free software or open source software is mentioned, a discussion about 
terms and definitions is likely to follow, as evidenced by the FS and OSS debate. Both terms 
have managed to become attached with a specific philosophies and ideologies, and what is 
more, each of these definitions will usually inform the type of licences used to distribute the 
work. Some of the discussions may seem academic, but the implication about the use of 
licences in each definition has a lot of bearing about the exporting the concepts to other areas.  
If non-proprietary licences are to be exported from the software forum and into other areas of 
intellectual creation, then there must be a certain amount of consensus about what is being 
discussed, and the terms that should be used to define the models. The experience with the free 
software and open source debate has demonstrated that the use of “free” may be problematic 
because it implies that the work is being offered without cost, which may be inaccurate 
description. The Spanish word “libre” has been suggested as well, but although it can be used in 
other countries, it may prove to be unpopular with other developers.  
Superficially, there is a good argument to choose the term “open source”, as it is the one that is 
more readily identifiable in the public perception of non-proprietary software models.621 
However, the term “open source” is problematic because the open source paradigm may not 
translate well into other fields. Besides, open source cannot be used to identify licensing 
schemes that do not refer to software at all, and where there is no source code to be open. For 
example, a recent article in The Economist asks: “What does it mean to apply the term “open 
source” in fields outside software development, which do not use “source code” as a term of 
art? Depending on the field in question, the analogy with source code may not always be 
appropriate.”622 Regardless, “open” appears to be the winning operating word, as evidenced by 
the adoption of open code623 as another substitute for OSS.  
                                                
621 As a measure of popularity, Google throws 8,760,000 results for “free software”; and 11,100,000 for “open source”.  
622 “An open-source shot in the arm?” The Economist, June 10, 2004. 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2724420    
623 This is the term preferred by Lessig to avoid the FS/OSS debate. See: Lessig, L. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New 
York: Basic Books, 2000, p.7.  
  
With open source as the inspiration, the term that has become prevalent in the literature in 
recent years is the term “open access” (OA). Open access is recently being used to identify 
works that are freely available over the internet (using free in the “liberty” sense). These works 
will generally be distributed by maintaining their copyright – although the term should be 
generic enough to define works that have been released into the public domain. Open access 
then will be any work that has been offered under a permissive licence that allows the 
redistribution of the work. In recent years, open access has gained some specific connotations, 
and it is being used to refer to academic journals, particularly after the Berlin Declaration on 
Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities,624 and the Budapest Open Access 
Initiative (BOAI).625 Suber defines open access thus: 
““Open access” (OA) is free online access. OA literature is not only free of 
charge to everyone with an internet connection, but free of most copyright and 
licensing restrictions. OA literature is barrier-free literature produced by 
removing the price barriers and permission barriers that block access and limit 
usage of most conventionally published literature, whether in print or online”.626  
Nevertheless, the term open access is not devoid of problems. Firstly, if the term is now being 
identified as an expression to define subscription-free academic journals, and there is a high 
probability that its use may be limited to that field. This would necessitate the creation of further 
definitions to use in other areas of intellectual creation, such as biotechnology, medicines or 
other creative arts. Secondly, the term open access is already used for such diverse range of 
subjects such as freedom of information, competition law and even digital divide subjects,627 
which may create needless confusion of terms and definitions. Thirdly, there are substantial 
numbers of hardcore free software activists that resent the use of the word open, preferring the 
definitions and philosophies exemplified by the free software movement.628 Using “open 
access” will probably serve to further alienate those who dislike its use in software 
development.   
                                                
624 Full text of the declaration can be found here: http://www.zim.mpg.de/openaccess-berlin/berlindeclaration.html 
625 More about the initiative in this site: http://www.soros.org/openaccess 
626 Suber, P. Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, May 28, 2004. 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001246/01/suberrev052804.pdf  
627 For example, see:  Piropato, M. “Open Access and the Essential Facilities Doctrine: Promoting Competition and Innovation”, 
University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2000, p.369; and Feld, H. “Whose Line is it Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable 
Open Access”, CommLaw Conspectus, Vol. 8, Winter 2000, p.23. 
628 Stallman, Why ``Free Software'' is better than ``Open Source'', op cit.  
  
Some other solutions could be found to bypass this conceptual quagmire, such as finding 
alternative names for the licensing movement. This is already being performed with the creation 
of specific licensing models and definitions for separate fields of endeavour. A good example of 
separate definitions can be seen in the Creative Commons (CC) project, which attempts to 
create “intellectual property conservancies”,629 separating a block of human knowledge offered 
for the benefit of the public, but still protected by intellectual property licences. This would be 
analogous to nature conservation areas that exist for the wider social benefit, but have 
restrictions on certain uses. In the Creative Commons, the goal of intellectual property 
conservancies is achieved through the offering of a wide variety of licences to protect creative 
works.  
Because Creative Commons licences are geared specifically towards creative works such as 
music, literature, photographs and paintings, a new concept has been designed to accommodate 
scientific research, such as biotechnology and medicines. This concept is the Science 
Commons, which has been created by the Creative Commons Project and will deal with other 
areas that are not covered at the moment by existing CC licences.630  
Although the differentiation of concepts may be useful in the future, there is still need to 
identify the entire model with a generic term. This is needed because both Creative Commons 
and Science Commons are part of a wider movement that is compatible with the non-
proprietary software model and the open access definition.  
The author suggests that at present, the best definition is open access, but it will have to be 
reworked to identify more than just academic online journals, as it has been the practice up until 
now. The new definition will have to recognise that not all open access needs to be provided 
online, as it would be perfectly feasible to assume that there will be circumstances in which 
open access works could be offered through offline copies. Paraphrasing the earlier OA 
definition, open access will be any work that is offered to the public domain, or that maintains 
its intellectual property protection but is offered to the public through a permissive licence that 
allows the copying and redistribution of the work.  
This definition has the advantage that is open enough to accommodate a very wide range of 
licensing schemes – including software licences. More details about a possible definition and 
standards of open access licences will be dealt with later in the chapter.  
                                                
629 Creative Commons. Legal Concepts, 2003. http://creativecommons.org/learn/legal/  
630 Creative Commons. Science Commons. http://creativecommons.org/projects/science/proposal 
  
2. Open access 
The suggested definition of open access can be used to cover different types of intellectual 
works, from music to biotechnological creations. This requires an adequate subdivision of all of 
the types of licensing schemes that are covered by the definition. Non-proprietary software 
works would be covered within this definition and have been dealt with already, so they will not 
be listed here. Besides software, open access works cover two other main types of creations 
subject to intellectual property protection: content and scientific research. This section will list 
the efforts to provide open access to these two types of works.  
 2.2 Open content 
The discussion in previous chapters regarding the digital divide evidenced the need to address 
the issue of access to works via the internet not only from the perspective of access to the 
worldwide network, but stressed the importance of addressing the problem of lack of quality 
content once people find themselves navigating the web. This problem can be solved by the 
adoption of open access to content. This content includes literary works, educational materials, 
music, traditional knowledge and artistic works. 
The largest repository of open content at the moment is the Creative Commons content 
directory, which lists all of the work that is being offered using one of the many CC licences 
available through the CC website. At the time of writing, the Creative Commons archive 
includes 2649 directories of works, of which 400 are audio, 41 movies, 362 images, 685 texts, 
216 educational works and 178 technical materials.631 It is important to point out that most of 
these are collections, which means that the number of individual works should be much greater. 
The works licensed through Creative Commons licences attempt to use intellectual property to 
ensure public access to content. In their words: 
“We use private rights to create public goods: creative works set free for certain 
uses. Like the free software and open-source movements, our ends are 
cooperative and community-minded, but our means are voluntary and 
libertarian. We work to offer creators a best-of-both-worlds way to protect their 
works while encouraging certain uses of them — to declare "some rights 
reserved."”632 
                                                
631  For a list of directories, see: http://commoncontent.org/ 
632 Creative Commons. "Some Rights Reserved": Building a Layer of Reasonable Copyright. 
http://creativecommons.org/learn/aboutus/ 
  
The Creative Commons idea has prompted the establishment of many other different projects 
that intend to offer open content to the public. The BBC has created the British Broadcasting 
Corporation Creative Archive (BBCCA),633 which plans to place some of the BBC’s 
professionally produced content online.634 Importantly, the BBC has stated that the Archive 
“will establish a pool of high-quality content which can be legally drawn on by collectors, 
enthusiasts, artists, musicians, students, teachers and many others, who can search and use this 
material non-commercially.”635 This seems to indicate that the BBC will be using some sort of 
open access licence, probably compatible with CC licences.636  
Education is another area that can benefit greatly from the open access ethos. Open 
Courseware637 is a project by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) that offers free 
educational course materials and free online courses online for a wide variety of subjects, 
ranging from Aeronautics to Writing. Open Courseware courses signal the willingness of a 
respected institution to provide their intellectual property openly for a worldwide audience. It 
must be pointed out that this project is offered using Creative Commons licences, enhancing the 
further distribution of the materials. This example of open access is of particular interest for 
developing countries, as there is a marked emphasis on technical subjects and the sciences, 
which may prove to be an invaluable source of content for cash-strapped educational 
institutions in developing countries. However, efforts must be made to make more of this 
content available in languages other than English.  
Wikipedia638 is another excellent project that generates freely available open content that can be 
distributed with some restrictions. Wikipedia is an online encyclopaedia that is written by the 
users in a method known as a wiki,639 which is a collaborative effort where users can modify the 
content to ensure its novelty and usefulness. Although there are some problems with the 
accuracy of the content,640 one of the strengths of Wikipedia is that it is offered through a 
                                                
633 See: http://www.bbcmotiongallery.com./customer/index.jsp 
634 Dean, K. “BBC to Open Content Floodgates”, Wired News, June 16, 2004. 
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,63857,00.html    
635 BBC. The Future of the BBC, 2004. http://www.bbc.co.uk/thefuture/ 
636 This has prompted some groups to lobby to ensure that the BBCCA will remain non-commercial. See: http://www.public-
domain.org/?q=node/view/36  
637 See: http://ocw.mit.edu/index.html 
638 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page  
639 Wiki is a Hawaiian word that means “quick”.  
640 A problem that is recognised by Wikipedia itself. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_Wikipedia_is_not_so_great  
  
copyleft licence, which states that “content can be copied, modified, and redistributed so long 
as the new version grants the same freedoms to others and acknowledges the authors of the 
Wikipedia article used”.641  
Although the aforementioned efforts go a long way towards creating considerable open content, 
perhaps the greatest encouragement for open content is the promulgation of the open access 
journal movement as exemplified by the aforementioned Berlin Declaration on Open Access to 
Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities of October 2003. The Declaration is the end result 
of a three-day conference organised by the Max Planck Institute in Berlin in which experts from 
German and international institutions gathered to discuss the implications of using the internet 
as a medium to communicate research results and as the main publishing medium. The 
Declaration is not only directed towards educational and research institutions, but attempts to 
promote open access dissemination of cultural works by museums, libraries and archives. What 
makes the declaration unique is the fact that the definition of materials that should be 
disseminated through open access should meet scientific requirements. The Declaration states 
that “We define open access as a comprehensive source of human knowledge and cultural 
heritage that has been approved by the scientific community.” This requisite sets the definition 
of open access managed by the Declaration apart from other open access projects, such as 
Wikipedia or the Creative Commons, as there appears to be a scientific peer-review prerequisite 
in the way in which the information is disseminated. This is because the internet contains too 
much information already, much of it garbage, a fact that may prompt users to reply on a few 
websites filled with low-quality or inaccurate content.642 Peer-review would be the way to filter 
out the dross.   
The Berlin Declaration is just the latest of a growing number of efforts to provide high-quality 
content open access journals, evidenced by the aforementioned Budapest Open Access 
Initiative, the Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing,643 and also the European 
Cultural Heritage Online (ECHO) Charter.644 The common denominator of these projects is the 
free access online to scholarly academic literature. The BOAI explains it thus: 
                                                
641 Wikipedia. Wikipedia: copyrights. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Copyrights 
642 Sunstein, C. Republic.com, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
643 http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/bethesda.htm  
644 http://www.ling.lu.se/projects/echo/contributors/charter.html  
  
“By "open access" to this literature, we mean its free availability on the public 
internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, 
or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as 
data to software, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, 
legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to 
the internet itself.” 
There is a growing understanding that this model is the future of academic content. Studies 
indicate that journals that are available online have wider circulation and are more cited than 
more prestigious journals. A study of 119,924 conference articles in computer science found 
that the most cited articles were significantly most likely to come from journals available online 
than from offline journals by an average 336%.645 Another study in the United States has found 
that online journal publishing is economically sustainable under the present system because the 
revenue obtained by each published article from the publisher is equal to the cost of producing 
the article, which removes the economic recuperation justification. The study points out that 
“The monetary cost of the time that scholars put into the journal business as editors and 
referees is about as large as the total revenue that publishers derive from sales of the 
journals.”646    
It must also be remarked that open content is just another continuation of the sharing ethic 
exemplified by the internet that has already been discussed. The implications for technology 
transfer to developing countries are evident. Freely available online content of peer-reviewed 
material should provide a manner to access academic research, which is one of the most 
important tools to allow countries to develop their own technology and strengthen their own 
research capabilities.  
2.2 Open science 
It could be argued that open content is a logical progression from the coming together of the 
internet and non-proprietary ideals. One could also argue that open content can be more easily 
subject to the protection of open licences because creative works are generally protected via 
copyright, which subsists in an original work as soon as it is fixed in tangible form.647 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that most successful open licences to date are those that 
protect works subject to copyright, such as software, journal articles and artistic works. The 
                                                
645 Lawrence, S. “Free online availability substantially increases a paper’s impact”, Nature, May 31, 2001. 
http://www.nature.com/nature/debates/e-access/Articles/lawrence.html  
646 Odlyzko, A. "The Economics of Electronic Journals", First Monday, Vol.2 No.8, 1997. 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue2_8/odlyzko/index.html 
647 Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 2.  
  
reason for this is simple, if copyright “flows from the nib of a pen”,648 it is much easier to 
distribute copyrighted works with an open licence as soon as it is originated, without requiring 
previous registration. On the other hand, works that require some sort of registration to be 
subject to protection – such as patentable scientific research – will be more difficult to distribute 
through an open licence, as there are several steps that are required to be able to distribute it as 
an open access work.     
Despite this problem, there is growing interest in using open licences to protect scientific 
research in other areas that are endangered through appropriation by commercial interests. After 
all, the scientific method has worked through the idea of peer-review and publication of 
scientific findings, ideas that are similar to the FLOSS ethos of collective development. Science 
works best when it is a collective effort, and the use of copyleft licences could ensure that 
collective efforts will remain accessible to the public at large. 
It would be similarly possible to apply the copyleft model to protect other works in areas as 
varied as biotechnology, biodiversity databases, traditional knowledge and medical research. 
Non-proprietary and open access models would be an excellent option to maintain a body of 
technological knowledge that can be shared without fear of misappropriation by commercial 
interests, facilitating technology transfer to developing countries. This can be understood as 
open science. According to Maurer: 
Open science is variously defined, but tends to connote (a) full, frank, and timely 
publication of results, (b) absence of intellectual property restrictions, and (c) 
radically increased pre- and post-publication transparency of data, activities, 
and deliberations within research groups.649 
This section will look at two particular areas of technology that could benefit from open access, 
biotechnology and medicine research.  
2.2.1 Open biotechnology 
The race for decoding and cataloguing the human genome650 can be used as an example of the 
dangers of sharing valuable scientific research through unprotected means. Many scientists and 
                                                
648 Cohen, P. and Ryan, T. Copyright Law and the Internet. http://info.utas.edu.au/docs/info/utas88/Peter.Cohen.html 
649 Maurer, S. “New Institutions for Doing Science: From Databases to Open Source Biology”, European Policy for Intellectual 
Property Conference on Copyright and database protection, patents and research tools, and other challenges to the 
intellectual property system, University of Maastricht, November 24-25, 2003. 
http://www.merit.unimaas.nl/epip/papers/maurer_paper.pdf 
650 For an account of this race, see: Sulston J. "Intellectual Property and the Human Genome”, Global Intellectual Property 
Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, op. cit; pp.61-73.  
  
researchers working in the biotechnology field have made calls to release genetic research 
online, which constitutes a de facto release of the research into the public domain. This is 
evidenced by the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) protocols and the Bermuda 
Principles.651 The release of the information into the public domain would have the effect of 
widening the research and dissemination of results achieved by organisations around the world. 
Another effect of the release of materials into the public domain would be to pre-empt future 
patent applications, because the research has been already made public. Eisenberg explains this 
tactic:    
“In addition to making it difficult for publicly-funded investigators and their 
institutions to file timely applications for patents, the Bermuda rules also lead to 
the prompt creation of "prior art" that could potentially defeat patent claims 
based on similar DNA-sequencing efforts in the private sector. No one can get a 
patent on something that was already publicly disclosed before the patent 
claimant discovered it.”652 
Despite this seemingly watertight solution, there is still a real potential that the information that 
has been made available for free could be copied and then used to make patent applications 
about that same material. The chaotic state of patent application in areas such as software and 
biotechnology – particularly in the United States653 – provides a warning that patent offices 
cannot be trusted in identifying whether a patent application is innovative, or if it is based on 
prior-art.  
The state of affairs in biotechnology patenting generates considerable problems for all of those 
involved in this area. The misuse of patenting threatens to hinder collaboration and research 
considerably because it generates an environment that lives in constant fear of litigation. A 
study conducted in 2002 has found that researchers working in the area of genetics have 
reduced significantly normal academic collaboration practices due to fears about patents.654 
Similarly, overly broad gene patents could be used to attempt to gain a foothold in the market 
and stifle competition in the nascent biotechnology industry. Small research centres, educational 
institutions and individual researchers may find it difficult to conduct research for fear of 
                                                
651 For a look at a summary of both meetings, see: http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/research/bermuda.html 
652 Eisenberg, R. S. The Public Domain in Genomics, 2000. 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ili/conferences/freeinfo2000/abstracts/eisengberg.html  
653 For more about patent abuse in these two fields, see: Gratton, E. “Should Patent Protection Be Considered for Computer 
Software-Related Innovations?” Computer Law Review & Technology Journal, Winter, 2003, p.223; and Andrews, L. “The 
Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives With Health Needs”, Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy, 
2002, p.65.  
654 Blumenthal, D. et al, “Data Withholding in Academic Genetics”, JAMA, 2002, pp.477-480. 
  
becoming involved in a patent suit. Moreover, even if a biotechnology patent has been 
erroneously granted, stakeholders and researchers would still need to get involved in a lengthy 
procedure to cancel the invalid patent, further stifling research.655 A decrease in the practice of 
sharing biotech research could have nefarious consequences to the field, as the exchange of data 
held in different databases could be hindered.656  
This is where open access biotechnology could provide an excellent tool to foster the exchange 
of research and the transfer of technology amongst researchers all over the world. The first 
effort to create a licence was performed by Tim Hubbard of the Sanger Institute in the UK, 
which was involved in the Human Genome Project. Hubbard became interested in open source 
and open content licences, until one day he realised that the model could be used to protect 
human genome research.657 Although Hubbard drafted a licence, the idea was never 
implemented by the Sanger Institute because all of the materials were being released into the 
public domain. John Sulston, a prominent voice in the genetic research community, has 
provided some sobering comments about the fact that protecting scientific works intended for 
public dissemination with a licence is contrary to the ethos behind such undertaking.658 The idea 
is to make the works available to the public, not to tie them up in legal battles and complex 
patent suits.    
There have been other suggestions that copyleft licensing models could be used to protect the 
public results of the biotechnology research, although such schemes have never been 
implemented.659 The idea behind open biotechnology would be to produce results and protect 
them by using non-proprietary licences – particularly copyleft ones. The research would be 
made available to the public online with an attached licence that allows further uses of the 
material, but forbids the commercialisation of the research by threatening to enforce the 
intellectual property rights that protect them. This strategy would be compatible with the 
existing ethos of sharing research that exists in the scientific community. Talking about the 
possible use of the open source model in the field of bioinformatics, scientist Ewan Birney from 
                                                
655 Andrews, “The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives With Health Needs”, op cit.  
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658 J. Sulston, “Intellectual Property and the Human Genome”, Global intellectual Property Rights, op cit, pp.561-73. 
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the European Bioinformatics Institute commented that “For us, it's straight scientific principles. 
If you want to be a scientist, open up your data and open up the code that helps you work with 
that data.”660  
The implications for developing countries are easy to see. Protected biotechnology research 
could lock away valuable technological applications for developing countries. For example, 
some data that can be found in a proprietary database could only be accessed through a 
subscription fee, costing money that researchers in poor countries cannot afford. Similarly, 
patented biotechnological applications could lock away valuable applications in agriculture, 
genetics and health, with institutions in developing nations having to purchase licences in order 
to use the research. On the other hand, research that has been made available through a copyleft 
licence could be accessed, used, modified, copied and distributed by researchers for non-
proprietary purposes. Carlson comments that “As open-source biological manufacturing 
spreads, it will be adopted quickly in less developed economies to bypass the first world's 
investment in industrial infrastructure.”661 
Open biotechnology remains one of the best existing tools to ensure that developing countries 
have access to high-technology in the area of biotechnology, but it would also allow them to 
protect their own low-technology from misappropriation through biopiracy patents. Protecting 
indigenous technology through an open access licence would allow LDCs to generate “benefit 
sharing”662 of knowledge that is subject to commercial exploitation. . Benefit sharing is defined 
as: 
“…all forms of compensation for the utilisation of genetic resources whether 
monetary or non-monetary, and includes, in particular, the participation in 
scientific research and development on genetic resources, and the making 
available of the findings of such scientific research and development and the 
transfer of technologies.”663    
It is clear to see how non-proprietary licences could be used to achieve this goal. Knowledge 
could be made available to the public, but protected by copyleft licences to achieve the goal of 
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maintaining the knowledge in the commons and providing benefits to the originating 
communities.  
2.2.2 Open health  
The open biotechnology movement is in its very early stages, and the translation of licences 
from software development into the scientific field has been slow. The last section 
demonstrated that there is already some theoretical discussion about how this may be achieved, 
but so far, no actual licences have been drafted. This may be about to change with several 
concrete proposals geared towards the use of non-proprietary licences in health research, and in 
particular in the development of medicines.  
Previous chapters have explained how the justifications for the patent system apply best to 
pharmaceutical research and development. Instinctively, it would be difficult to see how open 
licenses could be used to fund expensive pharmaceutical research, and it has usually been 
thought that this can only be done through patents. However, recent proposals have attempted to 
undermine such traditional arguments and provide some workable open health projects.  
The problem of the under-funding of research into tropical diseases has already been explained. 
This lack of resources has prompted the creation of “virtual pharmaceutical companies”, in 
which some pharmaceutical companies enter into collaboration and research agreements with 
academic institutions to be able to research and develop medicines that can tackle tropical 
diseases – this collaboration allows companies to fund otherwise unprofitable endeavours.664 
However, some have criticised that virtual pharmaceutical companies are not enough to tackle 
the problem, and that under funding is still a problem in this area.665   
Maurer et al.666 propose the creation of a new research body called the Tropical Disease 
Initiative (TDI), a body that would coordinate all research and development of tropical diseases 
and could come up with raw data that can be easily exchanged by researchers around the world 
– this would be done through the publication of findings to the public domain. The authors call 
this type of development “open source drug delivery”, but are adamant that the results should 
go into the public domain. When the paper explains the manner in which this project can be 
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taken forward, there is little or no consideration about licences or the eventual legal ownership 
of the research, which may stem from a misunderstanding of what open source means in legal 
terms.667 The term open source here is then used more in the Bazaar sense of development, 
rather than the legal sense of open source licences. This means that while the proposal is very 
valid and noteworthy, it may be plagued by the same problems that have plagued other releases 
of research into the public domain. Further proposals into pharmaceuticals and open access 
must provide some practical legal solutions.  
In a more thorough effort, Hubbard and Love have released a paper in which they explore some 
alternative models of pharmaceutical research and development to produce new medicines.668 
Their list of models includes increased government funding; prizes in the shape of credit or 
research grants for researchers that release their work to the public domain; and the creation of 
R&D investment funds that use stock market investment to produce funds. This proposal uses 
the existence of free software as an example that alternative business models can work, but 
unfortunately it fails to make the point of how to translate FLOSS licensing ideals into the 
pharmaceutical industry. Although Hubbard and Love’s argument may not connect directly 
with open access models, their proposal is important because they propose workable ways to 
fund the basic research and to generate incentives to companies to distribute their intellectual 
property to the public. This release would then be performed using open licences.  
However, there is not yet a single proposal that provides a killer argument that will allow 
companies to relinquish existing licensing models in pharmaceutical arena. This is easy to 
understand taking into consideration the immense costs and profits involved. Why would a 
company release their intellectual property?  
There are some circumstances in which a company may benefit from revealing their intellectual 
property in an open licence model, but these benefits may be indirect, or intangible. Firstly, a 
pharmaceutical company could greatly benefit from releasing an open licence of a product if 
they do not expect to benefit form the product itself, but they may have a stake in marketing 
complimentary or secondary products. Secondly, companies should never underestimate the 
advantage of the first-mover in a competitive environment. Thirdly, medicines released under 
an open licence would definitely encourage further innovation and improvements from other 
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researchers and licensees; this would be in line with the creation of a Bazaar environment where 
research is freely exchanged and improved upon by the community. Fourthly, companies could 
benefit from considerable public good will and good publicity if they are seen to work for the 
public good.669  
Nevertheless, all of the proposals and ideas that propel the open access movement will come to 
naught if no licences can be drafted that fit the open access model, or if the licences are 
erroneous, unenforceable or badly drafted. Some proposals for licensing will be discussed next.  
3. The licensing paradigm  
One of the problems exposed so far in the open access debate is that it has become clear that 
there is significant misuse and misunderstanding of the terms and definitions involved in the 
development system. It is common to read terms such as free software, commons, open source 
and public domain used interchangeably. There must be an understanding that besides the 
ideological and philosophical connotations of each term, the heart of the movement is the 
distribution of intellectual works through permissive licences.  
Open access has to be based upon adequate licences. Without licences, the movement is just a 
project management technique that encourages the use of peer-review. The free software and 
open source software movements have shown the way to follow regarding licensing 
agreements. The starting point for non-software licences will be to learn from the experiences in 
non-proprietary software development.  
If the open access licences are to work, they need the intervention of the legal community to 
draft new licences that may apply to scientific research. The licences tend to be specific to 
software development, and in many instances they have been drafted by software engineers 
with little or no intervention of the legal community.670 Furthermore, the some software 
developers appear to display considerable reluctance about external intervention in the decision 
process regarding licensing decisions.671  
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3.1 Sorting the open access clutter 
The most prevalent open access licences are those offered by the Creative Commons project, 
which allows the creation of licences for creative works subject to copyright protection. The 
interesting part of the CC licensing environment is that it empowers users because there is a 
wide range of licences to choose from their website. Creators and authors need to go to a drop-
down menu and choose from different options offered, and the system chooses the licence that 
fits the parameters entered. These licences range from offering the work straight to the public 
domain, to licences akin to the copyleft GPL model.  
Creative Commons licences maintain a minimum set of standards that are met by all of their 
offered legal documents, with the exception of the one that offers the work to the public 
domain. This works in line with the minimum set of standards that exists in non-proprietary 
software definitions such as the Free Software Definition and the Open Source Definition 
studied in the previous chapter. This could be called the Creative Commons Definition, but it is 
generally known as the CC baseline rights.672 All CC licences will provide these baseline rights 
are:  
• Licensors retain their copyright; this explains why the baseline rights do not apply to 
public domain offerings.    
• The licences announce that fair use rights are not affected by the licence. This is a 
curious statement, as it should be assumed that any clause that erodes acquired fair use 
or fair dealing rights should be specified in the licence. 
• Licensees will have to obtain specific permission to perform one of the acts restricted by 
the licence. For example, if the licence does not allow modification or adaptation of a 
work, this action could only be performed with the permission of the owner. This seems 
to be a redundant statement, as this is an action that is usually understood in all licences.  
• Copyright notices should not be removed from all copies of the work. 
• Every copy of the work should maintain a link to the licence. 
• Licensees cannot alter any terms of the licence. This seems to be yet another redundant 
clause, as it should be understood that this is common licensing practice.  
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• Licensees cannot use technology to restrict access to the work. This baseline right 
specifically forbids the use of digital rights management tools.673  
• Licensees are granted the right to copy, distribute, display, digitally perform and make 
verbatim copies of the work into another format.  
• The licences have worldwide application, have lasts for the entire duration of copyright 
(unless otherwise specified), and are irrevocable.  
It is important to note that the baseline definition of CC licences does not mention anything 
about modification or adaptation of a work; does not deal with copyleft-like clauses requiring 
the use of similar licences to distribute the work; does not mention attribution; and does not deal 
with the distribution of copies for commercial purposes. This makes the basic Creative 
Commons definition more alike to the open source ideals than to the free software principles 
exemplified by the GPL. Nevertheless, creators can choose a CC licence that maintains all of 
the restrictions mentioned, from all of the options offered. Authors then can choose from the 
following options to generate their licence: 
• Attribution: The work is made available to the public with the baseline rights, but only 
if the author receives proper credit.    
• Non-commercial: The work can be copied, displayed and distributed by the public, but 
only if these actions are for non-commercial purposes.  
• No derivative works: This licence grants baseline rights, but it does not allow 
derivative works to be created from the original.  
• Share-Alike: This is based on copyleft principles. Derivative works can be created and 
distributed based on the original, but only if the same type of licence is used, which 
generates a viral licence.674  
It is possible to have licences that combine different of these options. The strongest CC licence 
is the Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike License,675 which is the licence that most 
resembles the GPL in the type of rights offered. All CC licences are presented in three formats: 
the first is a short and easy to read “Commons Deed”, which explains the terms and conditions 
of the licence in a simple manner; the second format is the “Legal Code”, which is the full 
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licence; the third is the “Digital Code”, which provides an HTML version of the licence676 that 
can be read by search engines and makes it easier to list the content in the Creative Commons 
directory.  
Creative Commons presents a very positive step towards the wider distribution of non-
proprietary technology. It is innovative, thoroughly planned and greatly implemented. CC 
delivers open access licences in the digital domain with scalability, adaptability and ease of use 
for those unfamiliar with the legal issues involved in licensing. CC offers a great tool for 
individual creators or small enterprises that do not have the money to pay expensive licensing 
drafting services, and their services fare well even when compared to some proprietary or fee-
based licence services available online.677   
The other major open content licence is the GNU Free Documentation License (GFDL),678 
which is GNU’s non-software licence, and is generally used to protect manual and other 
literature related to the free software movement, but it is also used in other open access projects, 
such as Wikipedia. The GFDL is similar to the GPL, hence it could be classified as a copyleft 
licence, but it has some important distinctions. The main difference is one of length and style, as 
the GFDL is clearer and more concise than the GPL, lacking some of the verbose ideological 
statements that are characteristic of the copyleft software licence. The other main difference can 
be encountered in paragraph 2 of the licence, which states:  
“You may copy and distribute the Document in any medium, either 
commercially or noncommercially, provided that this License, the copyright 
notices, and the license notice saying this License applies to the Document are 
reproduced in all copies, and that you add no other conditions whatsoever to 
those of this License.” 
This is different to the GPL because that allows copying and distribution of the source code 
mostly for non-commercial use, with the exception that a charge can be done to cover the costs 
of transferring the software into physical form.679 The GFDL allows for the modification and 
translation of the work, provided some specific sections are maintained or deleted; and all 
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derivative works must be licensed using the GFDL.680 This clearly means that this is a copyleft 
licence, perpetuating itself through this viral clause.  
The viral nature of the GFDL can be seen in practice through the wide copying and 
dissemination of Wikipedia articles, which are being used by many other open content 
providers. For example, Wikipedia articles are now used in many other content providers, such 
as The Free Dictionary.681 The articles found in this online resource have to be licensed through 
the GFDL, allowing yet another third party to copy them and use them in their website, 
provided that they use the GFDL.  
With so many creative works that may be subject to be protected by open access licences, it 
should come as no surprise that there has been a recent proliferation of licences that allow 
commercial and non-commercial content creators to adopt the non-proprietary open access 
model. One such project is the OpenContent Licence (OPL), a collaborative effort that sets a 
copyleft licence, ensuring that shared works will continue to remain free to subsequent users.682 
Similar efforts also include music creation via the Open Audio Licence (OAL)683 the SCRIPT-
ed Open Licence (SOL),684 and even Open Cola, the world’s first copyleft fizzy drink.685 It 
seems that access to content online is now ensured through the use of these open access 
licences. But what happens with scientific works?  
3.2 Trouble with patents 
All of the aforementioned licences have one thing in common, they protect only copyright 
works, which leaves open the question of what licences are available to protect scientific works, 
such as biotechnology and health research. It is important to note that despite the many 
scientists and researchers advocating the implementation of open licensing models to the 
scientific arena, it is difficult to find a scientific equivalent to the GFDL or the Creative 
Commons licences.   
The reason for the lack of open science licences is that there may be some problem in porting a 
licensing model that has been designed to work with copyright into a system that would have to 
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work with other types of intellectual property protection. At present, patenting is the best way to 
protect scientific works, but this would mean that the scientist posting their research to the 
public would have to obtain patent protection for it first, which can prove to be an expensive 
endeavour. Some studies estimate that an average biotechnology patent application could cost 
an average $7,500 USD on legal fees alone.686 The enforcement of patents is even more 
expensive,687 which would mean that even if a research institution would be able to protect their 
research through patent, the right holders would find it extremely expensive to defend their 
intellectual property against misuse – particularly considering that most of these patents will be 
awarded to small research institutions or even to individual researchers. The problem would be 
more pronounced for researchers in developing countries, as they would possibly have to 
enforce patents abroad.  
However, there may be a viable solution for the problem of the enforcement of patents held by 
individual organisations. The problem of enforceability of free software is similar to what has 
been described, as many software developers do not have the resources to enforce their 
copyrights. For that purpose, the FSF recommends to all those programmers using the GPL that 
they should assign copyright ownership of their works to the FSF because in that way they can 
enforce the licence better in case of infringement.688 This could be replicated in future open 
science licences. Collective organisations, foundations or NGOs could be in charge of the 
enforcement of research held by individuals.  
Another possible problem about the use of open source models in biotechnology research is that 
it could be considered to be incompatible with existing patent policy goals. The stated goal of a 
patent system is to encourage the distribution of inventions through the utilitarian justification 
that allows for economic reward. An open access model might clash with this stated goal 
because it would stop inventors from being able to economically recuperate investments in 
future research related to the patented one, particularly if a copyleft licence is used.689 For 
example, imagine a gene sequence that is patented and then licensed through a copyleft licence 
containing share-alike restrictions. Researchers who would want to use the sequence in the 
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future would have to use similar licences to the one with which they acquired access to the 
sequence in the first place. This would mean that they would have to license their research using 
a copyleft clause as well.   
Taking into consideration all of these difficulties, it should come as no surprise that most 
biotechnology information that is now being made publicly available online is being released 
into the public domain, as was the case with the human genome. The exception to this rule is 
the International HapMap Project Public Access License,690 which is part of the HapMap 
genetic database project. An interesting feature of this document is that it is not an intellectual 
property rights assignment licence; it reads more like an end user licence agreement as it must 
be agreed upon registration and before gaining access to certain parts of the HapMap genetic 
database. The wording of the licence makes it appear to be an intellectual property assignment 
of rights, but it is not entirely clear what rights are held over the data that is being offered. For 
example, the work is clearly offered as a database, but the United States does not have a 
database right.691 One could assume that the work could be offered as a copyright work, but this 
would have the troublesome implication that one could actually copyright the actual letters of 
the human genome, a solution that seems absurd.692 Nevertheless, the wording of the HapMap 
licence is very careful not to assign intellectual property rights, so it must be assumed that it is 
just a user agreement. This can be seen when paragraph 3 of the licence states that “You may not 
access, copy, modify, sublicense, distribute or otherwise use the Genotype Database or the data 
contained in it except as expressly provided under this License.” The most relevant part of the 
HapMap licence is with regards to future patent applications. Paragraph 2(b) of the licence does 
not allow the patenting of genetic information from the database, with the exception of 
particular uses of sequences, provided that the patent allows further use of the information 
obtained from the database.  
The HapMap licence offers an ingenious way of getting around the problems of patent 
protection enumerated above, as it relies on contractual obligations more than on intellectual 
property protection, and may prove to be the way to go as far as open science licences are 
concerned. This can be evidenced by the wording of the Science Commons documentation, 
                                                
690 The licence can be found here: http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-perl/registration 
691 For more about the European database right, see: Colston C. “Sui Generis Database Right: Ripe for Review?” Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology, 2001 (3). http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_3/colston/  
692 For more about genetic database protection, see: Baba, E. “From Conflict to Confluence: Protection of Databases Containing 
Genetic Information”, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 30, 2003, p.121.  
  
which enumerates the problems caused by database and patent protection of genetic research 
but does not say that the solution is to offer a patent licence, mush in the way in which the CC 
licences are copyright assignments.693 The Science Commons proposal goes as far as stating 
that “Many of the things that we have learned in forming the Creative Commons do not 
translate completely to the world of science policy. We dealt primarily with copyright - here the 
issues would also involve patent and trade secret.”694  
Apart from the two solutions enumerated, the tackling of the patenting problem is short in 
suggestions, as most of the proponents of the open biotechnology movement usually fail to 
tackle the question. As an exception, Cukier suggests that patenting problems could be 
overcome through the use of policy by applying existing national interest patent defences that 
are already in use in the United States in the area of defence and health.695 Another solution 
may be found in other open access licences and open source software licences. It would be 
possible to change the wording of existing open access licences to specify generic intellectual 
property assignment instead of specific copyright provisions.696 Another solution would be to 
include a patent assignment in all open access works. This is already being done in some open 
access licences, such as is the case with the Apache Licence (version 2.0), which contains a 
patent assignment clause.697  
4. Validity of open access licences698 
The discussion in this chapter has been centred so far upon the possible application of the non-
proprietary software model into other areas of endeavour. However, recent legal developments 
have moved the debate of the open access movement from the philosophical and economic 
implications of the model, to a strictly legal one. There have been a surprisingly small number 
of court cases generated by these licences – something that will undoubtedly change with the 
legal battle started by SCO – so a full study of the eventual validity or invalidity of the 
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contractual copyleft clauses must be subject to an analysis by the academic community, 
something which has not been forthcoming in this side of the Atlantic.699  
This section will explore the validity of the GPL, because it offers the strongest non-proprietary 
licence. Although this means that the analysis will go back to the software arena, it is in 
software development where the legal test of the movement is taking place, so the lessons learnt 
by this movement may be translated to the younger licences. This analysis will be done from a 
broad European perspective. There are reasons to evaluate the validity of copyleft licences from 
a European contract law perspective because many principles vary from the American 
approach. Other legal aspects, such as the competition law and the copyright aspect of the 
protection of GPL works will be analysed as well, as they vary in some aspects to the American 
approaches.  
4.1 Validity matters: SCO v IBM 
Until recently, there had been no court cases against non-compliance with a copyleft licence, 
and the few incidents that have arisen had been dealt swiftly with cease-and-desist letters to 
those parties suspected of producing proprietary software.700  
This all changed when a developer of non-proprietary database software named MySQL sued 
NuSphere – a software company that it believed was using its source code to produce 
proprietary software – something that contravened the terms of the GPL.701 This file was issued 
in response to a suit filed by NuSphere claiming “breach of contract, tortious interference with 
third party contracts and relationships and unfair competition.”702 Unfortunately this case was 
settled out of court; hence the GPL did not receive a judicial review in this occasion. However, 
this was only the opening shot in what is set to become one of the largest and most complex 
legal battles that the software industry has ever seen.  
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The legal question about the validity of copyleft licensing models broke spectacularly in legal 
circles in March 2003 when the SCO Group – a well known software developer of UNIX 
related products – filed a lawsuit703 against IBM alleging that the company was infringing its 
intellectual property over the UNIX kernel.704 The full details of the suit are still sketchy 
because SCO is keeping some of the most detailed information of the code they allege to have 
been protecting as a close secret, not letting it be known which part of the code it claims 
ownership of.705 However, it is known that SCO claims that back in 1985 AT&T and IBM 
signed a contract to produce a version of UNIX called AIX. In 1995, SCO purchased all of the 
intellectual property related to UNIX from AT&T, hence the claim they have filed against IBM. 
It would seem that SCO is somehow making claims that they own part of the code for AIX, or 
that they own some other part of the UNIX kernel code that is used in most machines running 
Linux distributions. Furthermore, SCO threatened to sue every corporate Linux user for 
copyright infringement,706 claiming that any Linux user must purchase a licence from them. 
This threat finally came to fruition in March 2004 when they sued DaimlerChrysler and auto 
parts retailer AutoZone, two corporate Linux users.707 As a result of this action, IBM 
countersued SCO claiming that the company has been infringing its own copyrights and patents, 
and also alleging that SCO is in violation of the GPL because they are users and modifiers of 
the Linux kernel, which is licensed with the GPL.708  
It is too early to ascertain the strength of SCO’s arguments, but it has become clear that this 
case has increased the stakes in the financial importance of copyleft licences, and hence the 
importance in making sure that the licence terms are valid.709 Nevertheless, SCO’s arguments 
should be met with considerable scepticism given the nature of the development of UNIX and 
Linux described in the previous chapter. It will be very difficult for SCO to prove ownership of 
some code that was developed under an atmosphere of collaboration, and that may date as far 
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back as 1969. Another aspect is that one should assume that the timing in this case counts. Why 
did SCO wait until now to exercise their intellectual property rights? Could this have to do with 
the fact that SCO’s share price has quadrupled since this case made the headlines?710 One also 
must be suspicious of the fact that Microsoft has obtained a Unix licence from SCO, which has 
prompted repeated accusations that SCO may be in league with Microsoft to destroy Open 
Source development.711 However, it could be argued that even if some of the code was found to 
be property of SCO, the existing users could claim an implied licence due to the lack of 
enforcement for more than a decade. 
4.2 Contractual issues   
4.2.1 Contract formation 
Contractual formation is a problem that has been addressed by contract law since Roman times, 
and the rules controlling them tend to vary from one jurisdiction to another. Although some 
basic rules of contract formation are common to most jurisdictions, such as the basic 
requirements about the capacity to contract, and requirements about offer and acceptance,712 the 
specifics of contract formation tend to be varied. This makes the analysis of contract formation 
of agreements that are entered into at an international level difficult to analyse, but a simple 
analysis of how electronic contracts are being dealt with may help to provide light in this 
difficult topic. 
Contracts that are offered online tend to take two different shapes, click-wrap agreements and 
browse-wrap agreements. Click-wrap agreements originate from another type of agreement 
called a shrink-wrap agreement.713 Click-wrap agreements are generally to be found in software 
that is pre-installed on a computer, or that is downloaded over the Internet. Upon downloading 
or installing the software, a window containing the terms of the licence opens for the user to 
read. The user is then asked to click either "I agree" or "I do not agree".714 Browse-wrap (also 
known as web-wrap) agreements generally appear only as a hyperlink that is accessed by 
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clicking on it, and are generally located at the bottom of the page.715 Both shrink-wrap and 
click-wrap agreements tend to be accepted nowadays as valid contract formation.716 The 
problem has been taking place in the area of browse-wrap agreements, as some courts in the 
United States have found some problems with the practice because there is no proper 
incorporation of terms.717  
The relevance of web-wrap for the GPL is that this licence is not offered through a click-wrap 
formation, but it only requires that a notice about the licence and about the ownership of the 
program be provided with the source code.718 However, this may prove problematic because it 
may not be obvious where exactly the notice is located. It would be easy to imagine how a court 
could find that the licence was not properly displayed to the attention of the user, and then it 
could be possible that a ruling would say that there is no contract.719 Proper care should be 
taken by creators and licensors to make sure that the licence is clearly noticeable and that the 
terms and conditions are properly marked. Mere references to the licence in the source code 
may not fulfil this.   
There may be another problem of contract formation with the GPL under English law. English 
contract law contains the requirement of consideration of an acceptance. The consideration 
doctrine means that a contract is enforceable only if there is some form of reciprocity involved 
in the contract, often categorised as a form of payment.720 It could be argued that the GPL does 
not fulfil consideration doctrine under English Law as there is no payment involved. Although 
this debate is generally considered an idiosyncrasy of English Law, it must be pointed out that 
the courts have often found that monetary payment is not always what is required to fulfil the 
consideration requirement, and that other forms of reciprocity may be accepted.721  
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4.2.2Unfair terms 
The second contractual concern for the consideration of the validity of copyleft clauses must be 
to ask if they are unfair according to European consumer protection legislations. Most 
jurisdictions have different public policy restrictions to contractual terms, the most common 
being restrictions against terms that will give away basic human rights,722 but beyond these 
basically recognised principles, the range of restricted or excluded terms varies from one 
jurisdiction to another.723 It is because of the wide variation in this area of contract law that the 
European Union felt the need to harmonise the different approaches to unfair terms across 
member states. Consumers in the EU are now subject to a wide-ranging regime designed to 
protect them from unfair terms in a variety of circumstances in which they are presented with 
pre-formulated standard contracts, a regime implemented in the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Directive (the Directive),724 which specifies what an unfair contractual term is, and 
sets a number of considerations by which clauses will be analysed to test for unfairness. The 
directive also provides a non-exhaustive list of some terms that will be considered unfair, one of 
which applies directly to copyleft licences. 
The GPL contains several different clauses that may be considered in light of the existing unfair 
terms legislation. The most likely candidate for this is the limitation of liability expressed in 
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the licence. These sections are the ones most likely to be found unfair 
as the Directive is specific about the inherent unfairness of such clauses,725 so and likely to 
receive the same analysis as those in European courts.726  
The main question then is to analyse whether or not the copyleft clause included in the GPL is 
unfair or not. There are many issues to consider when asking this question. The first one is 
whether the licensee of GPL protected software should be considered a consumer as understood 
by the definition provided by Art. 2(b) of the Directive, which states that a consumer will be 
any natural person who “is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or 
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profession”. This is a very broad definition of consumer, and even though the wording of the 
Directive would seem to exclude legal persons, it must be underlined that courts have generally 
taken a very broad interpretation as to what a consumer is, even to include companies.727 The 
common interpretation of this requirement will be that the person entering into a standard 
contract – such as a software licence – will be considered to be a consumer if they are not 
signing the contract as the regular course of dealing in that business. It would be fair to assume 
that if a software firm develops a software programme and licenses it to another software firm 
using the GPL, the licensee firm will probably not be considered a consumer for the purposes of 
the Directive. On the other hand, an individual consumer who has acquired some copyleft 
licensed software could possibly make a strong case arguing that he is signing the licence as a 
consumer. This is of course a general interpretation, and the circumstances of each contract 
must be individually determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Assuming that the licence is considered to be a consumer contract as described, there is still a 
need to determine whether the term itself is unfair. Art. 3(1) of the Directive specifies that: 
“A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”    
A term will be considered not to have been negotiated individually if it has been drafted in 
advance and the consumer did not have a say in the terms of the final contract.728 This definition 
is at the heart of any contractual dispute that may arise by the application of the Directive, and 
its interpretation is the one that offers more problems as it can be considered as using a very 
open-ended requirement, such as the often nebulous expression ‘good faith’. In the UK, the test 
for unfairness as expressed by the Directive has been established by Director General of Fair 
Trading v. First National Bank plc.729 According to this ruling, the consumer must prove that 
there has been bad faith on the part of the undertaking in the drafting of the contract, that there 
is a significant imbalance to the obligations and powers of the parties, and that such imbalance 
must be detrimental to the consumer. The court in this ruling specified that good faith would be 
present if the contract was signed with fair and open dealing. Openness means that the term 
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must be clear, legible and not contain hidden pitfalls; and fair dealing would have to be 
understood that the supplier should not take advantage of the other party’s relatively weak 
position. It is important to note as well that some commentators suggest that the concept of 
“good faith” should be understood in accordance to Civil Law principles,730 and as such many 
different aspects must be taken into consideration, for example the gravity of the imbalance, the 
social position of the parties and the way in which the term in question came into existence.731 
Analysing the copyleft clause with the requirements presented by this ruling, one could say that 
there appears to be an imbalance in the obligations of the parties as the licensee will have to use 
the GPL and cannot profit from derivative works. This imbalance could also be assumed to be 
detrimental to the consumer as it is imposing the responsibility of not being able to use the work 
in whatever way it is desired. However, one must say that this is precisely the same type of 
imbalance that exists in every other copyright-based software licences, and hence it would be 
difficult to find it unfair.  
The main question will be in trying to determine if there has been good faith by the drafter of 
the licence. This is more difficult to ascertain given the test of good faith presented above. In the 
case of the GPL, the test does not appear to be met. The copyleft clause is clear enough, does 
not contain hidden pitfalls, and the software owner is not taking advantage of the relatively 
weak position either because the consumer is always free not to use the software if he so 
desires, and is even free to look for similar software that does not use copyleft licences.     
Based on this brief analysis of the copyleft contract term and the existing European unfair 
contract legislation, it would seem that the GPL copyleft clause is valid, as there are too many 
uncertainties as to whether or not a court would interpret this clause in favour of a licensee on 
the basis of the existence of good faith. It must also be assumed that the copyleft clause will be 
valid as it does not fall into any of the specified unfair terms provided in the Annex to the 
Directive. However, the question must remain open until the first case testing the validity of this 
type of licence comes up. Given the amount of money involved in software development, it is 
likely that at some point copyleft will indeed receive some judicial review.  
                                                
730 McKendrick, E. Contract Law, Fourth Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p.369. 
731 Some of these principles in civil law can be seen in several continental cases, such as Saladin/HBU, Hoge Raad, NJ 1967.261 
(G.J. Scholten). For a more complete work on the subject of good faith in Civil Law, see: Zimmermann, R. and Whittaker S. 
eds; Good faith in European contract law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.   
  
4.2.3 Passing obligations to third parties  
Another interesting legal issue that arises when considering the validity of GPL clauses is the 
problem of passing obligations to third parties. The legality of this practice is usually covered 
under the English contract law concept of the privity of contracts, of which there are two rules, 
one for passing burdens and one for passing benefits.  
The first rule exists under traditional privity doctrine, where “a third party cannot be subjected 
to a burden by a contract to which he is not a party.”732 This general principle is still in effect in 
most jurisdictions and responds to the reasonable principle of legal security by not allowing 
parties to place contractual burdens that they are not aware of. Wherever this practice is 
permitted, it is usually well regulated.733 The question must be asked of whether the GPL 
constitutes the imposition of a burden to third parties. The initial response would be negative, as 
the imposition of the clause is done on a one-to-one basis. If one does not agree with the 
copyleft clause, then it is only logical that one should not use the software; and certainly one 
should not use it to create a derivative product.  
If the passing of burdens is generally not accepted in contract law, what happens to the passing 
of benefits? There is a second controversial privity rule in English law which does not allow a 
third party to benefit from the contract, although the rule has been largely modified in England 
as to render it practically inexistent.734 It is important to point out that this second privity rule 
exists in Civil law jurisdictions,735 where third-party rights (known in Scotland as jus quaesitum 
tertio), has been an integral part of contract law.736  
The relevance of third-party rights to copyleft results in the question of whether the originator 
of a program licensed under the GPL may sue a licensee who is located further down the 
software distribution chain for breach of contract. Assuming that A is the software creator and 
B is the copyleft licensee and B licenses the software to C using the GPL; could A sue C for 
contractual breach if C does not comply with the copyleft clause? Contractually speaking, one 
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would have to assume that for A to successfully sue C; A must have a third-party right arising 
from the contract between B and C, which appears to be an invalid proposition.  
The possible applicability of third-party rights to copyleft can be better understood in the 
famous Scottish case of Beta Computers v Adobe Systems.737 In this case, Beta Computers 
provided a copy of software authored by a third party called Informix, for which they had a 
licence. The court in this case found that Informix – although not part of the contract between 
Adobe and Beta – had a third party right. This position has been adequately criticised by 
MacQueen, who says that when the subject of a software transaction is a licensing agreement, 
third-party rights cannot possibly apply as a licence grants rights by the third party, it does not 
create rights to the third party, which is the doctrinal requirement of third-party rights.738 There 
cannot be much doubt that in the case of copyleft licences, the author’s rights arise from the 
licence itself and the contractual provisions contained within. It will be seen later whether the 
author could sue under copyright providing the code has been copied without a licence, but it 
would be more difficult to state that the author could sue for a broken contractual term 
contained in the licence. The contractual validity of the copyleft clause would then work on a 
one-to-one basis, where only the two parties involved could sue each other and there would be 
no possibility of involving third parties, even if the third party is the author.  
2.3 Copyright concerns 
2.3.1 Copyright infringement  
The analysis above would seem to indicate that the author or owner of a work that has been 
licensed using copyleft will find it difficult to sue subsequent users of the software down a 
distribution chain for contract breach. Yet, the question still remains on whether the author can 
sue for copyright infringement. The answer to this is much more straightforward than the 
contractual analysis.  
Using the same example cited above, let’s assume that A is the software owner and B is the 
copyleft licensee, and that B licenses the software to C using the GPL. C modifies the software 
and releases a proprietary version of it by closing the source code to subsequent users. Could A 
sue C for copyright infringement? The answer is a definitive yes, as copyright is less 
preoccupied with who licensed the software to C, but the emphasis would be whether or not C 
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is committing actions that would be considered as infringing A’s copyright. The question then 
would become one of infringement and originality, possibly hindering on the question of 
whether or not C has done enough work to the original source code to be considered an original 
work.  
This is a much better explored area of copyright law. Computer software is awarded copyright 
protection as a literary work if it is considered to be an original work.739 The question of 
originality has been long discussed by the courts, but there is agreement that an original work is 
one that demonstrates the use of skill and labour by the author, in short, “that it should originate 
from the author”740. Even though the originality requirement states that the work should not be 
copied in its entirety, courts have recognised that certain amount of copying is acceptable. For 
example, copying of the drawing of existing designs has been deemed to be original in some 
instances.741 When copying exists, the copying must fulfil the long standing qualitative test to 
determine whether the copying has been substantial.742  
In computer software, the courts have been following the general qualitative test in cases of 
copying from another work. In both Richardson Computers v Flanders743 and Ibcos v 
Barclays,744 the courts found that if there had been any copying from a protected original work, 
that there had to be an analysis of whether such copying had been substantial. It is important to 
stress that the test is for qualitative copying, not quantitative. There will be some consideration 
about the quantity of the work copied,745 but even if this is minimal it may result that the 
copying may be deemed to be substantial. This is evident in the case of Cantor v Tradition,746 
where copying of original source code took place from former employees of a financial services 
company. In this case, expert witnesses found that only 2% of the original source code had been 
copied, accounting for only 2,952 lines of code out 77,000.747 The lines of code were deemed to 
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be of importance for some modules in the resulting software, but the copying was not 
considered substantial to grant the infringement case, but was enough for the copier to agree to 
take financial responsibility for the infringed code and offer to pay for it. Nevertheless, the fact 
that some of the copying was even considered in the ruling must send signals to potential 
copiers of non-proprietary software about their chances in court.   
Given the state of the rulings in software copyright infringement, it appears that if a copyright 
author or owner can prove to a court that a proprietary copy of their original software has been 
infringed, then it will not matter just how they obtained the software, and it will certainly not 
matter if they are further down in a chain of distribution. If a programmer uses substantial 
sections of code belonging to a copyleft program, that programmer will still be subject to legal 
action by the author.  
2.3.2 Moral rights 
Moral rights could pose significant problems for the application of licences that allow the 
modification and adaptation of works, hence becoming more important to non-proprietary 
licences than it would appear at first glance. The reason for this is that most non-proprietary 
licences are drafted in the United States, where moral rights are not particularly observed 
because they tend to be alien to common law systems and, and are generally better applied in 
civil law traditions.748 Even the most ardent proponents of copyleft licences tend to recognise 
that there are possible problems with moral rights and non-proprietary licences. Talking 
specifically about the GPL, Eben Moglen admitted that “There are contexts where a subject in a 
moral rights system might change how the GPL is applied”.749  
It has already been mentioned in earlier chapters that moral rights are more prevalent in two 
forms the right to have the work attributed to the author (paternity) and the right to object to 
derogatory treatment (integrity). The right of integrity is the one that presents more problems to 
copyleft licences, but there may be problems with the paternity right in some jurisdictions. 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention specifies that “the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.” The implications to viral licences of the strict reading of Berne should be evident, 
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as authors maintain the right to object to certain modifications in countries that apply the 
Convention. This would mean that authors could object to adaptations of works licensed 
through copyleft licences, even if these adaptations are permitted in the licence. However, there 
is room to argue this point, particularly in software, as it is generally understood that moral 
rights have very limited application to software even in civil law systems, and they are generally 
considered to be invalid in software in the United States.750 Others have commented that there 
are doubts about the applicability of moral rights in digital environments751 because of the 
malleability of content, where as it would become extremely difficult to police the integrity 
right with a medium where changes are one click away.  
Regardless of the possible arguments against the use of moral rights in software, moral rights 
would still pose serious problems to other open access licences based on the copyleft model. An 
example of the problematic application of moral rights to open access licences can be seen in 
UK copyright law. In the UK, the moral right of paternity (or attribution) must be asserted.752 
Most open access and copyleft licences tend to emphasise on the right of attribution, such as the 
Creative Commons licences, and therefore they must contain the assertion, as it already does. 
However, in the UK the attribution right only applies to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works and films,753 which means that sound recordings and broadcasts are not subject to this 
right. This could affect open access licences that are used to protect such works.  
The moral right of integrity could also prove problematic in the UK. According to the CDPA, 
derogatory treatment is “distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author or director.”754 This wording seems incompatible with 
licences that allow adaptation of the original work because it would generate too many 
problems. What amounts to mutilation? Can an author really object to derogatory treatment if 
they implicitly allow adaptations of the work to be made by others? Does the licence constitute 
a waiver of this right? The CDPA specifies that the only right that needs to be asserted is the 
attribution right, while the right to integrity exists even without assertion. This would mean that 
all UK licences that do not want to provide an integrity right in the UK must contain a specific 
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waiver to make sure that the work is not protected by this moral right. There is a debate about 
whether moral rights can be waived at all,755 but fortunately, the CDPA allows it.756 
2.4 Competition law 
There is one final area that may provide validity problems for copyleft licences. Even though 
these licences do not impose obligations to third parties as the licence is passed to a single 
licensee at the time, it is less clear whether such restrictions could be considered anti-
competitive in accordance to European competition rules, as it could be found that the 
imposition of the copyleft clause, even if done on a one-to-one basis, could be found to be anti-
competitive.  
EC competition rules have a set of provisions that impose certain restrictions upon the passing 
of obligations through a distribution chain which may create anti-competitive restrictions on the 
recipient; this is evident in the regulation and implementation of competition law in the area of 
licensing and vertical agreements. Vertical agreements in the competition sense “are those 
entered into between undertakings whose relationship is complementary, such as manufacturer 
and distributor or licensor and licensee.”757 An example of a regulated vertical agreement is the 
existing set of restrictions in the area of technology transfer licensing, where a number of 
impositions down a distribution chain are blacklisted.758  
There is an ongoing debate about the seriousness of vertical agreements that impose restrictions 
through a distribution chain, as economists in the 1980s started seeing vertical restraints in a 
positive light759 despite some early emphasis by the European courts on clamping down on 
these types of agreements.760 The debate has continued, with the official position steadily 
moving towards a less restrictive approach towards vertical restrictions. In fact, a Green Paper 
by the European Commission found that:    
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“…distribution agreements raise special difficulties because they are usually 
something of a two-edged sword. They can be a useful way for a firm to 
penetrate a new market and to sell its products effectively. But they can also be 
used to prevent outsiders from entering a market, and so perpetuate the 
compartmentalization of the Community.”761 
National implementation of the European rules seems to vary as well. It has been generally 
commented that the UK has less strict application of vertical restrictions than the rest of Europe, 
with the emphasis being placed on whether there will be a sanction for such practices being 
placed upon undertakings with considerable market dominance that is used in detriment to the 
consumer.762 Having said this, licensors of copyleft software are not likely to posses the market 
share to be considered dominant by any stretch of the imagination. It is also very unlikely that 
these licences would be considered to impose a considerable damage to the consumer, as they 
always have the option to purchase non-copyleft software. Another important consideration is 
that copyleft licences do not fall into the four main types of vertical agreements listed by the 
European Commission in their Green Paper (exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing, 
selective distribution and franchising).763  
In this light, it seems unlikely that copyleft licences will be considered anti-competitive by the 
courts and regulators, but this is an area that demands closer scrutiny from future users of the 
GPL and regulators.   
More generally, this initial look at the problem of the validity of copyleft licences seems to 
indicate that these licences are valid in accordance to general European contractual principles.     
5. A drafter’s primer 
The problems with the validity of the GPL should serve as a warning to all of those who are 
willing to implement non-proprietary licences based on the copyleft ideology. Furthermore, the 
legal battle of SCO against IBM should also serve as a warning that the commercial interests at 
stake may drive proprietary developers and creators to challenge open access licences in court. 
One could envisage similar legal battles ensuing in areas such as biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals. One need only change the names Microsoft and SCO for Celera, Monsanto 
and Pfizer. 
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Drafters of open access licences should then be careful about the rights awarded, the type of 
intellectual property protected, the jurisdiction where the licences are more likely to be enforced 
upon, and the validity of the clauses involved. Creators and researchers in developing countries 
should be doubly careful about the blind adoption of licences that may prove to be invalid in 
their respective legal systems. This section explores some of the drafting decisions that authors, 
inventors and researchers should keep in mind, both in developed as in developing countries. 
5.1 Standardisation vs. customisation 
The first choice presented to authors or researchers that wants to distribute their work through 
an open licence should be whether to choose an existing standard licence, to adapt an existing 
one, or to draft and entirely new one. This choice is of uttermost importance, as the licence 
chosen will determine the level of protection awarded, the development philosophy, and it may 
even play a considerable part about the future adoption of a work by other developers. For 
example, Strasser points out that free software developers are remarkably reluctant to “pollute” 
their distributions with software that they do not consider to be free.764  
The problem with choice is the amount of ideological baggage that comes with each licence, as 
evidenced by the differences in definitions that have been discussed throughout this and last 
chapter. There are indeed some similarities in principles and ideals, but these tend to be lost 
amongst the extensive variety of licences available. Talking in particular about the diverse 
nature of software licences, Gomulkiewicz points out: 
There are four fundamental rights that an open source license needs to grant: 
First, access to source code; second, the right to run the software for any 
purpose; third, the right to change the software in any way; fourth, the right to 
redistribute the original software and any derivatives. However, these 
fundamental principles are where the consensus begins and ends.765 
Faced with a substantial array of licences and models from which to choose, creators may want 
to forego the allure of customisation and select an existing licence, possibly using the most 
visible and widely used one. Under this option, creative authors would choose one of the 
existing Creative Commons licences; software developers would choose the GPL, and science 
researchers would choose one of the Science Commons licences (when they are finally drafted). 
This option has the advantage that it allows the use of tried and tested licences that may have a 
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considerable better chance of standing up in court if challenged. On the other hand, the use of a 
single distribution model may generate a monoculture that would be vulnerable if the licence is 
defeated in court after a challenge. One only needs to imagine what would happen to the free 
software movement if the GPL receives a negative review in court as a result of the SCO case. 
The standardisation of licences also has the problem that existing licences may not fully 
accommodate the requirements of a specific area of research, or they may not serve the 
purposes of the individual author or organisation. This could result in important rights being 
overlooked for the sake of the ease of use.  
The way to overcome the potential problems of standardisation is through minor customisation 
of existing licences to accommodate specific needs. This can be achieved by picking and 
choosing clauses and licences found in different projects and incorporate them into a modified 
end-product. Customisation has proved successful in the software development arena, 
particularly in the open source movement. Customisation is achieved by an organisation that 
drafts a set of principles and definitions that must be adhered to by licences in one area of study 
– such as is the case with the Open Source Definition. The licences that adhere to these 
principles are provided with a certification. This approach is also seen in open access efforts, 
with the Berlin Declaration and the BOAI both providing minimal standard definitions.  
However, minor customisation displays a number of problems. The main complication is lack 
of knowledge and misunderstanding, as the person adapting the licence should truly understand 
the different rights and options involved.766 Ideally this should be performed by legal 
professionals, but this may not be possible all the time because of lack of resources, particularly 
in small projects. This could be solved through the use of the internet in order to exploit the 
knowledge of the open access community and gain from the experience of other developers in 
the same area – internet weblogs767 and mailing lists are especially useful to achieve this 
objective.  
Another problem with customisation is that it generates licences that may not be compatible 
with one another. This would generally pose no problem; after all proprietary software 
companies release their software using their own licences all the time. However, open licences 
are different, particularly ones that have a copyleft or a share-alike clause. Copyleft clauses 
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require that the licences are compatible, or even that the same licence is used. There is a clear 
danger that some areas of intellectual endeavour could become incestuous or ghettoised licence 
environments because derivative works and adaptations would be forced to use similar licences 
to the works that originated them.    
Despite all of the problems enumerated, a middle ground between standardisation and 
customisation is possible through the use of online technology. Radin explains that “... 
customization of terms and conditions is possible. Instead of a take-it-or-leave-it set of fine print 
terms, a website could offer a menu of choices for various clauses, and the user could check 
boxes for which ones were desired.”768 
There is a rarer and bolder approach.  One can forego standards and modifications and create a 
fully new licence. This is riskier because breaking new ground is not easy, but this is precisely 
how new ideas take place. The GPL is perhaps the best example of this approach. However, this 
should be the last resort, and should only be undertaken by people who are extremely capable in 
their fields of endeavour, and that have a basic understanding of licences.      
5.2 International vs. national  
The second choice for creators and researchers in the open access movement is closely related 
to the standardisation dichotomy. There cannot be any doubt that the open access phenomenon 
is now a global one, therefore developers should think carefully about choosing licences that are 
written with American copyright law in mind.   
A large portion of the most widely used non-proprietary licences are generally designed for the 
American legal system, such as CC licences and the GPL. This could eventually pose problems 
for their applicability and validity in other jurisdictions, as the analysis of the GPL in the 
previous section has underlined. The possible areas of conflict between licences are too many to 
mention, and they are obviously unique to each jurisdiction. Some possible conflicts between 
copyleft clauses and European contract and competition law have also been explored, but other 
areas remain.  
One of the main areas of conflict is with regards to the consumer laws, which are areas that tend 
to provide marked differences between jurisdictions depending on the balance of interests 
protected. Some jurisdictions prefer legalistic and bureaucratic approach to consumer laws, 
while others tend to provide significant protection to consumers. An example can be found in 
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UK and European law, where consumer protection regulations require that licences should be 
written in “plain intelligible language”769 This could spell trouble for clunky and verbose 
licences filled with complicated legal terms, in particular licences like the GPL.  
The other main area of concern for those choosing to use generic licences is the issue of moral 
rights, as evidenced by the argument presented in previous sections. The wide divergence in the 
application of moral rights between civil and common law legal systems presents the main 
stumbling block to the application of generic open access licences, particularly those that have 
been drafted in the United States. Licences such as the GPL and the CC licences tend to include 
only attribution rights, but ignore completely the integrity moral rights. This could prove to be 
dangerous in jurisdictions where the integrity right is applied more forcefully than in the UK 
and the US, such as Germany and France.770 Countries with strong moral rights traditions will 
probably have to draft their own licences instead of having to use the American generic ones. 
This is already taking place, for example, a group of French legal experts have drafted their own 
version of the GPL with special concern to moral rights clauses.771   
The careful implementation of the open access licences model with adjustments for each 
country involved constitutes a serious option for creators. There are already adapted versions of 
the Creative Commons licences for Brazil, Finland, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands, with 
many other countries drafting their own adaptations under the auspices of the CC 
organisation.772 However, this may result in some unwanted fragmentation of licences, 
returning us to the standardisation debate. Talking about the iCommons UK licence 
implementation, internet activist Cory Doctorow points out that: 
“Creators will have to decide if they want to grant the UK freedoms or the US 
freedoms -- which means that a creator in the US might choose a UK license or 
vice-versa: we're trying to simplify the licensing process, not complexify it, and 
100 different national implementations of the CC license invites a combinatorial 
explosion of license confusion.”773 
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Another argument against the internationalisation of existing licences is the fact that many 
companies already produce intellectual products in one country and distribute them 
internationally with the same licence that they applied in the jurisdiction of origin – a typical 
example is Microsoft. While this objection is factually accurate, it must be remembered that 
proprietary licences are designed to operate in an entirely different distribution model. 
Proprietary licences are generally quite simple; they protect the software and grant some limited 
rights to the user.774 On the other hand, the open access licensing model generally involves very 
complex legal relationships, as evidenced by the validity analysis described above. Many 
concepts are new and have not been tested in court – such as copyleft clauses – and getting the 
licence right is vital. It is also important to think about locality, because open access generally 
involves individual creators and developers who do not have the resources to enforce their work 
around the world. Large proprietary companies have access to a network of local firms around 
the world, and the resources to use them. They have the power, and the money to implement 
their licences.  
Internationalisation is very important for developing countries, as open licences should be able 
to withstand scrutiny in each jurisdiction because it is likely that some may be challenged by 
proprietary companies. This would require legal experts in each country to draft new licences, 
or to ascertain the validity of existing ones in each jurisdiction. 
5.3 Specific clauses 
All of the points mentioned in the last two sub-sections should be considered while choosing 
whether to adapt an existing licence or using a standard form. However, if the decision is to 
customise, then drafters should be aware of the existing perils of each of the clauses that are 
generally used in the non-proprietary system. New licence drafters have to look for licence 
options that follow the open access ethos described model, but they must be able to adapt the 
common clauses to fit their specific needs. The following clauses should be taken into 
consideration by the drafters of these licences: 
a) Back to basics. The licence must be always clear about what intellectual property rights are 
protected; what is its subject matter; who owns the rights, what development model is sought; 
what philosophy fits that development; and what will be the likely opposition to the licence. 
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Stakeholders should always ask these questions before undertaking any licensing exercise, and 
they should also look at existing standard licences for inspiration.      
b) Moral rights. While moral rights are generally more prevalent in civil law systems, special 
care should be taken in order to ensure that the proposed clauses comply with their 
application.775 The licence should consider whether to assume their existence, or to make it an 
essential part of the licence. For example, some jurisdictions require moral right clauses to be 
specified or asserted in the licence, while others assume their existence. 
c) What rights are being granted? Copyright law gives authors a wide variety of rights, which 
may vary from one country to another. For example, UK copyright law gives authors the right 
to copy, distribute, adapt, perform, and broadcast works, amongst others.776 Careful thought 
should go towards thinking which rights should be granted and that these rights are in 
accordance with local copyright law. Some specific regimes may apply to derivative works, 
adaptations and translations.  
d) Commerciality. Some licences object to the distribution and creation of derivative works 
based on the original work if it is going to be used or distributed for commercial purposes. If a 
similar clause is going to be included in the licence, then there should be a strict definition of 
what is meant by commercial. A useful distinction may be made between proprietary and 
commercial use.   
e) Spreading the licence by viral means. Copyleft licences contain a viral clause that specifies 
that derivative works should use the same licence as the original. This is a very difficult legal 
subject; as such clauses may prove to be unconscionable in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
some of these licences may run contrary to traditional contract law, as it may be difficult for the 
original author to try to enforce the licence further down a chain of derivative works. Drafters of 
new licences should keep in mind that viral clauses may be objected to in their local 
jurisdictions.  
f) Support and liability. Drafters should pay some thought to the possible liabilities arising 
from the work. Most American open licences contain disclaimers of liability and admonitions 
that the work that is licensed is not supported and is not offered under warranty. There is a 
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growing trend in consumer and contract law to consider broad exclusion clauses as 
unconscionable.777   
g) Other IPRs? As discussed earlier, open licensing models may not translate well into other 
intellectual property regimes, particularly software. Although most non-proprietary licences in 
existence are designed with copyright in mind, some thought should go towards creating 
licences in intellectual works protected by other types of intellectual property, such as patents. 
This may prove difficult given the vast difference in registration and enforcement between both 
systems, but if works are already protected and registered, then specific non-proprietary will 
have to be drafted. .  
These are just some initial considerations for future licence drafters around the world. However, 
a final recommendation should be directed to potential licensors in developing countries – and 
to those interested in allowing the transfer of open technology to poor nations. There is dire 
need of more projects that tackle the transfer of technology in the natural sciences, as most open 
access and open content projects are presently geared towards the distribution of cultural works 
and educational works, and not towards the distribution of technological resources. Although 
the conservation of cultural content is a worthy cause, it is not what is needed at present in 
developing countries. The absence of a patent-specific licence demonstrates this problem, as the 
amount of useful technologies protected by copyright is limited. These criticisms may appear 
harsh when the educational uses of open technology are obvious; but more work is required to 
ensure adequate technology transfer open licences.    
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Conclusion 
“If you want to know your past, look into your present conditions. If you want to 
know your future, look into your present actions.” 
Buddhist saying 
 
The problem of the transfer of technology to developing countries is essentially a topic that 
deals with innovation, imitation and trade. Technology is being created all the time, but true 
innovative leaps are few and far between. Most innovation results from the reshaping and 
improvement of existing technology, which makes technological endeavour a matter of access 
to existing innovations. One of the results of the nature and characteristics of technological 
development is that access restrictions to the initial innovative technology will lead to fewer 
future advances. Another corollary from the cumulative nature of technological advancement is 
that technologies become more complex as time goes by, and therefore the amount of research 
and development required to produce innovations becomes higher as well.  
As innovation becomes more expensive, there is more of an incentive to copy and imitate 
technology that has already been developed by those with the resources to achieve it. This 
imitation could take three different shapes: it could be purchased directly from the owner of the 
technology; it could be adopted once it has become non-proprietary; or it could be subject to 
reverse-engineering and used without the owner’s permission.  
Developing countries find themselves in different stages of this imitation trilemma. At the 
present time, most valuable proprietary technology must be acquired from the owners through 
licences. The second option is to wait for the technology to lose its intellectual property 
protection, which may prove to be a good option for low-technologies. However, most of the 
higher technology sought by developing countries may be required immediately in order to 
accelerate the development process. Therefore, waiting for it to become available is often not a 
viable alternative.  
Some nations have reached a stage of development that allows them to imitate technologies 
from developed nations – for example, Brazil and India can imitate pharmaceutical technology 
at present with a large level of success. As a response to the growing imitative capabilities of 
some developing countries, industrialised nations have been pushing for a stronger international 
intellectual property regime; a trend that attempts to ensure that technology is acquired through 
some form of monetary purchase in the shape of licensing agreements. This is achieved through 
the enactment of trade agreements that regulate the transfer of knowledge, such as TRIPS.   
  
Under present circumstances, the transfer of technology becomes an issue of international trade, 
in which there is a flow of advanced technology to those developing nations that can afford it. 
At the same time, the knowledge possessed by developing nations is held in low esteem, or is 
not subject to intellectual property protection and therefore holds little bargaining value within 
these international relations. 
There may be some possible solutions to the technology trading deficit. One solution is a top-
down approach in which governments negotiate new international agreements – or amend 
existing ones – that provide a framework for ensuring the transfer of technology to developing 
countries, or even give them leeway to imitate proprietary knowledge. This is already taking 
place in the area of access to essential medicines with efforts by the WTO to ensure some 
flexibility in the application of trade restrictions for pharmaceuticals. However, more should be 
done in this respect because technology transfer provisions in existing agreements and treaties 
have proven to be insufficient to encourage increased flow of information. Ideally, the top-down 
approach should be followed by capacity-building within developing countries. This can be 
encouraged through education and the use of ICTs to acquire the knowledge that will translate 
into indigenous innovation. This is a long-term solution because education is an investment in 
the future.  
A more likely approach is to encourage the creation of a common pool of knowledge where 
people from around the world can share ideas and technology. The creation of a common space 
will have the benefit that the flows of technology that have been the source of so many 
problems would eventually become irrelevant. With the creation of open access to information, 
technology that has been conceived in Germany can be copied and implemented in Haiti; and 
knowledge originating from Brazil can be used in Japan.  
The easiest way in which this common space can be created is by releasing the information into 
the public domain and relinquishing all ownership claims to it. This approach is already taking 
place, especially in biotechnology research. However, the release of information into the public 
domain can have some negative effects. There is a chance that this information will eventually 
be appropriated by proprietary interests and then “closed”, commodified, and commercialised. 
This would mean that further access to the information could become compromised. To avoid 
this, the common space requires some form of protection against abuse and misuse.     
The experience of open source or free software technologies has offered a legal mechanism to 
control the access to the common space. Open licences could serve as a legal deterrent to those 
  
who would like to take that information, repackage it and make it proprietary. If we think of 
intellectual property as a fence, the non-proprietary model would work best by placing the fence 
around the information, yet leaving the gate open. The licence could be understood as the 
gatekeeper. If somebody tries to get that information with a view to shutting the gate behind 
them, the gate-keeper could shut the gate first and deny access. In other words, the licence 
would prevent such rustling. The open licence model has several advantages over the top-down 
approach. It is cheap to implement, it does not require lobbying of officials and legislators to 
obtain some small concessions. Most importantly, open licensing can be adopted immediately.  
There should still be caution with the implementation of the open licensing philosophy. Firstly, 
the development model exemplified by the open source software movement has only proven to 
be successful in the area of computer programming; and it may not be easy to port into 
scientific research. Secondly, there is a significant risk of a backlash from commercial and 
proprietary developers, which could be translated into lengthy and expensive legal suits. 
Thirdly, there is a lack of licences at present to protect scientific research using the open access 
philosophy, which could result in the creation of a copyright-only common space.  
A final warning should be that one could argue that the open model encourages the distribution 
of low-quality intellectual works, while all the quality materials are offered commercially. This 
would mean that the common space would consist only of defective software, badly written 
poetry, niche market music and holiday photos. The efforts of the open access journal 
movement could help to avoid this scenario. Peer-review will still be necessary in the common 
space. 
Non-proprietary models and open access are still the way of the future for many developing 
countries. They can help to alleviate immediate problems, such as the digital divide and access 
to affordable and stable software solutions for education. But the potential benefits have not 
been met yet. Open content, open biotechnologies and open medicines are yet to prove their 
promise. The time to implement these ideas fully has finally arrived.  
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